No change in the Russian Caucasus. The Winter Olympics amid a local war. OSW Study 47/2014 by Gorecki, Wojciech
N O  C H A N G E  I N  T H E  R U S S I A N  
C A U C A S U S
T H E  W I N T E R  O L Y M P I C S  A M I D  A  L O C A L  W A R
W o j c i e c h  G ó r e c k i
4 7
NO CHANGE IN THE RUSSIAN 
CAUCASUS 
THE WINTER OLYMPICS AMID A LOCAL WAR
Wojciech Górecki
NUMBER 47
WARSAW
JANUARY 2014
© Copyright by Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich
im. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies
CONTENT EDITORS
Adam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak
EDITOR
Anna Łabuszewska
CO-OPERATION
Katarzyna Kazimierska
TRANSLATION
OSW
CO-OPERATION
Nicholas Furnival
GRAPHIC DESIGN 
PARA-BUCH
PHOTOGRAPH ON COVER
Wojciech Górecki (painting by Alexander Novoselov, from the collection  
of the Akhmad Kadyrov Museum in Grozny)
DTP
GroupMedia
MAP
Wojciech Mańkowski
PUBLISHER
Ośrodek Studiów Wschodnich im. Marka Karpia 
Centre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, Poland
Phone + 48 /22/ 525 80 00
Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40
osw.waw.pl
ISBN 978-83-62936-39-7
Contents
KEY POINTS  /5
INTrOduCTION /8
I. ThE gEOgraPhICal aNd hISTOrICal CONTExT /9
II. ThE CIvIl war /13
1. Parties to the conflict and their aims /13
2. The Caucasus Emirate /15
2.1. Origins /15
2.2. Structures /18
2.3. Evolving tactics /20
3. Federal and local security forces /25
4. Consequences for the region /26
III. SITuaTION IN ThE NOrTh CauCaSuS SubjECTS  
OF ThE ruSSIaN FEdEraTION /29
IV. ThE rOlE OF azErbaIjaN aNd gEOrgIa /49
V. CulTural aNd CIvIlISaTIONal ChaNgES /53
VI. ThE NOrTh CauCaSuS IN MOSCOw’S POlICIES /58
1. Strategies towards the region /58
2. Operation Sochi 2014 /63
VII. CONCluSIONS aNd TENTaTIvE FOrECaST:  
ruSSIa wIThOuT ThE CauCaSuS? /67
aPPENdICES  /74
MaP  /78
5O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
/2
01
4
KEY POINTS
•	 The	North	Caucasus	remains	the	most	volatile	region	in	the	Russian	Fed-
eration,	and	there	is	nothing	to	suggest	that	the	situation	could	change	over	
the	next	few	years.	With	the	very	high	level	of	violence	(clashes	with	the	
armed	Islamic	underground	and	acts	of	terror	claim	700–750	casualties	on	
average	yearly)	the	region	may	justifiably	be	considered	to	be	in	a	state	of	
civil	war.	Underlying	the	conflict	is	a	clash	between	two	opposing	visions	
for	 the	North	 Caucasus	 as	 either	 a	 confessional	 (Salafi	 Islamic)	 republic	
independent	of	Moscow,	or	as	a	region	that	remains	part	of	Russia	while	
maintaining	its	separate,	specific	character	with	a	major	role	for	tradition-
al	Islam.	These	two	visions	are	represented	by	the	two	sides	of	the	conflict:	
the	Caucasus	Emirate,	 a	decentralised	 terror	organisation	established	 in	
2007;	 and	 the	 secular	 regimes	 in	 power	 in	 the	 individual	 North	 Cauca-
sus	republics,	backed	by	the	local	and	federal	security	forces	(FSB	and	the	
structures	of	the	Interior	Ministry).	At	the	beginning	of	the	present	decade	
(around	2011),	the	character	of	the	civil	war	changed	from	‘total’,	affecting	
the	entire	population	in	varying	degrees,	to	‘selective’,	involving	only	the	
militants	and	the	security	forces.	This	development	has	led	to	a	decline	in	
the	number	of	civilian	casualties.
•	 In	 cultural	 terms,	 the	 North	 Caucasus	 has	 been	 drifting	 ever	 further	
away	from	the	rest	of	Russia.	One	of	the	most	significant	processes	in	the	
region	concerns	its	Islamisation,	with	both	currents	of	Islam	gaining	ever	
larger	numbers	of	adherents.	The	process	of	de-modernisation	is	also	im-
portant,	i.e.	the	revival	of	traditional	social	institutions	that	existed	be-
fore	 these	 lands	were	 incorporated	 into	Russia.	Finally	a	process	of	de-
Russification	is	visible,	whereby	the	Caucasus	languages	are	pushing	out	
Russian	and	 the	knowledge	of	Russian	 is	declining.	There	 is	 a	 growing	
sense	of	mutual	alienation	between	the	North	Caucasus	and	the	rest	of	
Russia,	 visible	 in	 the	findings	 of	 sociological	 surveys,	which	 show	 that	
more	than	50	per	cent	of	Russians	would	accept	the	secession	of	Chechnya	
from	the	Russian	Federation.
•	 The	processes	mentioned	above	have	been	felt	in	the	entire	region.	None-
theless,	the	dynamics	of	developments	vary	between	the	North	Caucasus	
republics.	For	example,	in	Dagestan,	a	country	marked	by	high	diversity,	
there	are	many	internal	actors	(apart	from	the	armed	Islamic	underground	
and	 the	 local	 governments	 there	 are	 also	 criminal	 business	 groups,	 na-
tional	movement	elites	and	groups	centred	around	religious	leaders)	who	
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maintain	a	dynamic	balance	among	themselves.	The	most	important	social	
change	to	have	 taken	place	 in	Chechnya	concerns	 the	erosion	of	 the	 tra-
ditional	role	of	clans	and	the	gradual	development	of	a	modern	nation.	In	
Ingushetia,	however,	the	clan	structure	persists,	but	the	country	has	po-
litical	opposition,	something	Ramzan	Kadyrov	has	managed	to	eliminate	
in	Chechnya.
•	 For	 Moscow,	 the	 North	 Caucasus	 is	 important	 mainly	 as	 a	 border	 area	
where	important	transport	routes	are	located.	A	further	escalation	of	the	
situation	in	the	region	would	pose	a	risk	to	the	security	of	this	infrastruc-
ture.	Moreover,	if	Russia	wishes	to	maintain	its	influence	in	Georgia,	Azer-
baijan	and	Armenia	it	must	ensure	it	retains	effective	control	of	the	North	
Caucasus.	There	is	also	the	phenomenon	wherein	instability	gets	‘export-
ed’	beyond	the	North	Caucasus,	with	attacks	carried	out	by	the	Caucasus	
Emirate	 in	 central	 Russia	 (for	 example	 in	 the	Moscow	metro	 in	 2010	 or	
Moscow	Domodedovo	airport	in	2011).	Meanwhile,	the	rise	in	the	number	
of	migrants	from	the	North	Caucasus	in	Russian	cities	has	been	generating	
ethnic	clashes,	increasingly	often	taking	the	form	of	riots	(most	recently	in	
Moscow	in	October	2013).
•	 In	the	short	term,	the	absolute	priority	for	the	Kremlin	is	to	ensure	secu-
rity	for	the	Olympic	Games	in	Sochi.	In	the	run-up	to	the	Games,	Moscow	
has	been	avoiding	any	measures	that	could	escalate	tensions.	Any	attack	
just	before	or	during	the	Games,	in	Sochi	or	in	its	surrounding	area,	would	
be	a	blow	to	the	prestige	of	the	Russian	state	and	of	President	Vladimir	Pu-
tin	personally.	While	the	Emirate	has	not	attacked	any	targets	beyond	the	
region	since	January	2011,	a	change	of	this	policy	should	not	be	ruled	out,	
since	the	militants	have	threatened	to	attempt	to	disrupt	the	Games	(which	
start	on	7	February	2014).	The	attack	on	a	bus	in	Volgograd	on	21	October	
2013	might	be	the	first	act	of	violence	ending	the	long	hiatus.
•	 In	the	longer	term,	the	greatest	threat	to	the	region’s	stability,	apart	from	
the	activities	of	the	Emirate,	will	come	from	the	ambitions	of	the	Chechen	
leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov,	whose	aim	is	to	establish	control	first	of	Ingushe-
tia,	and	then	of	at	least	a	part	of	Dagestan.	In	Chechnya,	Kadyrov’s	power	is	
almost	unlimited	and,	despite	his	declarations	of	loyalty	to	Moscow	(which	
is	financing	his	government),	the	Chechen	leader	is	practically	more	inde-
pendent	of	Russia	than	the	separatist	leaders	Dzhokhar	Dudayev	and	Aslan	
Maskhadov	were	 in	 the	 past.	Kadyrov	has	 been	 legitimising	his	 rule	 by	
references	to	traditionalist	(Sufi)	Islam,	while	introducing	some	elements	
7O
SW
 S
TU
D
IE
S 
 1
/2
01
4
of	sharia	 into	 the	 local	 legislation;	he	has,	however,	 taken	action	against	
Salafi	Islam.
•	 The	North	Caucasus	 is	 the	poorest	region	of	Russia,	with	 the	highest	re-
corded	unemployment	and	 the	 lowest	 incomes.	The	 role	of	 the	economic	
factor	in	social	and	political	instability	seems,	though,	to	be	limited	and	of	
secondary	importance.	The	North	Caucasus	societies	are	in	reality	much	
wealthier	than	the	statistics	would	suggest,	due	to	a	well-developed	grey	
economy	as	well	as	high	levels	of	economic	migration	and	the	remittances	
provided	by	 those	working	 in	central	Russia	 to	 family	members	who	re-
main	in	the	region.
•	 Moscow	has	not	yet	worked	out	any	coherent	strategy	for	the	development	of	
the	region.	Its	policy	towards	the	North	Caucasus	has	evolved	from	the	use	of	
force	to	‘economic’	solutions	(involving	transfers	of	large	sums	of	money	for	
various	development	programmes).	The	funds	are	not	being	spent	effectively	
and	increase	the	levels	of	criminality	in	the	local	economies.	They	do,	never-
theless,	buy	the	loyalty	of	the	local	elites	and	reinforce	the	local	particular-
isms,	making	the	region	easier	to	manage	in	line	with	the	principle	of	divide	
and	rule.	Moscow	appears	not	to	have	decided	yet	whether	to	integrate	the	
North	Caucasus	into	the	rest	of	the	Federation,	or	to	isolate	it,	accepting	the	
existence	of	an	informal	‘internal	abroad’	within	Russia.
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INTrOducTION
The	present	paper	is	neither	a	full	monographic	study	of	the	region,	nor	a	de-
scription	of	the	preparations	for	the	Winter	Olympics	in	Sochi.	Its	purpose	is	
to	present	the	situation	in	the	North	Caucasus,	with	special	focus	on	those	as-
pects	which,	in	the	author’s	opinion,	may	directly	or	indirectly	influence	the	
security	of	the	Games	or	play	an	important	role	in	developments	in	the	region	
in	the	coming	years.	The	paper	discusses:	the	activities	of	the	Caucasus	Emir-
ate	(potentially	the	greatest	threat	to	the	security	of	the	Games),	the	dynam-
ics	of	developments	in	the	individual	republics,	and	the	impact	of	Georgia	and	
Azerbaijan	on	the	region.	The	activities	of	the	Chechen	leader	Ramzan	Kady-
rov,	undoubtedly	the	most	influential	politician	in	the	North	Caucasus,	with	
ambitions	to	control	the	neighbouring	republics,	are	also	discussed	in	detail.	
The	two	final	chapters	are	devoted	to	cultural	and	civilizational	changes	in	the	
region	and	the	strategies	that	Moscow	has	been	adopting	in	dealing	with	them.	
The	paper	ends	with	a	conclusion	and	an	attempt	at	a	forecast.	
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I. ThE gEOgraPhIcal aNd hISTOrIcal cONTExT
The	North	Caucasus	 is	defined	 in	various	ways	 in	 the	 literature,	with	 some	
definitions	proposing	a	broader	understanding	of	the	region,	and	others	nar-
rowing	down	its	scope.	For	the	purposes	of	the	present	paper,	a	rather	broad	
definition	of	the	region	has	been	adopted,	which	includes	the	Caucasus	fore-
land	(Ciscaucasia).	It	comprises	ten	administrative	units	(subjects)	of	the	Rus-
sian	Federation,	including	seven	republics	(from	west	to	east	these	are:	Ady-
gea,	 Karachay-Cherkessia,	 Kabardino-Balkaria,	 North	 Ossetia,	 Ingushetia,	
Chechnya	and	Dagestan),	two	krais	(Krasnodar	and	Stavropol)	and	one	oblast	
(Rostov	Oblast,	with	the	capital	 in	Rostov-on-Don).1	 It	spans	an	area	of	more	
than	 350,ooo	 km2	 (around	 2%	 of	 Russia’s	 territory),	 and	 has	 a	 population	 of	
nearly	20	million	people	(around	13.6%	of	Russia’s	total	population).
The	lands	of	the	North	Caucasus	are	located	in	two	federal	districts:2	the	North	
Caucasus	Federal	District,	which	 includes	six	of	 the	republics	 (without	Ady-
gea)	and	Stavropol	Krai,	and	the	Southern	Federal	District,	with	Adygea,	Kras-
nodar	Krai	(where	Sochi	is	situated)	and	Rostov	Oblast,	as	well	as	three	other	
subjects	of	the	Russian	Federation.	The	North	Caucasus	Federal	District	was	
separated	from	the	Southern	Federal	District	 in	2010.	One	of	the	reasons	for	
this	was	 to	 symbolically	 separate	 the	Olympic	 town	of	Sochi	 from	 the	most	
volatile	republics	of	the	North-East	Caucasus.3
These	divisions	in	the	region	along	administrative-territorial	lines	reflect	its	
high	ethnic	and	linguistic	diversity.	In	Ciscaucasia	(Rostov	Oblast	and	the	two	
krais)	Slavs	(mostly	Russians	but	also	Ukrainians,	often	of	Cossack	origin)	are	
the	dominant	ethnic	group,	while	the	North-West	Caucasus	 is	mainly	popu-
lated	by	the	Caucasian	peoples	from	the	Circassian	group	(Adyghes,	Cherkess,	
Kabardin),	and	the	North	East	Caucasus	by	peoples	from	the	Vainakh4-Dagest-
ani	group	(Ingush,	Chechens	and	Avars,	Dargwa,	Lezgians,	Laks,	Tabasarans	
1	 In	the	narrower	meaning,	the	region	only	includes	the	republics	(sometimes	even	without	
Adygea),	while	the	broadest	definition	includes	Kalmykia,	and	in	some	cases	even	the	Vol-
gograd	and	Astrakhan	Oblasts.
2	 Created	in	2000,	the	federal	districts	are	not	a	tier	of	the	administrative-territorial	divi-
sion	of	the	country	but	more	closely	resemble	military	or	economic	districts.	Each	federal	
district	is	a	grouping	of	several	to	more	than	ten	federation	subjects,	governed	by	a	presi-
dential	plenipotentiary	representative.
3	 This	move	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	chapter	on	Moscow’s	strategies	towards	
the	region.
4	 Vainakhs	is	a	name	denoting	the	Ingush	and	the	Chechens.
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and	others).	Turkic	nations	including	Balkars	and	Karachays	as	well	as	Nogais	
and	Kumyks	are	also	present.	The	Ossetians,	who	are	an	Iranian	people,	belong	
to	the	Indo-Europeans,	like	the	Slavs.
With	the	exception	of	Ciscaucasia,	the	North	Caucasus	was	incorporated	into	
Russia	only	 in	the	second	half	of	 the	19th	century,	several	decades	 later	 than	
the	lands	of	today’s	Georgia,	Armenia	and	Azerbaijan.	This	was	due	to	strong	
resistance	 from	the	highlanders.	The	conquest	of	 the	eastern	part	of	 the	re-
gion	was	completed	in	1859	with	the	capture	of	Imam	Shamil.	In	the	following	
decades	the	Russians	limited	themselves	to	controlling	transport	routes	there	
and	combating	insurgencies.	They	did	not	interfere	with	the	internal	affairs	
of	 the	 local	 communities	 in	Dagestan,	Chechnya	or	 Ingushetia,	nor	did	 they	
draft	the	highlanders	 into	the	army	or	spread	Orthodox	Christianity,	which	
contributed	to	the	petrification	of	the	traditional	social	order	and	allowed	Is-
lam	to	maintain	its	dominant	role.	The	conquest	of	the	North-West	Caucasus	
ended	in	1864,	the	year	which	marked	the	end	of	the	entire	Caucasian	Wars	
period.5	A	large	proportion	of	the	surviving	natives	(especially	the	Circassians)	
then	had	to	flee	to	the	territory	of	the	Ottoman	Empire.	The	emigrants	started	
the	Circassian	diaspora,	which	today	is	scattered	all	around	the	world,	and	the	
abandoned	lands	were	populated	by	Slavic	peoples,	as	a	result	of	which	their	
ethnic	make-up	and	religious	relations	changed	over	time.	The	effects	of	the	
policy	pursued	at	that	time	towards	the	two	parts	of	the	region	are	still	visible	
today,	for	example	in	the	proportion	of	Russians	in	the	total	population	of	the	
different	republics	(the	further	east,	the	smaller	the	proportion)	or	in	the	level	
of	religious	practice	(diminishing	from	east	to	west).
Following	 the	 fall	of	 the	short-lived	Mountainous	Republic	 (1917–1919)	estab-
lished	in	the	North	Caucasus	as	the	power	of	the	central	government	in	Russia	
waned	(monarchy	overthrown,	the	civil	war	in	Russia),	the	Bolsheviks	created	
a	number	of	ethnic-territorial	units	in	the	region	which,	on	the	one	hand,	of-
fered	the	native	ethnic	groups	of	the	North	Caucasus	a	form	of	statehood,	but	
on	the	other,	created	artificial	divisions	which	undermined	their	sense	of	pan-
Caucasian	unity,	which	was	strong	among	the	highlanders,	despite	numerous	
differences	between	the	various	groups	(divide et impera,	or	divide	and	rule).	
5	 The	victory	parade	was	held	on	12	May	1864	in	Krasnaya	Polyana	near	Sochi,	where	some	of	
the	sporting	events	will	take	place	during	the	Games.	Some	of	the	Circassian	communities	
abroad	consider	this	to	be	a	desecration	of	a	cemetery	of	the	highlanders	who	died	fighting	
in	that	area,	especially	since	the	Olympic	year	also	marks	the	150th	anniversary	of	the	con-
quest	of	the	North	Caucasus.
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The	breaking	up	of	 the	Circassian	ethnos	 (proper	name:	Adyghe)	 into	 three	
groups	is	a	case	in	point:	it	was	intended	to	lead	over	time	to	the	formation	of	
three	small	nations	 in	the	place	of	one	as	a	result	of	deepening	ethnograph-
ic	 and	 linguistic	 differences.	 Three	 territorial	 units,	 i.e.	 Adygea,	 Karachay-
-Cherkessia	and	Kabardino-Balkaria,	were	established	in	the	Circassian	lands,	
and	in	addition	the	Circassians	had	to	share	two	of	them	with	the	Caucasian	
Turks,	a	people	 that	was	also	split	between	 two	different	units	 (a	single	Ka-
rachay-Balkarian	language	exists	to	this	day).	The	shape	of	the	administrative	
borders	(and	the	resulting	claims	about	what	belongs	to	whom)	became	one	of	
the	main	conflict-generating	factors	in	the	North	Caucasus	after	the	break-up	
of	the	USSR.6
Since	the	beginning	of	the	1990s,	the	North	Caucasus	has	been	the	most	un-
stable	region	of	the	Russian	Federation	(and	along	with	the	South	Caucasus	–	
of	the	entire	post-Soviet	area).	Conflicts	in	the	area	initially	concerned	ethnic	
and	political	issues	(e.g.	the	Ingush-Ossetian	war	over	the	so-called	“Prigorod-
ny	District”	in	the	autumn	of	1992,	or	Chechen	separatism,	which	became	one	
of	the	main	reasons	for	Russia’s	military	intervention,	and	the	first	Chechen	
War	of	1994–1996.7	After	radical	Salafi	Islam	emerged	in	the	region	in	the	mid-
1990s	and	gained	importance	at	the	turn	of	the	decade,	it	gradually	became	the	
source	of	centrifugal	tendencies,	for	which	it	provided	an	ideological	ration-
ale.	 During	 the	 second	 Chechen	War	 (1999–2009,	 regular	 armed	 operations	
to	2000),	 the	Chechen	fight	 for	national	 independence	evolved	 into	a	Cauca-
sian	Jihad,	which	manifested	itself	in	the	replacement	of	the	structures	of	the	
unrecognised	Chechen	Republic	of	 Ichkeria	by	the	Caucasus	Emirate,	which	
6	 The	situation	was	further	complicated	by	the	fact	that	in	the	1920s–1950s	the	administrative	
divisions	of	 the	North	Caucasus	were	reorganised	on	several	occasions,	 inter alia	 in	con-
nection	with	the	deportations	of	the	four	nations	–	the	Chechens,	the	Ingush,	the	Balkars	
and	the	Karachays	–	to	Central	Asia	during	World	War	II	and	their	return	to	the	Caucasus	
after	Stalin’s	death	(after	the	deportation,	the	administrative	units	corresponding	to	those	
nations	were	dismantled,	and	subsequently	restored,	but	with	slightly	different	borders).	
After	the	collapse	of	the	USSR	the	two	original	autonomous	districts	(Adygea	in	Krasnodar	
Krai	and	Karachay-Cherkessia	in	Stavropol	Krai)	became	republics,	and	Chechen-Ingushe-
tia	was	split	into	two	parts.	In	the	aftermath	of	the	break-up	of	the	USSR	some	nations	found	
themselves	living	in	two	separate	states:	the	Ossetians	in	Russia	and	Georgia,	the	Lezgians	
and	the	Avars	in	Russia	and	Azerbaijan.
7	 The	North	Caucasus	was	also	involved	in	the	conflicts	that	took	place	in	the	first	half	of	the	
1990s	in	Georgia.	The	leadership	and	the	people	of	North	Ossetia	backed	the	Ossetian	side	
in	the	Georgian-South-Ossetian	war	(1991–1992),	volunteers	from	the	Circassian	republics	
took	part	in	the	Georgian-Abkhazian	war	(1992–1993;	the	Circassians	are	ethnically	close	
to	the	Abkhazians),	and	in	1992,	the	ousted	Georgian	president	Zviad	Gamsakhurdia	was	
offered	safe	haven	in	Grozny.
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is	still	in	operation.8	At	the	same	time	the	role	of	traditional	Islam	(regarded	
as	‘impure’	by	the	radicals	because	it	includes	elements	of	local	religious	cus-
toms)	also	grew,	along	with	the	re-emergence	of	traditional	social	institutions	
such	as	vendetta,	councils	of	elders,	clan	divisions9	and	a	revival	of	national	
cultures.	 In	 the	 civilizational	dimension,	 those	processes	have	been	driving	
the	North	Caucasus	ever	further	away	from	Russia,	leading	to	a	growing	sense	
of	mutual	alienation,	among	other	phenomena.
8	 This	process	will	be	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.
9	 The	role	of	traditional	clan	structures	is	diminishing	only	in	Chechnya	–	the	reasons	for	
this	will	be	discussed	below.
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II. ThE cIvIl war
1. Parties to the conflict and their aims
The	armed	conflict,	which	has	been	ongoing	in	the	Caucasus	for	twenty	years	
without	respite,	finally	morphed	into	a	full-fledged	civil	war	in	early	2011.10	The	
fact	that	the	conflict	is	indeed	a	civil	war	manifests	itself	both	in	the	scale	of	
violence,	claiming	more	than	a	dozen	lives	a	week	on	average	as	a	result	of	dif-
ferent	kinds	of	clashes	and	attacks,	and	in	the	ideological	motivations	of	the	
two	sides.	One	party	to	the	conflict	is	the	militant	underground,	i.e.	a	decen-
tralised	terror	organisation	operating	under	the	umbrella	name	of	the	Cauca-
sus	Emirate,	whose	aim	is	to	separate	the	region	from	Russia	and	to	create	an	
Islamic	confessional	state	governed	by	sharia	law	and	having	close	links	with	
the	 countries	 of	 the	 Arabian	 Peninsula	 and	 the	Middle	 East.	 In	 statements	
published	as	video	records	on	the	Emirate’s	website	the	organisation’s	leader	
Dokku	Umarov	often	emphasises	that	the	North	Caucasus	is	part	of	the	Um-
mah,	i.e.	the	community	of	all	Muslims,	and	that	the	operations	performed	by	
the	Caucasus	militants	are	part	of	global	 jihad.11	The	Emirate	claims	to	have	
its	roots	in	the	19th	century	theocracy	of	Imam	Shamil12	and	follows	the	Salafi	
version	of	Islam	while	disrespecting	traditional	Islam.	This	does	not	of	course	
mean	that	all	Caucasian	Salafis	are	militants	and	 terrorists	–	many	of	 them	
have	nothing	to	do	with	the	Emirate.13	According	to	the	Emirate’s	ideologues,	
10	 Wojciech	Górecki,	 ‘Creeping’	 civil	war	 in	 the	North	 Caucasus,	OSW Commentary,	 No	 50,	
15.03.2011.	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2011-03-15/creeping-
civil-war-north-caucasus	
11	 For	example,	in	a	statement	on	7	February	2011,	Umarov	mentioned	the	break-up	of	Sudan,	
which,	he	argued,	took	place	under	pressure	from	Israel	and	the	United	States	seeking	to	
take	over	control	of	the	country’s	energy	resources.	This	might	be	a	way	for	Umarov	to	woo	
potential	sponsors	from	the	Arab	world	–	a	declaration	that	the	Caucasus	militants	are	in-
terested	in	developments	in	Sudan	may	contain	a	hidden	suggestion	that	the	Arab	world	
should	not	forget	about	the	Caucasus.	Umarov’s	statements	are	also	a	means	to	discuss	cur-
rent	tactical	issues	relevant	for	the	militant	underground	and	to	transmit	general	guide-
lines	for	the	militants.
12	 Imam	Shamil	was	a	leader	from	the	period	of	the	Caucasian	Wars	who	combined	secular	
and	spiritual	power	and	who	by	today’s	definitions	was	a	fundamentalist:	he	replaced	cus-
tomary	law	norms,	the	so-called	adats,	with	the	Sharia	and	sought	to	eradicate	those	tradi-
tions	which	he	considered	to	be	pagan.
13	 The	dichotomy	between	traditional	and	non-traditional	Islam	(within	Sunni	Islam)	is	a	sim-
plification.	On	the	one	hand,	‘traditional’	Islam	is	not	homogeneous,	and	on	the	other,	‘non-
traditional’	Islam	also	has	a	history	in	the	Caucasus.	Salafism	is	currently	banned	in	Chechn-
ya,	but	 is	openly	practised	 in	Dagestan	 (see	 the	next	chapter	 for	more	 information).	Some	
researchers	believe	that	Salafism	should	be	regarded	as	an	equally	legitimate	current	of	Islam	
in	Russia	(on	the	same	footing	as	the	Sufism,	the	Hanafi	school,	the	Shafi’i	school,	etc.).	See:	
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armed	struggle	must	go	hand	in	hand	with	educational	 ‘work	at	the	founda-
tions’	–	the	local	communities	need	to	grow	to	accept	the	changes,	and	for	this	
reason	the	noticeable	Islamisation	of	the	region	(e.g.	the	emergence	of	Salafi	
nursery	schools	or	halal restaurants)	is	sure	to	play	into	the	hands	of	the	mili-
tant	underground	in	the	longer	term.
The	declared,	formal	enemy	of	the	Caucasus	Emirate	is	Moscow,	i.e.	the	Rus-
sian	federal	government.	In	reality,	however,	it	is	the	governments	of	the	dif-
ferent	 Caucasian	 subjects	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation	 and	 the	 security	 forces	
backing	them	(the	so-called	siloviki14)	that	are	the	enemy	on	the	other	side	of	
the	Caucasus	civil	conflict.	In	the	ideological	dimension,	a	broadly	understood	
‘West’	is	also	the	Emirate’s	enemy.
The	official	leaderships	of	the	North	Caucasus	republics	want	the	region	to	be	
secular	 and	 to	 remain	within	 the	Russian	Federation	 for	pragmatic	 reasons	
while	maintaining	 a	 considerable	 degree	 of	 independence	 from	 the	 central	
government	in	Moscow.	They	accept	the	dominant	role	of	Islam,	especially	tra-
ditional	Islam,	in	social	life,	provided	that	religious	leaders	remain	loyal	to	the	
state	(this	acceptance	is	the	widest	in	Chechnya	and	Dagestan).	The	civil	war	
and	the	presence	of	underground	militant	groups	poses	a	threat	to	them	on	the	
one	hand,	but	on	the	other	it	provides	them	with	a	bargaining	chip	in	dealings	
with	the	central	federal	government.	The	local	elites	blackmail	Moscow	in	or-
der	to	preserve	their	positions	by	creating	the	impression	that	they	alone	are	
able	to	guarantee	stability	and	secularity	in	the	given	area,	while	the	siloviki	
often	exaggerate	the	security	threats	in	order	to	demonstrate	how	necessary	
they	are	and	 to	 justify	 their	financial	 claims.	The	 funding	 for	 the	Caucasus	
provided	from	the	central	budget	is	treated	locally	as	a	due	payment	for	loyalty	
(de facto	extortion	money)	and	a	sign	of	Moscow’s	weakness.15	2013	saw	some	
signals	that	Moscow	may	attempt	to	change	this	situation.16	However,	the	Rus-
Бадма Бюрчиев, Алексей Малашенко: ваххабизм надо оставить в покое,	Big Caucasus,	
7.01.2013.	http://www.bigcaucasus.com/events/topday/07-01-2013/82007-malashenko-0/
14	 From	Russian	–	the	functionaries	of	all	the	security	forces,	and	the	security	services	in	gen-
eral	(Ministry	of	Defence,	Interior	Ministry,	Federal	Security	Service,	Investigative	Com-
mittee	of	the	Russian	Federation,	structures	of	the	Prosecutor’s	Office,	etc.).
15	 According	to	a	Russian	expert	interviewed	in	April	2010.	The	expert	also	said	that	“if	not	
for	this	money,	the	local	elites	would	consider	themselves	freed	of	any	obligation	to	remain	
loyal	to	the	central	government”.	See	the	chapter	on	the	situation	in	the	individual	repub-
lics	for	more	information	on	the	local	governments.
16	 The	arrest	of	the	long-time	mayor	of	Makhachkala	Said	Amirov,	and	the	harsh	criticism	of	
the	profligacy	of	Caucasian	politicians	may	be	interpreted	in	this	way.	See	following	chap-
ters	for	more	information.
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sian	leadership	is	unlikely	to	take	any	significant	steps	in	this	direction	before	
or	immediately	after	the	Sochi	Olympics.
2. The caucasus Emirate
2.1. Origins
The	Caucasus	Emirate	originated	 in	Chechnya.	The	conditions	which	enabled	
its	formation	began	to	emerge	in	the	period	between	the	First	and	the	Second	
Chechen	Wars,	i.e.	in	the	years	1996–1999	when	the	republic	had	no	formal	status	
(under	the	agreement	which	ended	the	war,	signed	on	31	August	1996	in	the	Dag-
estani	town	of	Khasav-Yurt,	its	status	was	to	be	determined	within	the	next	five	
years).	The	quasi-independent	Chechnya	(the	Chechen	Republic	of	Ichkeria)	was	
in	a	permanent	severe	economic,	social,	political	and	ideological	crisis	caused	
by	the	damage	inflicted	by	war,	by	Moscow’s	policy	(a	de facto blockade	of	the	
republic,	suspended	financing),	and	by	the	brutal	turf	war	waged	by	the	former	
field	commanders	who	held	private	armies	and	controlled	large	swathes	of	the	
republic	(this	considerably	restricted	the	real	power	and	room	for	manoeuvre	
of	Aslan	Maskhadov,	elected	as	the	president	of	Chechnya	on	27	January	1997).17
Disillusioned	by	‘democracy’,	which	they	associated	with	war	and	violence	(Bo-
ris	Yeltsin,	 the	 then	president	of	Russia	who	was	 responsible	 for	 starting	 the	
war,	liked	to	present	himself	as	a	democrat),	and	‘independence’,	perceived	in	
the	context	of	pauperisation,	the	lack	of	prospects	and	rising	crime,	including	
kidnappings	 for	 ransom,	more	 and	more	Chechens	began	 to	 cherish	 the	 idea	
of	building	a	‘just’	Islamic	republic	in	Chechnya.	The	idea	was	popular	in	par-
ticular	 among	 the	 adherents	 of	 the	 fundamentalist	 Salafi	 Islam,	 which	 was	
relatively	new	in	the	Caucasus	and	was	sometimes	referred	to	as	 ‘pure’,	 ‘new’	
or	‘Arabic’,	to	distinguish	it	from	the	traditional	Sufi	Islam,	whose	role	was	also	
rising.	The	propagation	of	Salafi	Islam	was	aided	by	the	presence	in	Chechnya	
of	 foreign	mujahideen,18	 including	 the	Saudi-born	 commander	 Ibn	al-Khattab	
who	stayed	in	the	republic	after	the	war	and	founded	a	training	camp	for	mili-
tants,	funded	by	the	global	jihadist	centres.	Following	his	example,	some	of	the	
influential	Chechen	commanders,	including	Shamil	Basayev,	adopted	Salafism.
17	 Many	 commanders	 operated	 at	 the	 intersection	of	 politics,	 business	 and	mafia.	 Some	of	
them	were	members	of	the	Chechen	parliament	and	had	registered	businesses,	but	the	larg-
est	proportion	of	 the	 income	of	 this	group	came	 from	illegal	activities	 (smuggling,	arms	
trafficking,	kidnaping).	Serving	in	the	private	armies	of	former	commanders	was	at	that	
time	one	of	very	few	career	opportunities	available	to	Chechen	men	at	that	time.
18	 In	Islamic	culture,	a	mujahideen	is	a	militant	motivated	by	religion.
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Aslan	 Maskhadov	 himself	 indirectly	 contributed	 to	 the	 strengthening	 of	
Salafism.	The	 president	was	 an	 advocate	 of	 a	 secular	Chechnya,	 but	 having	
failed	to	subordinate	the	former	commanders	or	to	force	al-Khattab	and	the	
other	 foreign	mujahideen	 to	 leave,	he	decided	 to	create	a	broad	coalition	 in-
volving	the	Salafis	(including	Basayev,	whom	he	appointed	as	the	prime	minis-
ter)	and	to	introduce	elements	of	sharia	into	local	legislation	(e.g.	public	execu-
tions,	formal	recognition	of	sharia	courts).
Contrary	 to	 his	 declared	 intentions	 (reconciliation	 and	 national	 unity),	
Maskhadov’s	decisions	only	entrenched	the	marginalisation	of	the	secularists	
and	highlighted	 the	divisions	between	the	 Islamic	 traditionalists	 (known	as	
tarikatists)	and	the	Salafis.	Those	processes	gained	momentum	after	the	second	
Chechen	war	broke	out	in	the	autumn	of	1999.19	The	leading	Chechen	command-
ers	and	the	militants’	websites	began	to	increasingly	emphasise	the	religious	
aspect	of	the	conflict	as	a	war	against	the	enemies	of	Islam,	at	the	expense	of	the	
national	liberation	aspect	(the	war	for	independence).20	This	choice	was	ideolog-
ical,	but	also	pragmatic	–	it	was	intended	to	encourage	more	fighters	to	join	the	
armed	struggle	and	was	addressed	to	people	from	the	neighbouring	Caucasus	
nations,	who	would	not	be	interested	in	fighting	for	a	free	Chechnya	as	the	re-
gion	feared	potential	Chechen	domination,	but	who	might	be	willing	to	support	
the	jihad.	It	was	also	addressed	to	Muslims	from	beyond	the	region,21	in	line	with	
the	concept	to	take	the	war	beyond	Chechnya,	developed	by	Shamil	Basayev.	
It	was	also	important	that	the	move	towards	jihad	could	open	access	to	fund-
ing	from	fundamentalist	circles	in	the	Arab	states	(the	money	was	to	be	trans-
ferred	by	the	Arab	mujahideen,	initially	mainly	by	al-Khattab).
Another	 development	 that	 aided	 the	 formation	 of	 an	 armed	 Islamic	 under-
ground	 ideologically	 motivated	 by	 radical	 Islam	 consisted	 in	 the	 Kremlin’s	
19	 The	Kremlin	started	the	second	Chechen	war	under	the	slogans	of	the	fight	against	terror-
ism	(while	the	aim	of	the	first	war	had	been	to	restore	‘constitutional	order’,	i.e.	to	elimi-
nate	Chechen	separatism):	its	outbreak	in	late	September	and	early	October	1999	had	been	
preceded	by	a	raid	into	Dagestan	undertaken	by	Basayev	and	al-Khattab	(in	August,	under	
the	pretext	of	aiding	an	anti-Russian	insurgency	that	was	allegedly	being	prepared	there),	
and	a	series	of	attacks	against	residential	buildings	in	Moscow,	Buynaksk	and	Volgodonsk	
(September	1999,	the	circumstance	of	the	attacks	have	still	not	been	fully	clarified).
20	 The	death	of	Aslan	Maskhadov	on	8	March	2005	was	a	symbolic	breakthrough.
21	 According	to	the	Russian	authorities,	representatives	of	at	least	52	states,	identified	on	the	
basis	of	documents	found	on	them,	were	fighting	on	the	militants’	side	in	the	second	Chech-
en	war.	МВД РФ: среди чеченских боевиков были наемники из 52 стран,	Newsru.com,	
22.10.2008.	http://www.newsru.com/russia/22oct2008/baranov.html
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decision	 to	 formally	 hand	 over	 power	 in	 Chechnya	 to	 ‘pro-Russian’	 Chech-
en	politicians.22	The	aim	of	 that	process,	which	commentators	referred	to	as	
‘Chechenisation’,	was	 to	 combat	 the	militants	more	effectively	and	 to	 create	
the	impression	that	there	is	no	Russian-Chechen	war,	only	an	internal	Chech-
en	conflict	between	the	legitimate	leadership	of	the	republic	and	the	rebels.23	
Mufti	Akhmad	Kadyrov,	who	fought	on	the	rebel	side	in	the	first	Chechen	war,	
became	the	first	Chechen	leader	to	be	appointed	by	Moscow,	and	when	he	died	
in	an	attack	in	2004,	his	son	Ramzan	took	over.24	Over	time,	the	Kadyrovs	man-
aged	to	gain	considerable	 independence,	concentrating	real	power	in	the	re-
public	in	their	hands.
The	Kadyrovs	adhere	 to	 traditional	 Islam	and	 they	considered	 the	Salafis	 to	
be	their	main	enemy.	This	has	enabled	them	to	convince	a	considerable	pro-
portion	of	 the	militants,	 those	who	were	motivated	by	national	 rather	 than	
religious	sentiments,	 to	 lay	down	their	arms	and	 join	 the	armed	formations	
controlled	by	the	Chechen	leader	(which	formally	are	regular	units	of	the	Rus-
sian	Interior	Ministry25).	This	has	been	possible	due	to	a	series	of	amnesties	
agreed	with	Moscow.	By	the	second	half	of	the	2000s,	there	were	practically	
no	independence	fighters	left	among	the	militants	–	those	who	did	not	join	the	
Kadyrovs’	units	were	killed,	emigrated,	or	became	jihadists	themselves.
On	31	October	2007	Dokku	Umarov,	the	president	of	the	unrecognised	Chechen	
Republic	of	Ichkeria	(who	succeeded	Khalim	Sadulayev,	the	commander	of	the	
Chechen	underground	following	Aslan	Maskhadov’s	death),	stepped	down	from	
office,	dismantled	the	existing	structures	and	replaced	them	with	the	Caucasus	
Emirate	(Imarat).	He	appointed	himself	as	the	emir	(amir),	assumed	the	Arabic	
name	of	Abu	Usman	and	has	been	leading	the	Caucasian	jihad	since	then.
22	 As	 numerous	 cases	 demonstrate,	 being	 ‘pro-Russian’	 is	 often	 only	 a	 tactic	 for	 Chechen	
politicians.	For	example,	referring	to	the	current	Chechen	leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov	as	pro-
Russian	would	be	a	simplification	obscuring	a	much	more	complex	reality	(see	the	box	on	
Ramzan Kadyrov’s ambitions for	more	information).
23	 By	spring	2000	the	federal	forces	had	gained	control	of	the	entire	territory	of	the	republic	
(towns	and	transport	routes),	but	they	could	not	ultimately	defeat	the	militants,	and	hold-
ing	to	their	positions	required	the	constant	presence	of	the	army	and	generated	consider-
able	financial	costs.	In	this	situation	inviting	loyal	Chechen	forces,	with	their	better	knowl-
edge	of	 the	 terrain	and	 the	 local	 social	 relations,	 to	 take	part	 in	 the	military	operations	
offered	a	chance	to	more	effectively	eliminate	the	militants.
24	 Formally	Ramzan	Kadyrov	 took	 the	post	of	president	of	Chechnya	 in	2007,	 shortly	after	
reaching	his	thirtieth	birthday,	which	is	legally	required	for	this	position.
25	 In	addition,	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Defence	formed	two	spetsnaz	GRU	battalions	made	up	
of	ethnic	Chechens;	the	Kadyrovs	had	no	control	over	these	for	a	longer	time.
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2.2. Structures
The	Caucasus	Emirate	is	a	virtual	Islamic	 ‘state’	whose	area	largely	overlaps	
with	 the	 North	 Caucasus	 Federal	 District.	 It	 is	 divided	 into	 five	 provinces	
(vilayats)	whose	borders	generally	correspond	to	the	administrative	borders	
of	the	republics):	Dagestan,	Nokhchiycho	(Chechnya),	Galgayche	(Ingushetia),	
Kabarda-Balkaria-Karachay,	and	the	Nogay	Steppe	(southern	part	of	Stavropol	
Krai)26.	 The	 vilayats	 consist	 of	 so-called	 “fronts”	 (northern,	 north-western,	
south-eastern,	etc.).	The	vilayats	and	the	 fronts	are	governed	by	 local	emirs	
(amirs).	The	Emirate	uses	its	own	geographic	names,	e.g.	Grozny	is	Dzhokhar,	
Makhachkala	is	Shamilkala,	Kizilyurt	is	Rabbanikala,	etc.
Despite	this	centralised	structure,	the	Emirate	is	in	fact	a	federation	of	militant	
groups	enjoying	considerable	independence,	connected	by	a	shared	idea	and	by	
the	fact	that	they	all	formally	recognise	the	supremacy	of	Dokku	Umarov,	who	
is	 the	only	person	authorised	 to	nominate	 lower-level	emirs.	The	Emirate	 is	
a	kind	of	umbrella	or	trademark,	attractive	and	recognisable	enough	for	radi-
cals	from	other	parts	of	Russia	to	identify	with.27	The	fact	that	the	militants	are	
dispersed,	and	that	it	is	therefore	difficult	to	co-ordinate	the	activities	of	dif-
ferent	groups	on	the	one	hand	makes	it	impossible	for	the	Emirate	to	organise	
a	larger-scale	operation,	such	as	an	attempt	at	taking	control	of	a	town	(like	
the	attack	on	Nalchik	in	October	2005,	during	the	second	Chechen	war),	but	on	
the	other	hand	makes	it	difficult	for	the	authorities	to	combat	the	insurgency.
The	exact	number	of	the	militants	is	impossible	to	ascertain.	Based	on	expert	
estimates	 and	 statements	 by	 representatives	 of	 the	 Russian	 federal	 and	 lo-
cal	authorities	and	security	services,	one	may	assume	that	the	entire	region	
26	 Since	11	May	2009,	the	vilayat	Galgayche	also	includes	North	Ossetia,	which	had	previously	
been	a	separate	vilayat	(Iriston).	The	“united	vilayat	of	Kabarda,	Balkaria	and	Karachay”	
(KBK)	spans	the	area	of	Kabardino-Balkaria	and	Karachay-Cherkessia.	The	decision	to	cre-
ate	 ‘national’	 vilayats	 took	 into	 account	 the	 strong	 ethnic	 identification	 of	 the	militants	
(despite	the	Emirate’s	assumption	of	unity	and	the	equality	of	all	Muslims),	and	especially	
the	strong	attachment	to	national	traditions	among	the	civilian	population,	which	was	ex-
pected	to	provide	backup	and	support	to	the	militant	groups.	In	the	summer	of	2010,	a	con-
flict	arose	against	this	background	between	Umarov	and	militants	from	the	group	led	by	
Khuseyn	Gakayev.	While	not	rejecting	the	ideal	of	the	Emirate,	Gakayev	at	the	same	time	
recognised	the	right	of	the	Caucasus	nations	to	self-determination	(this	was	particularly	
important	for	young	Chechens,	who	accounted	for	the	majority	of	the	militants).	The	con-
flict	was	resolved	after	several	months,	and	Gakayev	and	his	followers	repeated	their	oath	
of	loyalty	to	Umarov.	However,	a	similar	division	in	the	future	cannot	be	ruled	out.
27	 Radicals	from	Tatarstan	and	the	entire	Volga	Region	often	refer	to	their	area	as	the	‘Idel-
Ural	vilayat’.
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contains	between	several	hundred	(close	to	one	thousand28)	and	several	thou-
sand	militants.	Some	of	them	are	stationed	in	bases	in	the	mountains,	and	some	
in	rented	houses	and	flats	from	which	they	set	out	for	their	terror	operations.	
The	back-up	and	support,	 i.e.	 the	people	 in	charge	of	propaganda	(including	
the	websites),	finance	and	broadly	understood	logistics,	are	certainly	greater	
in	number,	but	it	 is	even	more	difficult	to	estimate	how	many	of	them	there	
are.	The	number	of	people	actively	sympathising	with	the	Emirate,	i.e.	those	
ready	to	put	a	militant	up	for	a	night,	lend	a	car	or	warn	against	the	police,	is	
the	most	difficult	to	determine,	especially	since	a	sense	of	loyalty	to	fellow	clan	
members	or	neighbours,	which	is	very	strong	in	the	Caucasus,	may	also	come	
into	play	in	such	cases.	Researchers	agree	that	since	the	beginning	of	Emir-
ate’s	existence,	the	number	of	militants	has	remained	stable,	which	means	that	
every	year	between	 four	and	seven	hundred	new	fighters	have	been	 joining	
the	militant	groups	(corresponding	to	the	number	of	militants	the	Emirate	has	
lost	annually	in	recent	years,	including	those	killed	and	those	detained).	The	
average	age	of	the	militants	has	been	constantly	coming	down,	and	the	average	
duration	of	their	active	service	(from	the	time	they	join	a	militant	unit	until	
they	are	killed	or	detained)	has	been	getting	shorter:	it	is	currently	estimated	
at	around	18	months.29
The	Caucasus	Emirate	is	financed	from	several	sources.	Since	the	beginning	
of	the	previous	decade	it	has	most	probably	relied	mainly	on	extortion	money	
paid	by	businessmen	from	the	region	and	beyond,	while	the	significance	of	for-
eign	funding	from	the	Arab	states,	transferred	by	mujahideen	with	contacts	
in	al-Qaeda	and	other	jihadi	centres,	has	been	steadily	falling.	The	reasons	for	
this	include,	firstly,	the	fact	that	the	number	of	foreign	fighters	has	been	di-
minishing:	with	the	Arab	Spring,	and	especially	the	outbreak	of	civil	war	in	
Syria,	 the	Caucasus	ceased	 to	be	attractive	 for	 such	people	as	a	place	where	
they	could	fight	against	the	‘enemies	of	Islam’.	Secondly,	the	role	of	the	muja-
hideen	in	the	Emirate	has	been	gradually	diminishing.	After	al-Khattab	died	
in	 2002,	he	was	 replaced	by	 the	Arab	mujahideen	 leaders	Abu	al-Walid	 and	
28	 The	Dagestani	president	Ramazan	Abdulatipov	has	estimated	their	number	in	his	republic	
at	“150–250,	not	more	than	500”	in	a	statement	during	a	meeting	of	the	Valdai	Discussion	
Club,	16–19	September	2013.
29	 The	average	age	of	militants	is	currently	estimated	at	21–23	years	(while	three	years	ago	it	was	
at	least	25	years).	Typically,	men	join	the	armed	units	between	the	age	of	18	and	20.	See	e.g.:	
Екатерина Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет Ингушетия сделала огромный рывок, но работы 
еще много,	Mir24,	11.03.2013.	http://mir24.tv/news/politics/6648308;	Петр Акопов, Человек, 
который давал выход,	Взгляд,	27.08.2013.	http://vz.ru/politics/2013/8/27/647421.html
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Abu	Khavs	respectively,	as	the	perceived	al-Qaeda	representatives	in	the	Cau-
casus.30	They	did	not	make	it	to	the	top	leadership	of	the	armed	underground,	
though	while	 the	 Jordanian	Muhannad,	who	commanded	the	Arab	group	 in	
the	years	2006-2011	fell	out	with	Dokku	Umarov,	whom	he	had	initially	been	
closely	associated	with,	possibly	over	financial	issues.31
2.3. Evolving tactics
The	 Emirate’s	 principal	method	 of	 operation	 consists	 in	 attacks	 on	 various	
persons	or	facilities.	As	the	militant	forces	are	considerably	smaller	than	the	
government	forces,	the	militants	avoid	open	fighting;	it	does	nonetheless	takes	
place	occasionally.	The	largest	clashes	after	2004	took	place	on	13-17	February	
2012	 in	 the	mountains	on	 the	administrative	border	between	Chechnya	and	
Dagestan;	it	is	possible	that	as	many	as	several	dozen	people	died	as	a	result.32	
Over	the	six	years	of	its	existence,	the	Emirate	changed	its	tactics	on	several	
occasions.	Its	history	can	be	divided	into	four	periods.33
30	 There	were	also	Turkish	nationals	(Turks	and	Kurds)	and	Uyghurs	from	China	among	the	
mujahideen	fighters.	At	its	largest	during	the	first	months	of	the	second	Chechen	war,	this	
group	 could	 reach	numbers	of	more	 than	 500	mujahideen,	 currently	 there	 are	probably	
several	dozen	of	them	at	most.
31	 In	the	summer	of	2010	Muhannad	backed	the	break-away	group	within	the	Emirate.	Since	
his	death	on	21	April	2011,	the	foreign	mujahideen	probably	no	longer	have	a	separate	com-
mander.
32	 The	Chechen	 Interior	Ministry	 reported	 17	 casualties	 and	24	 injured,	but	 it	was	unclear	
if	these	figures	referred	only	to	its	own	forces	or	all	 the	security	forces	that	took	part	 in	
the	fighting.	The	same	source	reported	that	7	militants	were	killed.	The	first	skirmish	took	
place	in	the	region	of	Nozhay-Yurt	in	Chechnya	where	a	unit	of	the	Chechen	Interior	Minis-
try	forces	attacked	and	surrounded	a	militant	group	commanded	by	Makharbi	Timiraliyev.	
The	insurgents	managed	to	escape	from	and	made	it	to	Dagestan.	There,	two	groups	of	Dag-
estani	militants	joined	them	–	at	that	point	the	insurgent	forces	numbered	a	total	of	around	
60–100	men.	They	were	confronted	by	the	troops	of	the	Russian	Interior	Ministry	which	
used	artillery	and	air	attack,	among	other	measures	(the	Chechen	police	also	took	part	in	
the	operation	until	 its	completion).	Wojciech	Górecki,	Clashes	at	 the	border	of	Chechnya	
and	 Dagestan,	 Eastweek	 OSW,	 22.02.2012.	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2012-02-22/clashes-border-chechnya-and-dagestan	
33	 The	 division	 into	 periods	 is	 based	 on	 the	 dates	 of	 individual	 video-statements	made	 by	
Dokku	Umarov	(dates	of	online	publication,	which	are	not	the	same	as	dates	of	recording;	
the	changes	of	tactic	usually	became	visibly	effective	several	weeks	after	the	publication	of	
each	statement).	This	approach	to	dividing	the	Emirate’s	history	into	periods	stems	from	
the	assumption	that	the	Emirate	is	an	autonomous	entity;	while	the	media	has	speculated	
about	the	Emirate’s	links	to	the	Russian	secret	services	there	is	no	evidence	that	the	poten-
tial	existence	of	such	links	(which	in	themselves	are	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper)	has	any	
influence	on	the	tactics	and	the	modus	operandi	of	the	armed	underground.
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2.3.1. 	Guerrilla	war	(31	October	2007	–	25	April	2009)
During	the	first	year	or	so	of	its	existence,	the	Emirate	continued	the	guerrilla	
warfare	whichhad	previously	been	waged	by	the	unrecognised	Chechen	Repub-
lic	of	Ichkeria.	The	end	of	that	period	coincided	with	the	formal	ending	of	the	
second	Chechen	war	–	on	15	April	2009	the	so-called	“anti-terror	operation	re-
gime”	(Russian: KTO, контртеррористическая операция)	was	lifted	in	Chechn-
ya,	having	been	in	place	for	nearly	ten	years.	When	the	formation	of	the	Emirate	
was	announced,	the	fact	that	Sochi	had	been	selected	to	organise	the	2014	Win-
ter	Olympics	was	already	known	(the	decision	had	been	taken	in	July	2007).
2.3.2. Dramatic	attacks	(25	April	2009	–	2	February	2012)
In	a	statement	of	25	April	2009	Dokku	Umarov	said,	“If	we	are	not	allowed	to	kill	
[Russian]	citizens,	 the	so-called	civilians,	who	provide	the	army	and	the	FSB	
with	their	taxes	and	their	silence,	who	support	this	army	with	their	approving	
silence,	if	such	people	are	to	be	regarded	as	civilians,	then	I	don’t	know	accord-
ing	to	what	criteria	this	assessment	is	made”.34	The	statement	was	received	as	
a	call	to	massive	attacks	throughout	Russia,	or	at	least	as	approval	for	such	at-
tacks,	especially	given	that	at	the	same	time	Umarov	reactivated	the	so-called	
“Riyad-us-Saliheen”	brigade	(Gardens	of	the	Righteous	in	Arabic),	 i.e.	a	sabo-
tage-terror	group	specialising	in	suicide	attacks.35	It	appears	that	the	decision	
to	carry	out	attacks	 that	would	claim	large	numbers	of	casualties	 (especially	
among	civilians),	including	outside	the	Caucasus,	was	intended	to	demonstrate	
the	Emirate’s	power	and	potential	to	the	Russian	authorities	and	the	public	in	
Russia	and	in	the	North	Caucasus	republics,	and	also	to	the	global	jihadi	centres.
The	Emirate	carried	out	its	most	notorious	and	most	tragic	attacks	in	the	years	
2009–2011.36	 They	 included	 the	 attempt	 at	 assassinating	 the	 president	 of	 In-
gushetia,	Yunus-Bek	Yevkurov	(on	22	June	2009,	Yevkurov	survived	but	two	
34	 Имарат Кавказ на пути от Йемена к Алжиру (часть 1),	Prague Watchdog,	6.06.2009.	http://
www.watchdog.cz/?show=000000-000024-000004-000004&lang=2
35	 The	brigade	was	formed	back	in	2001	by	Shamil	Basayev.	After	its	reactivation	Said	Buryat-
sky,	the	Emirate’s	main	ideologue,	became	its	commander	(Alexandr	Tikhomirov—died	on	
2	March	2010),	followed	by	Emir	Khamzat	(Aslan	Byutukayev—he	accompanied	Umarov	in	
the	video-statement	published	online	on	February	2011).
36	 The	Emirate	routinely	claims	responsibility	for	all	attacks	in	the	North	Caucasus	and	other	
parts	of	Russia	and	in	most	cases	it	is	actually	responsible.	However,	the	accident	at	the	Saya-
no–Shushenskaya	hydroelectric	power	station	on	17	August	2009,	in	which	75	people	died	and	
for	which	the	Emirate	also	claimed	responsibility,	was	not	caused	by	a	terror	attack	according	
to	the	findings	of	the	investigation.	Claims	of	responsibility	for	attacks	are	usually	not	made	
by	the	Emirate	as	a	whole,	but	by	individual	units	such	as	the	Riyad-us-Saliheen	brigade	or	
the	vilayats,	which	further	proves	that	the	Emirate	is	not	a	centralised	organisation.
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people	who	were	accompanying	him	died),	the	attack	on	the	Nevsky	Express	
train	(27	November	2009,	28	casualties),	the	double	attack	on	the	Moscow	un-
derground	(29	March	2010,	41	casualties),	 the	sabotage	at	 the	Baksan	hydro-
electric	power	 station	 in	Kabardino-Balkaria	 (21	 July	 2010,	 2	 casualties),	 the	
attack	against	a	local	market	in	Vladikavkaz,	North	Ossetia	(9	September	2010,	
19	casualties),	the	attack	on	Domodedovo	airport	in	Moscow	(24	January	2011,	
37	casualties),	a	series	of	attacks	in	Kabardino-Balkaria	(18-25	February	2011,	
at	least	6	casualties;	in	addition,	a	cable	car	on	Elbrus	was	blown	up	in	the	at-
tack).	On	8	February	2010	the	Russian	Supreme	Court	ruled	that	the	Caucasus	
Emirate	was	a	terrorist	organisation,	and	on	26	May	2011	the	US	Department	of	
State	issued	a	similar	ruling.
The	Emirate	has	demonstrated	 its	 ability	 to	destabilise	 the	 situation	 in	are-
as	close	 to	 the	Olympic	 facilities	 (the	attacks	 in	Kabardino-Balkaria),	which	
means	 it	 could	 threaten	 the	 security	 of	 the	Games.37	However,	while	 the	 at-
tacks	in	Moscow	have	shown	that	the	Caucasus	terrorists	are	prepared	to	at-
tack	any	target,	disregarding	all	humanitarian	considerations,	they	have	also	
exposed	the	Emirate’s	limitations.	They	showed	that	the	militants	were	able	to	
prepare	and	carry	out	no	more	than	one	large	attack	in	Central	Russia	per	year,	
which	was	not	enough	to	 intimidate	the	Russian	public.	Many	people	 in	the	
Caucasus,	 even	among	 those	negatively	disposed	 towards	 the	Russian	 state,	
have	turned	against	the	Emirate	because	of	the	large	numbers	of	civilian	casu-
alties	claimed	by	its	attacks.	As	was	mentioned	above,	in	the	period	in	question	
the	militants	could	no	longer	count	on	major	support	from	militant	centres	in	
the	Arab	states	irrespective	of	what	they	did,	because	of	the	situation	in	the	
Emirate	itself	and	developments	in	the	Middle	East.
2.3.3. Targeted	strikes	(2	February	2012	–	3	July	2013)
In	his	 statement	of	 2	February	2012	Umarov	ordered	 the	militants	 to	 refrain	
from	attacks	on	civilian	targets,	explaining	that	the	Russian	public	had	ceased	
to	support	the	Kremlin’s	policy	(in	December	2011	Moscow	and	other	cities	wit-
nessed	massive	protests	against	ballot	rigging	during	the	parliamentary	elec-
tions).	Instead,	he	called	on	the	militants	to	deliver	“precise	and	isolated”	blows	
to	 the	 security	 forces	 and	 those	 in	 power.38	 This	 new	 tactic	 was	 apparently	
adopted	mainly	because	the	previous	one	had	turned	out	to	be	ineffective:	the	
37	 In	connection	with	this,	some	Russian	experts	have	suggested	that	the	Russian	government	
would	have	to	pay	Umarov	to	refrain	from	attacks	before	and	during	the	Games.
38	 Умаров приказал боевикам на Кавказе избегать атак на мирные цели,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	
3.02.2012.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/200452/
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large	strikes,	especially	beyond	the	Caucasus,	not	only	reinforced	the	militants’	
image	 as	 terrorists,	 but	were	 undoubtedly	 financially	 costly	 and	 logistically	
complicated	(involving	a	higher	risk	of	discovery),	and	they	failed	to	produce	
the	effects	the	Emirate	expected.	It	is	also	possible	that	Umarov	took	this	deci-
sion	after	ultimately	realising	that	the	armed	underground’s	real	and	main	en-
emy	was	not	the	federal	authorities	so	much	as	the	secular	regimes	in	power	in	
the	individual	republics	of	the	region.	It	is	also	worth	noting	that	the	last	attack	
with	civilian	casualties	that	was	carried	out	beyond	the	Caucasus	took	place	on	
24	January	2011,	i.e.	more	than	a	year	before	the	‘moratorium’	was	announced.39
In	the	period	in	question	the	Emirate	limited	its	activities	to	the	area	of	the	North	
Caucasus,	focusing	on	the	fight	against	the	local	security	forces	(and	in	this	way,	
the	conflict	ultimately	morphed	into	a	local	civil	war).40	The	victims	of	the	attacks	
were	mainly	officers	of	the	Interior	Ministry,	the	FSB	and	other	siloviki,	as	well	
as	public	officials	of	various	levels	(including	judges	and	prosecutors),	Muslim	
clerics	loyal	to	the	authorities,	and	journalists	whom	the	armed	underground	
deemed	harmful	or	dangerous.41	Among	the	civilian	casualties,	a	relatively	large	
group	is	comprised	of	people	dealing	with	broadly	understood	magic	(fortune-
tellers,	healers),	while	the	remaining	ones	were	usually	bystanders.42	The	most	
frequently	 attacked	 facilities	 included	police	 stations	and	headquarters,	mili-
tary	barracks,	 local	offices,	and	shops	and	restaurants	selling	alcohol.43	These	
were	targeted	for	‘educational’	purposes	according	to	statements	published	on	
the	Emirate’s	websites	(the	same	justification	was	given	for	the	‘elimination’	of	
the	centres	of	magical	practice	as	not	conforming	with	Islam).	In	the	mountain	
areas,	regular	armed	clashes	were	taking	place	at	the	same	time.
39	 The	Riyad-us-Saliheen	brigade	has	also	claimed	responsibility	for	the	shooting	of	Colonel	
Yuri	Budanov	in	Moscow	on	10	June	2011.	Budanov	kidnapped	and	killed	an	eighteen-year	
old	girl	during	the	second	Chechen	war.	
40	 The	Emirate	has	firmly	distanced	itself	from	the	Tsarnayev	brothers	who	were	behind	the	at-
tack	on	the	Boston	marathon	on	15	April	2013	–	it	stated	it	is	not	at	war	with	the	United	States.
41	 Unlike	in	the	case	of	the	siloviki,	in	attacks	against	officials,	clerics	and	journalists	the	vic-
tims	were	usually	specific	people	identified	by	the	armed	underground,	rather	than	ran-
dom	representatives	of	a	target	group.
42	 The	largest	numbers	of	casualties	died	in	so-called	“double	attacks”	whereby	a	second	ex-
plosive	device	would	be	set	off	some	time	after	the	first	one,	when	the	police	and	other	ser-
vices	and,	often,	the	first	onlookers	had	arrived	at	the	scene.	The	attack	on	19	August	2012	in	
the	Malgobek	region	of	Ingushetia	where	a	suicide	bomber	blew	himself	up	at	the	funeral	of	
a	policeman	killed	the	day	before,	was	a	special	case	of	this	tactic.	Apart	from	the	bomber,	
seven	people	died,	most	of	them	police	officers.
43	 Usually	those	which	refuse	to	pay	extortion	money	to	the	Emirate;	in	most	cases	the	attacks	
were	preceded	by	warnings	(with	the	exception	of	Chechnya,	alcohol	is	widely	available	in	
the	region).
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The	new	tactic	helped	to	mitigate	the	aversion	to	the	Emirate	among	the	local	
populations	and	increased	the	attractiveness	of	the	model	of	Islam	promoted	
by	the	militants.
2.3.4. “The	end	justifies	the	means”?	(3	July	2013	–	)
In	a	statement	published	on	3	 July	2013	Dokku	Umarov	recalled	the	 ‘morato-
rium’	on	attacks	in	Russia	‘proper’,	explaining	that	that	gesture	had	been	per-
ceived	by	Moscow	as	a	sign	of	weakness.	He	also	called	on	the	militants	to	use	
all	means	available	to	disrupt	the	Games	in	Sochi.44	At	the	same	time	he	em-
phasised	that	 the	war	waged	by	the	Emirate	was	part	of	global	 jihad	(which	
was	probably	intended	to	serve	as	a	reminder	or	call	on	foreign	centres	to	sup-
port	the	Caucasus	militants),	and	said	that	in	addition	to	the	North	Caucasus,	
jihadists	in	Russia	were	also	active	in	the	republics	of	Tatarstan	and	Bashkor-
tostan	in	the	Volga	region.
At	the	time	of	writing	(December	2013),	this	new	change	in	the	Emirate’s	tactics	
has	not	been	put	into	practice,	except	through	a	slight	increase	in	the	percentage	
of	civilians	in	the	total	number	of	casualties	(while	the	total	number	of	casual-
ties	has	decreased).	The	Emirate	is	still	fighting	the	broadly	understood	‘authori-
ties’	in	an	area	limited	to	the	North	Caucasus,	targeting	mainly	the	siloviki.	The	
most	notorious	operation	in	the	period	in	question	consisted	in	the	assassina-
tion	of	Ingushetia’s	Security	Council	chief	Ahmed	Kotiyev	on	the	road	between	
Malgobek	and	Nazran	on	27	August	2013,	in	which	Kotiyev’s	driver	also	died.	In	
another	attack	on	16	September,	a	suicide	bomber	blew	himself	up	in	front	of	
the	police	headquarters	in	Sernovodsk	in	Chechnya,	killing	four	police	officers.
Against	this	background,	the	attack	on	a	city	bus	in	Volgograd	on	21	October	
2013	looks	to	be	more	the	exception	than	a	new	rule.45	It	cannot	be	ruled	out	
that	 an	Emirate	 cell	was	behind	 the	bombing	 although	 the	Emirate	has	not	
claimed	responsibility.	According	 to	 the	Russian	authorities,	 the	attack	was	
carried	out	by	Naida	Asiyalova,	a	thirty-one-year-old	female	suicide	bomber	
from	Dagestan,	but	it	 is	highly	unlikely	that	a	single	attack	three-and-a-half	
months	before	the	Games,	carried	out	in	a	town	around	800	kilometres	away	
44	 Умаров призвал вооруженное подполье к срыву Олимпиады в Сочи,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	
3.07.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/226558/
	 The	militant	leader	has	called	the	Games	‘satanic’	as	they	are	being	organised	“on	the	bones	
of	 our	 ancestors”.	 See	 the	 Conclusions	 for	 an	 assessment	 of	 the	 likelihood	 of	 attacks	 on	
Olympic	targets.
45	 Wojciech	Górecki,	Attack	on	a	bus	in	Volgograd,	Eastweek	OSW,	23.10.2013.	http://www.osw.
waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-23/attack-a-bus-volgograd	
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from	Sochi	could	destabilise	Russia	in	the	slightest	degree	or	discourage	Olym-
pians	and	sports	fans	from	travelling	to	Sochi.	However,	 the	situation	could	
change	 if	 several	more	attacks	of	a	 similar	nature	were	 to	be	carried	out	 in	
towns	closer	to	the	Olympic	facilities.
Regardless	of	the	fact	that	no	attacks	have	taken	place	yet	in	Sochi	or	in	the	en-
tire	Krasnodar	Krai,	the	Emirate’s	terror	activities	continue	to	pose	the	great-
est	threat	to	the	security	of	the	Games	and	the	stability	of	the	region	in	general.
3. Federal and local security forces
The	operations	against	the	Emirate	are	conducted	mainly	by	the	Internal	Troops	
of	Russia,	including	units	controlled	by	the	federal	Interior	Ministry	as	well	as	
those	subordinated	to	the	Interior	Ministries	of	the	individual	North	Caucasus	
republics.	The	FSB	is	also	involved,	again	with	units	controlled	by	the	FSB	Head-
quarters	in	Moscow	and	units	operating	under	the	local	FSB	delegations.	This	
complicated	system	of	subordination	relations	and	existing	conflicts	of	interest	
(officers	of	the	local	Interior	Ministries	are	usually	members	of	the	local	titular	
nations,	with	some	exceptions	at	the	highest	level	of	ministry	leadership)	has	
been	undermining	the	effectiveness	of	this	structure.46	The	numbers	of	soldiers	
from	the	Internal	Troops	involved	in	the	region	have	been	growing	constantly.	
In	late	2009	and	early	2010,	23,000	soldiers	served	in	the	region,47	while	in	late	
2012	“nearly	half	of	the	total	number	of	182,000”	of	Russia’s	Internal	Troops48	
were	engaged	in	the	region,	including	around	10,000	in	the	spetsnaz.49	Units	of	
the	FSB	border	troops	in	the	North	Caucasus	district	numbered	165,000	in	2012	
(including	19,400	civilian	workers),	grouped	into	17	detachments.50
Units	of	the	Russian	Ministry	of	Defence	(which	has	no	representation	on	the	
republican	 level)	have	not	been	regularly	 involved	 in	operations	against	 the	
militants	since	2002	(they	would	occasionally	get	involved	as	late	on	as	2006;	
in	addition,	the	army	would	lend	heavy	equipment	such	as	tanks	to	the	Interior	
46	 Wojciech	Górecki,	‘Creeping’	civil	war...,	op. cit.
47	 Out	of	78,000,	which	was	the	total	number	of	all	soldiers	from	the	Internal	Troops	in	Rus-
sia	at	that	time.	Владимир Мухин, Бессилие антитеррора, Независимая Газета,	31.03.2010.	
http://www.ng.ru/politics/2010-03-31/1_antiterror.html
48	 A	 year	 earlier,	 the	 Russian	 Internal	 Troops	 had	 170,000	 soldiers.	 Анатолий Цыганок, 
Безопасность на Большом Кавказе,	 Icisecurity.ru,	 10.12.2012.	http://www.icisecurity.ru/
references/aktual_publications/kavkaz_bezopastost_12/
49	 Ibid.
50	 Ibid.
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Ministry	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	 single	 operations,	mainly	 in	 Dagestan).	 In	 the	
spring	of	2012	the	media	reported	that	large	numbers	of	troops	had	been	moved	
from	Chechnya	to	Dagestan.	Those	units,	however,	like	other	units	of	the	army	
deployed	in	the	North	Caucasus,	were	not	used	in	operations	against	the	mili-
tants	but	remained	in	the	locations	where	they	were	stationed.	It	was	only	in	
the	spring	of	2012,	after	a	six-year	respite,	that	army	units	became	involved	on	
a	limited	scale	in	local	anti-terror	operations,	following	a	decision	from	the	Na-
tional	Anti-terror	Committee	(NAK).51	The	total	presence	of	Russian	Ministry	
of	Defence	troops	in	the	region	is	estimated	at	110,000	soldiers.52	At	this	stage	
the	Ministry	of	Defence	units	cannot	be	regarded	as	a	party	of	the	Caucasus	
conflict	 (unlike	 the	 Interior	Ministry	 forces).	This	 situation	could	change	 in	
the	future,	though.
The	 siloviki	 have	 been	 combatting	 the	 armed	 underground	 by	 carrying	 out	
“anti-terror	operations”	which	can	take	different	forms	depending	on	the	lo-
cation	(the	 ‘liquidation’	of	militants	 in	residential	buildings	in	city	districts,	
blockades	 of	 entire	 villages	 and	 systematic	 searches	 for	 people	 in	 hiding	 or	
arms	depots	in	the	case	of	mountain	settlements,	or	attacks	on	Emirate	hidea-
ways	 in	difficult-to-access	 forest	ranges).	The	 term	 ‘operation’	usually	refers	
to	the	military	action	itself	as	well	as	the	legal	status	which	grants	the	siloviki	
involved	additional	powers,	e.g.	to	freely	enter	private	apartments.	The	“anti-
terror	operation	regime”	applies	to	a	precisely	defined	area	from	the	time	it	is	
announced	by	the	FSB	until	it	is	lifted;	usually	it	takes	between	several	hours	
to	several	days.
4. consequences for the region
In	recent	years	the	average	number	of	people	killed	in	the	Caucasus	war	has	
remained	stable	at	a	level	of	700–750	people	a	year,	while	the	number	of	those	
injured	has	been	falling.53	Dagestan	accounts	for	more	than	half	of	all	the	cas-
51	 They	 turned	out	 to	be	poorly	prepared	 for	fighting	 in	 the	mountains	and	suffered	 losses	
in	 those	 operations.	Источник: подразделения Минобороны спустя 6 лет привлекли 
к боевым действиям в Чечне, уже 4 жертвы,	Gazeta.ru,	8.10.2012.	http://www.gazeta.ru/
social/news/2012/10/08/n_2561873.shtml
52	 Анатолий Цыганок, Безопасность...,	op. cit.
53	 Statistics	quoted	here	and	below	on	the	numbers	of	casualties	in	the	North	Caucasus	con-
flict	come	from	the	Kavkaz-uzel.ru website	run	by	the	Memorial	association,	which	is	the	
most	authoritative	source	in	this	regard.	In	2010,	754	people	were	killed	and	956	wounded.	
In	2011,	750	were	killed	and	628	wounded.	In	2012,	700	killed	and	525	wounded.	Between	
January	and	September	2013,	373	were	killed	and	345	wounded.
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ualties,	 while	 Kabardino-Balkaria,	 Ingushetia	 and	 Chechnya	 exchange	 the	
top	places	following	Dagestan	(with	Ingushetia	reporting	the	 largest	ratio	of	
casualties	to	total	population),	followed	by	North	Ossetia,	Stavropol	Krai	and	
Karachay-Cherkessia	 (see	Appendices	 1	and	3).	On	8	October	2013	Aleksandr	
Bortnikov,	the	NAK	chairman	and	director	of	the	FSB,	said	that	144	cases	of	
terrorism	had	been	reported	in	Russia,	of	which	120	took	place	in	Dagestan.54	
According	to	the	International	Crisis	Group,	the	Caucasus	armed	conflict	is	the	
most	deadly	and	brutal	in	Europe.55
With	the	change	in	tactic	by	the	Emirate	–	i.e.	the	decision	not	to	attack	civil-
ian	targets	–	the	nature	of	the	civil	war	changed	noticeably;	before	early	2012	
it	was	possible	to	speak	(bearing	in	mind	that	such	terms	are	naturally	a	mat-
ter	of	convention)	of	a	‘total’	war	affecting	the	entire	population	of	the	North	
Caucasus,	albeit	in	varying	degrees,	while	after	that	point	the	conflict	became	
an	‘isolated’	war	limited	in	practice	to	the	militants	and	the	siloviki.	This	has	
also	been	reflected	in	the	statistics,	which	show	a	considerable	fall	in	the	num-
ber	of	civilian	casualties,	from	180	killed	and	489	injured	in	2010	(accounting	
for	more	than	39%	of	total	casualties)	to	89	killed	and	127	injured	in	2012	(less	
than	18%	of	 total	casualties).	The	numbers	of	killed	and	 injured	siloviki have	
remained	relatively	stable	(in	2012,	211	were	killed	and	389	injured,	accounting	
for	nearly	49%	of	total	casualties),	while	the	number	of	militant	casualties	has	
been	increasing	slightly	(409	killed	in	2012,	accounting	for	33%	of	total	casual-
ties,	and	14	detained)56,	see	also	Appendix	2.
As	the	nature	of	the	conflict	changed,	it	has	become	much	less	of	a	burden	for	
civilians.	The	frequency	of	various	checks	has	decreased	and	they	have	become	
54	 ФСБ: в 2013 году в РФ зафиксировано 144 террористических проявления, из них 120 – 
в Дагестане,	Kavkaz-uzel,	8.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231311/	
	 Another	high-ranking	 representative	 of	 the	NAK,	Evgeny	 Ilin,	 said	 in	October	 2013	 that	
more	than	98%	of	all	terrorist	crimes	were	committed	in	the	North	Caucasus	federal	dis-
trict.	На СКФО приходится 98% терактов в России – НАК,	Ekhokavkaza,	14.10.2013.	http://
www.ekhokavkaza.org/articleprintview/25136341.html
55	 The	North	 Caucasus:	 The	 Challenges	 of	 Integration	 (III),	 Governance,	 Elections,	 Rule	 of	
Law.	 Europe Report,	 No.226,	 September	 2013.	 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/eu-
rope/north-caucasus/226-north-caucasus-the-challenges-of-integration-iii-governance-
elections-rule-of-law.aspx.
56	 Figures	of	Kavkaz-uzel.ru.	No	data	is	available	on	the	number	of	injured	militants,	some	of	
them	were	probably	detained,	and	others	evacuated	by	fellow	militants	and	not	included	
in	the	statistics.	It	should	be	remembered	that	casualties	are	classified	as	militants	under	
communiqués	of	the	security	forces,	in	some	cases	confirmed	by	the	Emirate.	However,	in	
some	known	cases	it	was	claimed	that	a	killed	person	was	a	member	of	the	armed	under-
ground	while	in	reality	he	was	a	passer-by	who	died	as	a	result	of	a	terror	operation.
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much	less	inconvenient	(including	checks	at	the	borders	of	the	republics,	where	
currently	a	great	majority	of	vehicles	pass	without	being	stopped,	while	earlier	
nearly	all	cars	would	be	checked).	With	the	exception	of	Dagestan,	the	imposi-
tion	of	the	anti-terror	operation	regime	in	cities	is	only	exceptionally	still	ac-
companied	by	street	blockades	using	heavy	equipment,	and	an	atmosphere	of	
fear	and	tension	can	be	sensed	less	and	less	frequently	in	the	region.
As	mentioned	 above,	 it	 is	 very	difficult	 to	 assess	 the	 level	 of	 support	 for	 the	
armed	underground	among	the	public	in	the	Caucasus	republics,	even	approxi-
mately.	The	aversion	to	the	corrupt	bureaucracy,	widespread	in	the	region,	and	
the	progressing	de-Russification	and	de-modernisation	of	the	North	Caucasus	
could	add	credibility	to	the	assumption	that	the	militants	enjoy	the	sympathy,	or	
at	least	understanding,	of	sections	of	the	Caucasus	populations.57	Until	recently,	
the	militants	also	benefited	from	the	activities	of	the	police,	which	massively	
breached	the	rights	of	Muslims	by	persecuting	believers,	e.g.	bearded	men,	with	
arrests,	beatings,	or	very	brutal	interrogations	–	after	such	experiences	the	vic-
tims	would	often	 join	 the	 radicals.58	The	current	 situation	 is	 still	worrying,59	
but	some	improvement	has	been	reported,	mainly	due	the	fact	that	ever	fewer	
police	officers	have	their	origins	beyond	the	North	Caucasus	(deployed	in	the	
region	on	official	missions),	and	local	police	officers	have	to	take	note	of	pub-
lic	opinion	at	least	to	a	minimum	degree	(out	of	consideration	for	the	security	
of	 their	 families),	 and	moreover,	 they	are	 themselves	practicing	Muslims.	 In	
addition,	as	the	wages	in	the	police	have	increased,	service	has	become	more	
prestigious.	In	April	2012,	a	higher-ranking	police	officer	in	Kabardino-Balka-
ria	could	earn	as	much	as	50,000	roubles	monthly	(around	US$	1,500),	i.e.	three	
times	the	average	salary	in	the	republic,	while	a	lower-rank	police	functionary	
earned	30,000	roubles	(around	US$	900).	Those	developments	have	been	condu-
cive	to	a	polarisation	of	opinions	and	positions	on	the	armed	conflict.
57	 Those	processes	will	be	discussed	in	the	chapter	on	cultural	changes.
58	 Wojciech	Górecki,	‘Creeping’	civil	war...,	op. cit.
59	 See	 the	report	of	 the	European	Committee	 for	 the	Prevention	of	Torture,	drafted	on	 the	
basis	of	information	collected	during	a	study	visit	to	Dagestan,	Chechnya	and	North	Osse-
tia	in	2011,	published	in	Strasbourg	on	24	January	2013.	http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/
rus/2013-01-inf-eng.htm	
	 According	to	an	independent	trade	union	of	the	police	and	prosecution	authorities	in	Dagest-
an,	it	is	necessary	to	pay	a	bribe	of	3-500,000	roubles	(around	US$	9,200–15,400)	to	get	a	job	as	
a	low-ranking	police	functionary,	the	post	of	a	higher-ranking	officer	costs	around	one	mil-
lion	roubles	(around	US$	30,700),	while	the	post	of	a	minister	–	around	7	to	8	million	dollars.	
Those	paying	such	bribes	expect	to	recoup	the	money	within	a	short	time	span.	Светлана 
Болотникова, Сколько стоит пост главы дагестанского МВД?,	Bigcaucasus.com,	4.03.2013.	
http://www.bigcaucasus.com/events/topday/04-03-2013/82650-mvd_dagestan-0/
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III. SITuaTION IN ThE NOrTh caucaSuS SubjEcTS  
OF ThE ruSSIaN FEdEraTION
The	North	Caucasus	 republics	 and,	 to	 a	 lesser	 extent,	 the	 two	krais	 and	 the	
Rostov	Oblast,	are	governed	by	mafia-clan	groups	more	or	 less	disconnected	
from	the	societies.	Corruption	is	a	major	problem	everywhere	and,	according	
to	some	researchers,	it	will	be	a	greater	obstacle	to	the	region’s	development	
in	 the	 longer	 term	 than	 terrorism	and	 extremism,	 and	 is	 certainly	more	 of	
a	problem	than	ethnic	tensions,	which	currently	seldom	lead	to	serious	con-
flicts.60	Even	leaders	regarded	as	honest	and	not	corrupt,	such	as	Yunus-bek	
Yevkurov	of	Ingushetia,	are	not	able	to	effectively	combat	corruption	in	their	
countries,	which	they	themselves	admit.61
The	republics	all	share	a	similar,	very	difficult	economic	and	social	situation.	
They	occupy	the	lowest	positions	in	rankings	of	the	Russian	Federation’s	sub-
jects	in	terms	of	investment62	or	GDP	per	capita,	and	average	monthly	salaries	
per	person	can	be	as	much	as	fifty	per	cent	 lower	 than	 the	Russian	average	
(with	prices	only	10-15%	lower).63	Unemployment	rates	are	high,	with	the	high-
est	in	Ingushetia	at	47.68%	and	in	Chechnya	at	29.81%	(the	average	in	the	re-
maining	North	Caucasus	republics	ranges	between	8%	and	12%,	compared	to	
the	Russian	average	of	5.46%).64	Overpopulation	(due	to	high	birth	rates)	and	
the	scarcity	of	 land	are	causing	mass	migration	to	other	parts	of	Russia	 (es-
pecially	to	the	big	cities)65	and	abroad.	According	to	the	findings	of	a	research	
project	by	 the	Levada	Centre,	 the	armed	conflict	 is	not	 the	greatest	cause	of	
concern	for	people	in	the	region	–	it	is	instead	unemployment	and	poverty.66	
60	 OSW	interview	with	a	Chechen	political	scientist,	June	2013.
61	 Екатерина Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет Ингушетия сделала огромный рывок, но 
работы еще много,	Mir24,	11.03.2013.	http://mir24.tv/news/politics/6648308
62	 According	 to	 Rosstat	 (Федеральная служба государственной статистики,	 the	 Federal	
Statistical	 Service),	 during	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 2013,	 Chechnya,	 Ingushetia,	 Kabardino-
-Balkaria	and	Karachay-Cherkessia	did	not	receive	a	single	dollar	of	 foreign	 investment.	
http://www.gks.ru/wps/wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/publications/
catalog/doc_1140086420641
63	 Rosstat	figures	for	the	1st	half	of	2013.	Ibid.
64	 Official	figures	for	2012:	http://xn----8sbcbbscql7bijpi7ac0eweh.xn--p1ai/	
	 Unofficial	unemployment	estimates	are	even	higher,	at	around	60%	for	Ingushetia,	around	
40–50%	for	Chechnya	and	around	20%	for	the	remaining	republics.
65	 Which,	in	turn,	generates	conflict	situations.	This	issue,	as	well	as	other	aspects	of	the	rela-
tions	between	the	North	Caucasus	and	the	federal	centre,	will	be	discussed	in	the	chapter	
on	Moscow’s	strategies	towards	the	region.
66	 Социологи: жители Северного Кавказа опасаются безработицы и последствий 
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However,	remittances	sent	by	the	migrants	to	their	families	in	the	region,	as	
well	as	revenues	from	the	grey	economy	(putting	to	one	side	the	above	men-
tioned	corruption)	mitigate	this	difficult	situation	to	a	considerable	degree.67
In	2013	the	parliaments	of	Ingushetia	and	Dagestan	decided	that	the	heads	of	
those	Federation	subjects	would	not	be	elected	in	general	elections	(while	gen-
eral	 elections	 of	 governors	were	 restored	 in	Russia	 after	 eight	 years	 during	
which	leaders	of	Federation	subjects	were	nominated,68	with	individual	sub-
jects	of	the	Federation	being	offered	an	opt-out).	On	8	September	2013,	i.e.	the	
day	of	 local	elections	 in	Russia,	 the	Ingush	parliamentarians	elected	Yunus-
bek	Yevkurov	for	a	second	term	as	the	leader	of	Ingushetia,	and	the	members	
of	the	Dagestani	parliament	elected	Ramazan	Abdulatipov,	who	had	been	the	
country’s	acting	president	since	January	2013,	as	the	president	of	the	republic.	
The	terms	of	the	remaining	North	Caucasus	leaders	expire	in	the	years	2015–
2017,	but	the	parliament	of	North	Ossetia	has	already	decided	that	there	will	
be	no	general	election	in	that	republic,	either	(the	term	of	the	current	leader	
of	the	republic,	Taymuraz	Mamsurov,	ends	in	201569).	The	decisions	not	to	hold	
general	elections	are	clearly	designed	to	protect	the	interests	of	the	local	politi-
cal	elites,	concerned	about	potentially	losing	power	in	the	event	of	a	victory	of	
someone	 from	outside	 their	 circle	 (no	Federation	subjects	outside	 the	North	
Caucasus	have	chosen	to	use	the	opt-out	yet).
*
Since	the	beginning	of	this	decade,	dagestan has	been	the	most	unstable	re-
public	in	the	region,	accounting	for	more	than	half	of	the	total	number	of	peo-
ple	killed	in	the	armed	conflict.	Moreover,	this	proportion	has	been	growing:	
социального расслоения больше, чем терроризма,	Kavkaz-uzel,	28.01.2013.	http://www.
kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/219264/
67	 Compared	to	cities	in	central	Russia,	cities	in	the	region	are	more	neglected	–	this	refers	
in	particular	to	infrastructure	and	public	facilities,	while	private	houses	do	not	differ	in	
terms	of	 the	quality	and	standard	of	 furnishings	 from	those	 in	Russia,	even	 in	Moscow.	
Iwona	Kaliszewska	notes	that	“if	we	take	a	closer	look	at	their	everyday	life,	the	statistics	
seem	difficult	to	believe”	(Everyday	life	in	North	Caucasus,	http://www.udsc.gov.pl/files/
WIKP/info_pdf/Binder1_Kaukaz_ang.pdf).
68	 The	leaders	of	the	Russian	republics	are	called	heads	(глава	in	Russian).	Only	the	leaders	of	
Dagestan,	Tatarstan	and	Bashkortostan	have	still	retained	the	title	of	‘presidents’,	which	was	
used	commonly	before	the	end	of	the	last	decade,	but	in	future	is	going	to	be	reserved	only	for	
the	president	of	the	Russian	Federation.	The	leaders	or	krais	and	oblasts	are	called	governors.
69	 Парламент Северной Осетии принял поправки об отмене прямых выборов главы 
региона,	Kavkaz-uzel,	28.11.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/234254/
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in	2010,	378	people	died	there,	out	of	a	total	of	754	killed	in	the	entire	region;	in	
2011	the	figure	was	413	(out	of	750),	in	2012	it	was	405	(out	of	700),	and	in	the	first	
seven	months	of	2013	it	was	176	(out	of	287).
In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2013,	 the	 average	 salary	 in	 Dagestan	 was	 16,676	 roubles	
a	 month	 (around	 US$	 510),	 compared	 to	 the	 Russian	 average	 of	 23,076	 rou-
bles	 (around	US$	710).	The	population	growth	rate	was	11.9%	(17.5	births	and	
5.6	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants),	compared	to	the	Russian	average	of	
-0.8%.70	The	unemployment	rate	in	2012	fell	to	11.7%	(before	2007	it	had	never	
been	lower	than	20%,	in	2010	it	decreased	to	14.8%	and	in	2011	to	12.7%).71	In	2011	
the	republic	ranked	80th	in	Russia	(out	of	the	83	subjects	of	the	Federation)	in	
terms	of	the	number	of	cars	per	one	thousand	inhabitants	and	equal	81st	place	
(in	fact,	last	place	with	two	other	subjects)	in	terms	of	the	number	of	comput-
ers	per	one	hundred	workers.72
Ethnically,	the	republic	is	highly	diversified	–	it	is	populated	by	several	dozens	
of	nations	and	smaller	ethnic	groups,	and	fourteen	languages	are	recognised	
as	official.	Apart	from	the	armed	Islamic	underground,	several	criminal-busi-
ness	clans	are	operating	there	and	are	brutally	jostling	for	supremacy.	Other	
actors	 include	 the	 relatively	weak	 republic	 government	 as	 well	 as	 national	
movement	elites	and	groups	centred	on	the	major	religious	leaders.	On	the	one	
hand	this	multiplicity	of	actors	constantly	generates	conflicts	over	various	is-
sues,	but	on	the	other,	paradoxically,	it	helps	preserve	the	republic’s	integrity,	
since	no	single	actor	is	strong	enough	to	dominate	the	others,	and	a	dynamic	
balance	prevails	among	them.73	As	a	peculiar	‘side	effect’	of	this	fragmentation,	
70	 These	figures	and	data	in	the	following	sections	on	the	other	Federation	subjects	are	quoted	
after	Rosstat,	op. cit.
71	 These	 and	 other	 unemployment	 figures	 quoted	 after	 http://xn----8sbcbbscql7bijpi7ac0e-
weh.xn--p1ai/
72	 Figures	 on	 this	 subject	 taken	 from:	 http://www.gks.ru/bgd/regl/b12_14p/IssWWW.exe/
Stg/d01/01-04.htm
73	 In	1994,	a	State	Council	was	formed	in	Dagestan;	it	was	a	college	of	fourteen	members,	which	
constituted	a	collective	‘presidency’	established	in	order	to	ensure	stability	for	the	repub-
lic	in	a	situation	of	a	weakening	federal	government	following	the	break-up	of	the	USSR.	
National	constituencies	were	also	created,	which	could	nominate	candidates	of	only	one	
nationality	–	this	was	intended	to	ensure	parity	in	the	parliament	while	not	precluding	real	
election	struggle	(several	candidates	would	be	nominated	from	each	constituency)	and	not	
discriminating	against	anyone	(persons	of	different	nationalities	had	their	own	constitu-
encies).	When	Vladimir	Putin	came	to	power,	the	national	constituencies	were	abolished,	
which	 led	to	many	complications	 for	 the	republic	 (it	became	necessary	to	make	very	de-
tailed	arrangements	and	tediously	compile	election	lists	in	order	to	ensure	ethnic	parity	in	
the	parliament),	and	in	2006	Moscow	nominated	the	first	president	of	Dagestan.	As	a	result	
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Dagestan	also	has	a	free	press	–	a	journalist	who	covers	a	subject	inconvenient	
for	one	group	will	find	protectors	in	another.	In	this,	Dagestan	is	exceptional	
not	only	in	the	region,	but	also	in	Russia	as	a	whole.	The	forecast	of	a	break-up	
of	the	republic	and	a	‘war	of	all	against	all’,	which	experts	have	been	reiterat-
ing	since	at	least	the	mid-1990s,	have	failed	to	materialise,	although	instability	
has	been	growing	over	the	last	several	years.
One	of	the	axes	of	the	internal	Dagestani	conflict	concerns	the	rivalry	between	
those	professing	traditional	Islam	(in	Dagestan,	as	in	Chechnya,	this	current	
of	Islam	comprises	mainly	Sufi	brotherhoods),	and	the	adherents	of	Salafism,	
who	are	sufficiently	strong	in	the	republic	for	the	authorities	to	be	obliged	to	
tolerate	them.74	The	Salafis	control	a	number	of	mosques	and	some	sectors	of	
trade.	The	situation	in	the	republic	worsened	in	late	August	2012,	when	Sheikh	
Said	Afandi	 (Atsayev),	 the	most	 influential	 leader	of	 traditionalist	Muslims,	
was	assassinated.	Afandi,	who	exerted	a	major	 influence	on	political	 life,	as	
many	ministers,	parliamentarians	and	members	of	 the	official	 religious	au-
thorities	had	been	his	disciples,	advocated	dialogue	with	the	Salafis,	which	was	
contested	by	some	of	the	traditionalists,75	and	by	the	most	radical	Salafis	be-
hind	the	armed	Islamic	underground.	His	assassination	appears	to	have	been	
intended	to	incite	the	disruption	of	this	dialogue;	dialogue	nonetheless	contin-
ued	in	the	following	months	as	the	traditionalists	refrained	from	retaliatory	
actions	and	the	Salafis	distanced	themselves	from	the	attack.76	The	Salafis	are	
already	more	numerous	than	the	traditionalists,	and	are	usually	more	deeply	
religious.	Many	experts	share	the	opinion	that	their	superiority	will	be	grow-
ing,	and	would	be	growing	even	faster	if	not	for	the	support	offered	by	the	state	
structures	to	their	ideological	rivals.
of	those	changes,	the	local	government	lost	authority	and	became	increasingly	alienated.	
(Statement	by	a	Russian	sociologist,	November	2012).
74	 The	Salafis	became	stronger	 in	many	places,	especially	 in	the	mountains,	as	early	as	the	
1990s	 (the	villages	of	Karamakhi,	Chabanmakhi	and	Kadar	even	proclaimed	 themselves	
an	“independent	Islamic	territory”	and	lived	according	to	sharia).	Currently	it	 is	usually	
forbidden	to,	for	instance,	sell	alcohol	in	the	mountain	villages	(by	decision	of	a	majority	of	
inhabitants).	Dagestan	is	the	only	place	in	Russia	where	a	second	generation	of	Salafis	has	
already	reached	adulthood.
75	 Members	of	 the	central	 religious	authorities	have	questioned	 the	point	of	 such	dialogue	
(statements	by	members	of	the	Spiritual	Board	of	Muslims	of	European	Russia	in	a	meeting	
of	the	Valdai	Discussion	Club,	16–19	September	2013),	but	in	Dagestan,	the	secular	and	reli-
gious	authorities	(the	Spiritual	Board	of	Muslims	of	Dagestan)	believe	it	to	be	necessary.
76	 The	weakness	of	the	Dagestani	government	is	visible	in	the	fact	that	the	then	president	of	
Dagestan	called	on	people	to	create	self-defence	militias	in	the	entire	Dagestan	when	the	
country	faced	the	threat	of	riots	in	the	wake	of	the	assassination	of	Said	Afandi	(the	last	
time	such	militias	had	been	created	was	in	1999,	on	the	eve	of	the	Second	Chechen	War).
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In	chechnya,	the	number	of	victims	of	the	armed	conflict	has	been	decreas-
ing	systematically	 since	2010	 (having	risen	at	 the	 turn	of	 the	decade,	 in	 the	
final	phase	of	the	Second	Chechen	War	and	immediately	after	its	end).	In	2010,	
127	died	and	123	were	injured,	in	2011,	95	died	and	106	were	injured,	and	in	2012,	
82	died	and	92	were	injured.	During	the	first	seven	months	of	2013,	30	people	
were	killed	and	46	were	injured.
In	 the	 first	 half	 of	 2013,	 the	 average	monthly	 salary	 amounted	 to	 15,096	 rou-
bles	 (around	 US$	 460),	 and	 the	 population	 growth	 rate	 was	 as	 high	 as	 19%	
(24.1	births	and	5.1	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	The	current	unemploy-
ment	rate	of	nearly	30%	is	the	lowest	since	2006,	when	unemployment	statistics	
first	started	to	be	complied	for	the	republic	(the	official	unemployment	rate	in	
that	year	was	67.7%;	it	had	fallen	to	43.3%	by	2010	and	to	37.3%	in	2011).	In	terms	of	
the	number	of	cars	per	one	thousand	inhabitants,	Chechnya	was	in	last-but-one	
position	in	Russia	in	2011	(ahead	of	the	Chukotka	Autonomous	District).
Unlike	Dagestan,	Chechnya	is	a	mono-ethnic	republic	–	the	Chechens	account	
for	more	than	95%	of	the	population	(compared	to	66%	in	1989).	Traditional	Islam	
is	the	dominant	religion,	while	Salafism	is	banned.	The	policies	of	the	Chechen	
leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov	are	conducive	 to	 the	strengthening	of	 the	position	of	
religion	–	Kadyrov	has	been	introducing	elements	of	sharia	into	the	local	legis-
lation,	which	has	led	to	questions	about	the	compliance	of	such	rules	with	the	
constitution	of	the	Russian	Federation.77	In	practice,	three	legal	systems	operate	
in	the	republic:	Russian	law	based	on	Roman	law,	sharia	law,	and	customary	law	
(the	adats).	They	refer	to	different	spheres	of	life	(public,	family,	relations	among	
neighbours,	etc.),	and	where	they	overlap,	the	choice	of	the	legal	system	to	be	
applied	depends	on	the	context	and	the	specificity	of	the	given	social	group.78	In	
mid-2013,	a	concept	of	the	Chechen	national	 ideology	was	developed	on	Kady-
rov’s	request.	It	is	based	on	a	dynamic	balance	among	three	elements,	none	of	
which	should	dominate:	1)	Chechnya	as	part	of	Russia,	2)	Chechnya	as	the	coun-
try	of	the	Chechens,	and	3)	Chechnya	as	an	Islamic	republic.79
77	 According	to	a	Chechen	political	scientist,	Chechnya	makes	the	most	of	the	legal	options	
offered	by	the	federative	system	of	Russia,	but	it	does	not	exceed	its	limitations	(OSW	inter-
view	with	a	Chechen	political	scientist...,	op. cit.).	For	more	information,	see	the	box	on	the	
ambitions	of	Ramzan	Kadyrov.
78	 Iwona	Kaliszewska,	Everyday	life...,	op. cit.
79	 OSW	interview	with	a	Chechen	political	scientist...,	op. cit.	The	researcher	explained	that	in	
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Chechnya	is	relatively	stable,	especially	compared	to	the	neighbouring	republics	
of	Dagestan	and	Ingushetia,	and	its	government	have	also	managed	to	consid-
erably	reduce	common	crime.	However,	this	has	been	achieved	at	the	expense	
of	eliminating	the	opposition,	and	of	repressions	against	a	number	of	groups,	
including	human	rights	activists	and	the	families	of	militants.80	Ramzan	Kady-
rov’s	autocratic	rule,	 in	 turn,	has	been	made	possible	due	 to	 the	changes	 that	
transformed	Chechen	society	as	a	result	of	 the	 two	wars.	First	of	all,	 the	role	
of	clans	diminished	–	their	 leaders	no	 longer	enjoy	such	great	authority	since	
the	former	commanders	took	over	spiritual	leadership	after	the	first	war	and,	at	
present,	it	is	Kadyrov	himself	who	has	concentrated	all	the	instruments	of	pow-
er	including	money,	support	of	the	clergy	and	good	relations	with	Moscow,	in	his	
hands.	In	this	situation	the	clans	are	no	longer	able	to	fulfil	their	basic	function	
(self-defence	and	comprehensive	protection	of	the	clan	members),	which	opens	
the	way	to	the	formation	of	a	modern	nation.	Those	dissatisfied	with	the	current	
economic	and	social	situation,	i.e.	the	unemployment,	low	salaries,	lack	of	pros-
pects,	and	also	with	the	political	situation)	leave	for	Russia	or	abroad.	Emigration	
intensified	in	2013	–	during	the	first	six	months	nearly	10,000	Russian	citizens,	
a	decisive	majority	of	them	Chechens,	claimed	asylum	in	Germany	alone	(which	
is	86.5%	more	than	in	the	corresponding	period	of	2012).81
ramzan Kadyrov’s ambitions
In	 the	medium	 term,	 and	 especially	 the	 long	 term,	 the	 ambitions	 of	 the	
Chechen	 leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov	may	pose	no	 less	a	 threat	 to	 the	stabil-
ity	of	the	region	and	the	territorial	integrity	of	Russia	than	the	activities	
of	the	Caucasus	Emirate.	Due	to	his	effective	and	uncompromising	policy,	
Kadyrov	has	managed	to	gain	much	greater	power	than	the	separatist	pres-
idents	Dzhokhar	Dudayev	and	Aslan	Maskhadov	enjoyed	and,	paradoxical-
ly,	has	become	much	more	independent	of	Moscow	than	they	were.	Having		
established	full	control	of	Chechnya,	Kadyrov	now	seeks	to	gain	control	of	
the	USSR,	the	first	element	was	dominant,	i.e.	the	Kremlin	decided	on	everything.	Dzhokhar	
Dudayev	emphasised	the	second	element,	i.e.	the	national	and	ethnic	element	while	under-
estimating	Islam	and	seeking	to	break	all	ties	with	Russia.	This	ethnic	separatism	led	to	the	
outbreak	of	the	First	Chechen	War	according	to	the	researcher.	Under	Aslan	Maskhadov’s	
rule,	the	third	element,	i.e.	Islam,	dominated	the	entirety	of	public	life	in	Chechnya,	which	
contributed	to	the	outbreak	of	the	Second	Chechen	War.	Ramzan	Kadyrov	has	been	imple-
menting	this	ideology	in	practice	for	some	time	already.
80	 For	more	information,	see:	Ramzan	Kadyrov’s	ambitions.
81	 В Германии зафиксирован массовый приток беженцев-чеченцев из России, Newsru.com,	
17.07.2013.	http://newsru.com/world/17jul2013/cheger_print.html.	The	discussion	on	the	caus-
es	of	the	rapid	increase	in	the	number	of	asylum	applications	is	beyond	the	scope	of	this	paper.
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Ingushetia	and	at	least	a	part	of	Dagestan,	and	ultimately,	perhaps,	even	the	
entire	North-East	Caucasus.
Kadyrov	has	been	able	 to	 reach	his	 current	position	due	 to	 the	policy	of	
Chechenisation.82	 Initially,	 his	 independence	 was	 limited	 by	 influential	
groups	in	Chechnya,	which	also	advocated	co-operation	with	Moscow.	Over	
time,	 though,	he	managed	 to	 subordinate	or	 eliminate	 them.	The	break-
through	came	with	the	disbanding,	in	November	2008,	of	two	Spetsnaz	GRU	
battalions	(“West”	and	“East”),	which	had	been	part	of	the	42nd	Motor	Rifle	
Division	of	the	Russian	Armed	Forces.83	The	two	units,	manned	by	ethnic	
Chechens,	had	been	created	five	years	earlier	and	their	commanders,	Said-
Magomed	Kakiyev	and	Sulim	Yamadayev,	had	good	 links	 in	 the	Russian	
Ministry	of	Defence	(while	Kadyrov	at	that	time	was	believed	to	be	a	protégé	
of	the	Interior	Ministry	and	the	FSB).	The	two	battalions	were	disbanded	
as	 a	 result	 of	 actions	 taken	by	Kadyrov,	who	 accused	 their	 commanders	
and	soldiers	of	a	number	of	offences,	and	even	sent	an	arrest	warrant	for	
Yamadayev.84	By	2011,	Kadyrov	had	no	major	opponents	left	in	the	republic	
(many	people	had	 left	Chechnya),	 and	 it	 became	 impossible	 to	 openly	or	
publicly	criticise	him	or	the	security	forces	and	the	administration	of	jus-
tice.	According	to	human	rights	activists,	the	republic	has	witnessed	and	is	
still	witnessing	cases	of	people	being	intimidated	or	terrorised	using	such	
methods	as	extrajudicial	killings,	hostage	taking,	kidnapping,	torture,	or	
detention	 in	private	prisons.85	Organisations	and	persons	whose	mission	
82	 Chechenisation	 is	 discussed	 in	more	 detail	 in	 the	 section	 on	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 Caucasus	
Emirate.
83	 Rozformowanie	batalionów	„Wschód”	i	„Zachód”	w	Czeczenii,	Tydzień na Wschodzie, OSW,	
19.11.2008.
84	 Originating	from	the	town	of	Gudermes,	the	Yamadayev	family	was	the	main	force	op-
posing	Kadyrov	in	Chechnya	in	the	second	half	of	the	2000s	(apart	from	the	militants).	
It	ceased	to	play	a	significant	role	following	the	assassinations	of	its	two	most	prominent	
members,	i.e.	Ruslan,	a	former	deputy	to	the	Russian	State	Duma	(killed	on	24	September	
2008	in	Moscow)	and	his	brother,	Sulim	(killed	on	28	March	2009	in	Dubai).	The	third	
brother,	Isa,	blamed	the	Chechen	leader	for	their	deaths,	as	well	as	for	failed	assassina-
tion	 attempts	directed	 at	himself,	 but	 then	backed	down	on	 the	 accusations	 and	on	 23	
August	2010	became	reconciled	with	Kadyrov	–	this	was	an	indication	that	the	latter	had	
in	practice	established	a	monopoly	on	the	system	of	power	in	Chechnya	(the	fourth	Yama-
dayev	brother,	Dzhabrail,	had	died	back	in	2003,	and	the	fifth	and	the	sixth,	i.e.	Badrudin	
and	Musa,	are	alive,	but	they	do	not	take	an	active	part	in	public	life).	Kadyrov’s	possible	
involvement	in	the	assassinations	of	the	Yamadayevs,	and	of	six	other	prominent	oppo-
nents	who	died	in	attacks	in	Russia,	Azerbaijan,	Turkey	and	in	the	West	in	late	2008	and	
early	2009,	has	not	been	proven.
85	 See	e.g.	Российские правозащитники получили международный приз за работу в Чечне,	
Lenta.ru,	9.10.2013.	http://lenta.ru/news/2013/10/09/watchdog/
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is	to	document	such	cases	are	unable	carry	out	their	work86	–	Natalya	Es-
temirova,	 an	activist	 from	 the	Memorial	 association	was	kidnapped	and	
murdered	on	15	July	2009	and	has	become	a	symbol	of	the	victims.
Kadyrov’s	authoritarian	rule	rests	on	the	armed	formations	he	controls,	es-
pecially	the	“North”	and	“South”	battalions,	which	are	formally	part	of	the	
46th	Brigade	of	the	Internal	Troops	of	the	Russian	Interior	Ministry,87	and	
the	units	of	the	guard	of	the	Head	of	Republic,	known	as	Kadyrovtsy).	The	
Chechen	leader	has	been	legitimising	his	power	by	representing	himself	as	
a	Chechen	patriot	and	a	pious	Muslim,	and	highlighting	such	notions	as	na-
tional	pride,	loyalty	to	the	faith	of	the	ancestors,	or	the	sacredness	and	invi-
olability	of	the	family.88	An	important	element	in	the	formation	of	this	new	
Chechen	identity	(which	it	was	possible	to	start	building	due	to	the	weak-
ening	of	the	role	of	clans	mentioned	above)	concerns	the	cult	of	Akhmad	
Kadyrov	as	the	founding	father	of	the	new	republic,	which	resembles	the	
cult	of	Heydar	Aliyev	in	Azerbaijan,	albeit	on	a	smaller	scale.	Portraits	of	
Akhmad	Kadyrov,	who	was	both	a	politician	and	a	Muslim	clergyman,	are	
displayed	on	entrance	gates	to	towns	and	villages,	next	to	portraits	of	Putin	
and,	less	frequently,	of	Ramzan	Kadyrov	himself.	The	“North”	battalion,	the	
Akhmad	Arena	stadium	in	Grozny	and	the	“Heart	of	Chechnya”	mosque	in	
Grozny	are	among	the	facilities	in	Chechnya	that	bear	the	name	of	Akhmad	
Kadyrov,	and	the	Chechen	capital	hosts	an	Akhmad	Kadyrov	Museum.	The	
researcher	Sergei	Markedonov	has	referred	to	the	programme	being	im-
plemented	by	Ramzan	Kadyrov	as	“new	nationalism”.89
86	 This	has	been	mentioned	for	instance	in	the	most	recent	annual	report	of	Human	Rights	
Watch	 (World	 Report	 2013):	 http://www.hrw.org/world-report/2013/country-chapters/
russia?page=2
87	 Since	2010,	new	soldiers	 for	battalions	come	 from	the	draft	–	Chechen	recruits	have	not	
served	 in	military	units	 outside	Chechnya	 since	 1992. Власти Чечни приняли решение 
о проведении осеннего призыва с 1 октября,	Kavkaz-uzel,	29.09.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-
uzel.ru/articles/230805/
88	 In	doing	this,	Kadyrov	does	not	refer	back	to	the	legacy	of	Imam	Shamil	(an	Avar	by	nation-
ality),	as	the	Caucasus	Emirate	does.	Instead,	he	invokes	the	legacy	of	Kunta	Haji,	a	Chechen	
Sufi	 sheikh	who	advocated	 resisting	 tsarist	Russia	using	peaceful	methods.	 It	 is	notable	
that	Kadyrov’s	catalogue	of	values	resembles	the	informal	“conservative-Orthodox	project”	
which	has	been	undergoing	implementation	in	Russia	since	the	beginning	of	Vladimir	Pu-
tin’s	third	term	(see	the	Russian	president’s	address	to	the	Valdai	Discussion	Club	on	19	Sep-
tember	2013:	http://www.kremlin.ru/news/19243).
89	 Sergey	Markedonov,	 A	 Patchwork	 Puzzle,	The American Interest,	 13.05.2013.	 http://www.
the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=1425
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Kadyrov	has	 introduced	some	elements	of	 the	sharia	to	the	Chechen	leg-
islation	 and	 legal	 practice,	 including	 restrictions	 on	 the	 sale	 of	 alcohol	
(which	can	be	bought	 legally	only	between	8.00	and	 10.00	a.m.	 in	a	 few,	
selected	stores)	and	the	obligation	for	 female	officials,	 television	anchors	
and	 students	 to	wear	headscarves.	There	are	 two	 religious	academies	 in	
Chechnya,	including	the	Kunta	Haji	Russian	Islamic	University	in	Grozny	
and	 the	 Akhmad	 Kadyrov	 Islamic	 Institute	 in	 Kurchaloy),	 20	madrasas	
(high	 schools),	 as	well	 as	 four	hafiz	 schools,	 i.e.	 schools	 for	Quran	 recit-
ers	(in	October	2013	the	construction	of	a	fifth	was	launched).90	There	are	
700	working	mosques	 in	Chechnya.	Built	 in	2008,	 the	“Heart	of	Chechn-
ya”	mosque	mentioned	above	is	the	largest	in	Russia—it	can	accommodate	
10,000	worshippers,	and	its	minarets	are	62	metres	high.	In	2013	Kadyrov	
put	forward	the	mosque	for	a	nation-wide	competition	of	natural	or	archi-
tectural	symbols	of	Russia.	By	mobilising	people	in	Chechnya	and	possibly	
also	 the	neighbouring	republics	 (the	voting	was	performed	via	e-mail	or	
text	message)	the	mosque	was	in	the	top	position	for	a	long	time	and	ulti-
mately	made	it	to	the	top	ten.91
Due	 to	activity	of	 this	 type,	 the	Chechen	 leader	enjoys	genuine	popular-
ity	 among	 sections	 of	 the	Chechen	public	 despite	 his	 heavy-handed	 rule	
(according	to	Alexei	Malashenko,	Kadyrov	has	a	stable	level	of	support	of	
around	50%	of	Chechens92).	He	can	certainly	be	credited	for	having	rebuilt	
the	capital	and	the	entire	republic	–	today	it	is	difficult	to	find	any	traces	of	
90	 В Чечне начато строительство пятой школы хафизов,	Kavkaz-uzel,	8.10.2013.	http://www.
kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231283/
91	 The	official	website	of	the	competition	is:	http://10russia.ru/	
	 Chechen	officials	were	tasked	with	sending	e-mails	and	text	messages	for	a	specified	num-
ber	of	hours	daily.	When	the	mosque	fell	into	the	second	position	in	the	final	phase	of	the	
competition’s	second	round,	Kadyrov	accused	the	telecom	operators	of	fraud	(alleging	they	
had	been	blocking	text	messages	coming	from	the	Caucasus),	said	he	would	withdraw	the	
“Heart	of	Chechnya”	from	the	competition,	and	threatened	to	refer	the	case	to	the	prosecu-
tion	authorities	(Илья Попов, Россия 10 лишилась	„Сердца Чечни”, Московский Комсомолец,	
31.08.2013).	The	competition	organisers	caved	in	and	the	mosque	finally	finished	in	equal	
first	place	with	 the	winning	Kolomna	Kremlin.	The	case	may	have	had	a	business	back-
ground:	after	the	jury’s	first	decision,	the	stores	of	the	all-Russian	telecom	operators	were	
demolished	in	Chechnya	and	Kadyrov	announced	that	he	would	not	pick	up	calls	from	their	
subscribers,	to	the	benefit	of	the	local	provider,	Vainakh	Telecom.
92	 OSW	 interview	with	Professor	Alexei	Malashenko,	 June	2011.	 It	 should	be	expected	 that	
when	the	generation	which	does	not	remembers	the	war,	i.e.	those	born	after	2007,	reach-
es	adulthood,	the	rate	of	acceptance	of	heavy-handed	rule	will	start	to	decline	noticeably	
(OSW	interview	with	a	Chechen	political	scientist...,	op. cit.;	Муса Мусаев, От вайнахской 
стабилизации к дагестанской неопределенности,	 Kavpolit.com,	 6.08.2013.	 http://
kavpolit.com/ot-vajnaxskoj-stabilizacii-k-dagestanskoj-neopredelennosti/).
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war	damage	in	Grozny,	and	investments	(in	industrial	plants,	gas	pipelines,	
road	infrastructure)	are	also	reaching	smaller	towns.	After	nearly	twenty	
years	of	unrest	and	war,	Kadyrov’s	efforts	to	provide	people	with	opportu-
nities	to	relax	and	entertain	themselves	at	various	festivals	and	anniversa-
ries,	to	which	he	invites	world-famous	film	stars,	sportspeople	and	singers,	
also	add	to	his	popularity	(in	addition	to	being	a	means	of	propaganda).93	
The	investments	and	festivities	are	largely	financed	from	grants	from	the	
central	budget	of	Russia;	it	is	difficult	to	estimate	the	sum	which	is	being	
distributed	 through	 the	 Akhmad	 Kadyrov	 Foundation,	 which	 demon-
strates	the	efficacy	of	the	Chechen	leader’s	policy	(in	Chechnya	some	people	
believe	that	this	proves	that	Moscow	has	admitted	defeat	in	the	war,	since	
it	is	normally	the	loser	who	pays	reparations	to	the	winner).
Kadyrov	has	been	using	the	funds	provided	by	Moscow	and	his	exceptional	
(if	 informal)	status	not	only	 to	rebuild	Chechnya,	but	also	 to	 further	ex-
pand	his	independence	and	reinforce	his	position.	The	international	flights	
from	Grozny	airport,	which	enable	the	export	and	import	of	commodities	
practically	beyond	any	control	by	the	Russian	customs	services,	are	one	of	
the	means	to	this	end.	Another	is	Kadyrov’s	own	historical	policy,	one	of	
the	manifestations	of	which	consisted	 in	 the	unveiling,	on	 15	September	
2013	 (on	 the	 locally	 celebrated	Chechen	Woman’s	Day)	 of	 a	monument	 to	
the	Caucasus	girls	who	died	in	the	years	1817-1864.	Located	in	the	village	of	
Khangish-Yurt,	the	monument	commemorates	an	event	in	1819	when	local	
girls	captured	by	Russian	soldiers	threw	themselves	into	the	Terek	River,	
taking	 their	 captors	 with	 them.	 Commenting	 on	 the	monument,	 Alexei	
Zhuravlyov,	a	Russian	deputy	to	the	Duma,	said	that	it	was	an	anti-Russian	
gesture	by	the	Chechen	leadership.94	In	another,	anarchistic	and	very	wor-
rying	sign	of	Chechnya’s	independence,	Kadyrov’s	personal	bodyguard	and	
functionaries	 of	 the	 Chechen	 Interior	Ministry	 can	 freely	move	 around	
Russia	bearing	arms	and	conducting	various	operations	without	notifying	
the	local	security	forces,	and	enjoy	de facto	impunity.95
93	 The	actor	Steven	Seagal,	 the	violinist	Vanessa	Mae	and	the	 legends	of	Brazilian	 football:	
Cafu,	Bebeto,	Dunga,	Romario	and	Zico	are	among	the	celebrities	who	have	visited	Grozny.	
When	Gérard	Depardieu	was	granted	Russian	citizenship,	Kadyrov	offered	the	French	ac-
tor	an	apartment	in	one	of	the	high-rise	building	in	the	Grozny-City	compound.
94	 Депутат Госдумы требует проверить законность установки в Чечне памятника 
девушкам, погибшим во время Кавказской войны,	Kavkaz-uzel,	21.09.2013.	http://www.
kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/230424/.	On	3	December	2013	Zhuravlyov	was	physically	assaulted	
at	the	Duma	by	a	Chechen	deputy	Adam	Delimkhanov,	a	close	associate	of	Ramzan	Kadyrov.
95	 Novaya Gazeta	 reported	on	a	case	of	a	group	of	such	 functionaries	who	were	detained	 in	
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The	Chechen	leader	declares	loyalty	to	Russia,	of	which	Vladimir	Putin	is	
the	personification	in	his	view	(the	main	alley	in	Grozny	is	split	into	two	
sections,	one	named	after	Akhmad	Kadyrov,	the	other	after	Putin),	but	at	
the	same	time	he	makes	sure	he	demonstrates	that	in	Chechnya,	he	is	the	
master	of	the	house.	During	President	Dmitry	Medvedev’s	visit	to	Grozny	
Kadyrov	picked	up	his	phone	and	talked	in	Chechen	for	several	minutes,	to	
the	dismay	of	the	Russian	president	and	his	entourage.96	Such	behaviour	is	
admired	by	some	Chechens,	impressed	by	the	fact	that	their	leader	has	no	
sense	of	inferiority	regarding	Russia.
Moscow	initially	tolerated	Kadyrov’s	methods,	regarding	the	human	rights	
violations	as	a	necessary	cost	of	 the	fight	against	 terrorism	(in	 the	years	
2004-2008	Kadyrov	 indeed	managed	 to	contain	 the	militants’	operations	
into	smaller	areas	and	to	supress	their	activities	in	Chechnya),	and	the	dis-
plays	of	attachment	to	national	traditions	and	Islam	as	a	necessary	gesture	
to	the	moderate	separatists	and	advocates	of	sharia	law.	Today,	tolerating	
all	this	is	no	longer	a	choice,	but	rather	a	necessity	for	Russia.	The	two	sides	
have	found	themselves	in	stalemate—formally	dependent	on	the	Kremlin,	
Kadyrov	has	become	practically	impossible	to	remove	because	Chechnya’s	
stability	rests	on	his	shoulders.	He	nevertheless	enjoys	full	power	 in	the	
republic	while	also	depending	on	money	from	Moscow.
Ramzan	Kadyrov	likes	to	speak	on	behalf	of	the	entire	region	of	the	North	
Caucasus.	In	2012	the	Chechen	government	financed	a	Hajj	(the	pilgrimage	
to	Mecca)	for	140-person	groups	from	the	neighbouring	North	Caucasus	re-
publics.97	In	August	2013,	two	demonstrations	were	held	in	Grozny	to	pro-
test	against	the	discrimination	against	people	of	the	North	Caucasus	origin	
in	central	Russia.98	Kadyrov	has	repeatedly	called	for	the	reunification	of	
Chechnya	and	Ingushetia,	suggesting	that	he	would	see	himself	as	the	lead-
er	of	the	new	republic.	When	the	Ingush	leader	Yunus-bek	Yevkurov	was	
in	hospital	in	Moscow	in	summer	2009,	recovering	from	injuries	sustained	
Moscow	on	charges	of	kidnapping	and	severely	beating	a	man.	They	were	allegedly	released	
at	the	request	of	the	FSB	after	it	received	an	order	“from	the	very	top”	to	leave	Kadyrov’s	peo-
ple	alone	until	the	Sochi	Olympics.	Сергей Канев, Москва-Юрт,	Новая Газета, 25.03.2013.	
http://www.novayagazeta.ru/inquests/57374.html
96	 After	hanging	up,	he	said	it	was	his	mother	calling.	A	video	of	this	incident	is	available	online.
97	 Паломники из Дагестана и Чечни готовятся к хаджу,	 Newsru.com,	 25.09.2013.	 http://
newsru.com/religy/25sep2013/hajj.html
98	 В Грозном намечен пикет против дискриминации уроженцев Северного Кавказа 
в регионах России,	Kavkaz-Uzel,	21.08.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/228855/
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in	an	assassination	attempt,	armed	units	of	the	Chechen	Interior	Ministry	
carried	out	operations	against	the	armed	underground	in	Ingushetia,	ex-
plaining	that	in	the	circumstances	they	had	to	take	responsibility	for	both	
republics.	The	raid	of	the	Chechen	police	into	Arshty	in	Ingushetia	in	April	
201399	was	probably	intended	to	test	how	the	Kremlin	and	the	Ingush	lead-
ership	would	respond	to	a	potential	forceful	variant	of	reunification.	The	
absence	of	a	firm	reaction	from	Moscow,	which	probably	feared	an	escala-
tion	in	the	run-up	to	the	Sochi	Olympics,	will	encourage	the	Chechen	lead-
ership	to	make	new	attempts	in	the	direction	outlined	by	the	law,	adopted	
by	 the	 Chechen	 parliament	 in	 late	 January	 2013	 and	 signed	 by	Kadyrov,	
which	expands	Chechnya’s	borders	to	include	a	number	of	towns	belong-
ing	to	Ingushetia.100	Ramzan	Kadyrov	has	also	mentioned	on	several	occa-
sions	that	Chechnya	needs	access	to	the	sea,	which	should	be	interpreted	as	
territorial	claims	being	made	against	Dagestan.	Unless	Moscow	curbs	his	
ambitions,	he	will	presumably	escalate	his	clams.
*
The	absolute	casualty	numbers	in	the	armed	conflict	in	Ingushetia are	com-
parable	to	the	figures	for	Chechnya	(134	killed	and	192	injured	in	2010,	70	killed	
and	38	injured	in	2011,	84	killed	and	83	injured	in	2012;	and	25	killed	and	44	in-
jured	between	January	and	July	2013),	but	bearing	in	mind	that	its	population	
is	three	times	smaller,	Ingushetia	should	be	regarded	as	the	most	severely	af-
fected	by	the	consequences	of	the	armed	conflict.
In	the	first	half	of	2013,	the	average	monthly	salary	in	the	republic	was	as	low	
as	11,728	roubles	(around	US$	360,	the	lowest	figure	in	Russia).	The	population	
was	growing	at	a	rate	of	16.6%	(20.3	births	and	3.7	deaths	per	one	thousand	in-
habitants).	In	2012	the	unemployment	rate	of	47.7%,	the	highest	in	Russia,	had	
decreased	 slightly	 compared	 to	 the	 three	preceding	years	 (48.2%,	 49.7%	and	
53.2%,	respectively).	Ingushetia	ranks	in	one	of	the	lowest	positions	in	Russia	
in	terms	of	access	to	various	consumer	goods.
99	 See	the	section	on	the	situation	in	Ingushetia	for	more	information	on	this	operation.
100	 Сергей Маркедонов, Кадыров и Евкуров: спор соседей в контексте „пограничных” 
проб лем, Caucasustimes.com, 13.08.2012. http://www.caucasustimes.com/article.asp?id = 
21063; Евкуров:  Су нженский район Ингушетии – неотъемлемая часть территории 
республики, Kavkaz-uzel, 13.03.2013. http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/221325/
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Unlike	in	Chechnya,	the	clan	structures	in	Ingushetia	persist	and	continue	to	
provide	the	basic	form	of	social	organisation.	For	this	reason	the	clan	leaders,	
usually	very	wealthy	people,	enjoy	much	greater	authority	than	the	leader	of	
the	republic,	who	is	not	in	a	position	to	provide	financial	assistance	to	some-
one	requiring	it	(while	such	assistance	is	available	from	the	clan	leaders,	and	
in	Chechnya	directly	from	Kadyrov).	According	to	one	survey,	Yevkurov’s	ap-
proval	ratings	were	as	 low	as	1.3%	in	the	summer	of	2013,101	but	the	approval	
ratings	of	potential	candidates	to	replace	him	were	not	much	higher.	The	only	
exception	 was	 Ruslan	 Aushev,	 the	 first	 president	 of	 Ingushetia	 (1993-2002)	
who	has	withdrawn	 from	active	political	 life	 after	 leaving	office,	but	 is	 still	
involved	in	various	popular	social	initiatives.	To	his	credit,	Yevkurov	has	man-
aged	to	reconcile	the	86	feuding	families	of	Ingushetia,	which	were	obligated	to	
a	bloody	vendetta	under	the	country’s	customary	law.102	Unlike	in	Chechnya,	
opposition	 is	operating	without	 impediment	 in	 Ingushetia	and	 it	 consists	of	
various	organisations	and	social	movements	which	are	able	 to	convene	con-
gresses,	hold	meetings,	etc.
Tense	relations	with	the	neighbouring	republics	of	Chechnya	and	North	Os-
setia	are	a	major	problem	for	Ingushetia.	The	most	serious	incident	recently	
took	place	on	18	April	2013	when	around	300	Chechen	police	officers	entered	
the	border	village	of	Arshty	inhabited	mostly	by	Chechens.103	The	roots	of	the	
clash	between	the	two	ethnically	close	republics	date	back	to	the	years	1944–
1957	when	the	Soviet	authorities	first	disbanded	the	Chechen–Ingush	Auton-
omous	Republic	and	deported	 the	Chechens	and	 the	 Ingush	 to	Central	Asia,	
and	then,	following	the	return	of	the	two	nations	to	the	Caucasus,	restored	the	
country	but	with	different	borders.104	For	example	the	Prigorodny	District	near	
101	 Блиц-опрос “ДОШ”: при прямых выборах глав Дагестана и Ингушетии люди голосовали 
бы против всех кандидатов,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	 2.09.2013.	 https://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti-
cles/229389/.
	 According	 to	 the	 same	 source	 (the	Dosh quarterly	 published	 in	Moscow	 and	 in	Grozny),	
Yevkurov’s	approval	ratings	were	8.7%	in	2011	and	4.8%	in	2012.
102	 Евкуров поблагодарил представителей трех ингушских семей, простивших своих 
“кровников”,	Kavkaz-uzel,	15.03.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/221446/.
103	 Politicians,	 including	 the	Russian	State	Duma	deputy	Adam	Delimkhanov,	 accompanied	
the	 police	 officers.	 The	 raid	 was	 carried	 out	 under	 the	 pretext	 of	 searching	 for	 Dokku	
Umarov,	but	according	 to	 the	Russian	authorities	 the	real	purpose	was	 to	hold	a	rally	 in	
Arshty	to	demand	that	the	village	be	incorporated	into	Chechnya.	The	incident,	which	had	
probably	been	instigated	by	Ramzan	Kadyrov,	met	with	no	serious	reaction	on	the	part	of	
the	federal	government.	Wojciech	Górecki,	Chechen-Ingush	border	dispute,	Eastweek	OSW,	
24.04.2013.	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-04-24/chechen-ingush-
border-dispute
104	 See	footnote	6.
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Vladikavkaz,	which	was	mostly	inhabited	by	the	Ingush,	remained	with	North	
Ossetia	(after	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union	this	led	to	the	Ingush-Ossetian	
war).	 The	 village	 of	Arshty	 found	 itself	 in	 the	new	 republic	 Ingushetia	 (the	
smallest	Federation	subject	in	terms	of	territory)	after	the	1992	split	of	Chech-
en-Ingushetia,	 but	 the	 border	 between	 the	 two	 republics	was	 not	 precisely	
delineated.	An	 escalation	 of	 the	Chechen-Ingush	 conflict	 could	 entail	major	
disruption	for	the	entire	region,	with	a	new	outbreak	of	the	Ingush-Ossetian	
conflict	and	spill-over	effects	in	the	neighbouring	areas	of	the	North	Caucasus.
*
The	situation	in	North Ossetia is	relatively	stable.	Still	in	2010,	24	people	were	
killed	 and	 171	 wounded	 in	 the	 republic	 (most	 of	 this	 number	 were	 victims	
of	 the	attack	on	a	 local	market	 in	Vladikavkaz),	but	 in	2011	only	 four	deaths	
were	reported	(with	10	people	wounded),	and	in	2012,	7	people	died	and	7	were	
wounded.	During	the	first	seven	months	of	2013,	no-one	was	killed	or	wounded	
in	the	republic.
North	Ossetia’s	economic	performance	is	slightly	better	than	that	of	its	neigh-
bours.	The	republic	had	the	highest	average	monthly	salary	in	the	entire	feder-
al	district	in	the	first	half	2013,	although	at	16,833	roubles	a	month,	i.e.	around	
US$	520,	it	corresponded	to	less	than	73%	of	the	average	monthly	salary	for	Rus-
sia.	North	Ossetia’s	population	growth	rate	is	3.7%	(14.8	births	and	11.1	deaths	
per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	The	unemployment	rate	was	7.9%	in	2012	and,	
like	in	the	neighbouring	republics,	has	been	declining	in	recent	years	(from	
9.7%	in	2010	and	8.2%	in	2011).
Due	to	its	location	on	important	transit	routes	(North	Ossetia	has	the	only	roads	
connecting	Russia	with	 the	unrecognised	South	Ossetia105	 and	with	Georgia	
‘proper’,	and	onwards	to	Armenia),	the	republic	has	been	struggling	with	the	
problem	of	smuggling	and	various	kinds	of	cross-border	crime,	in	addition	to	
the	corruption	typical	of	other	parts	of	the	North	Caucasus	(which	in	North	
Ossetia’s	case	is	mainly	related	to	the	operation	of	the	alcoholic	beverages	in-
dustry).	Due	to	the	fact	that	South	Ossetia	is	not	a	member	of	the	Customs	Un-
ion	of	Russia,	Belarus	and	Kazakhstan	and	has	set	many	of	its	tariffs	at	lower	
levels	than	the	Customs	Union,	 it	 is	common	practice	to	register	companies,	
cars,	etc.	in	its	territory,	and	to	transfer	funds	via	Tskhinvali.	In	the	spring	of	
105	 South	Ossetia	(along	with	Abkhazia)	has	been	recognised	as	an	independent	state	by	Rus-
sia,	Nicaragua,	Venezuela,	Nauru	and	Tuvalu.
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2012,	 the	Russian	president	Dmitry	Medvedev	appointed	the	North	Ossetian	
leader	his	representative	for	South	Ossetia	(the	post	is	independent	of	the	Rus-
sian	ambassador	to	Tskhinvali	and	the	representative’s	main	task	is	to	control	
the	budget	subsidies	transferred	to	South	Ossetia).
North	Ossetia	is	the	only	republic	in	the	North	Caucasus	in	which	Christians	
are	a	majority	(alongside	Adygea,	which	continues	to	be	mainly	populated	by	
Russians).	The	number	of	Muslims	in	the	republic	has	been	growing	for	sever-
al	years,	though.	According	to	estimates,	Muslims	currently	account	for	15%	of	
the	population,106	and	a	separate	Spiritual	Board	of	Muslims	of	North-Ossetia-
Alania	operates	in	the	republic.
*
Kabardino-balkaria	has	been	the	scene	of	intensive	activity	by	the	Caucasus	
Emirate,	which	is	reflected	in	the	number	of	terrorist	attacks	and	acts	of	vio-
lence.	The	armed	conflict	claimed	79	lives	in	2010,	and	82	people	were	wound-
ed	in	that	year.	In	2011,	129	people	were	killed	and	44	wounded,	and	in	2012,	
107	were	killed	and	49	wounded.	Between	January	and	July	2013,	46	were	killed	
and	9	were	injured.	
In	the	first	half	of	2013	the	average	monthly	salary	in	Kabardino-Balkaria	was	
12,711	roubles	(around	US$	390),	making	it	one	of	the	poorest	republics	of	the	re-
gion	(alongside	Ingushetia	and	Karachay-Cherkessia).	The	population	growth	
rate	was	5.7%	(14.8	births	and	9.1	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	The	
unemployment	rate	reached	8.9%	in	2012,	having	decreased	from	12.7%	in	2010	
and	10.6%	in	2011).
The	history	of	Salafism	 in	Kabardino-Balkaria	dates	back	 to	 the	early	 1990s	
when	a	 group	of	 young	Muslims,	 graduates	 of	 religious	 schools	 in	 the	Arab	
states,	founded	the	Islamic	Centre.	It	has	been	conceived	as	an	alternative	to	
the	 local	 Spiritual	 Board	 of	 Muslims,	 which	 represented	 traditional	 Islam,	
strongly	influenced	by	local	beliefs	and	customs	in	this	part	of	the	Caucasus.	
The	group,	which	was	initially	committed	to	operating	within	the	bounds	of	
the	law,	became	radicalised	over	time	and	went	underground	(in	part	because	
of	 the	 state’s	 repressive	 policies	 after	 the	 outbreak	 of	 the	 Second	 Chechen	
106	 No	exact	figures	are	available;	the	above	number	has	been	derived	from	estimates	quoted	
by	various	researchers	including	Mikhail	Roshchin,	Artur	Tsutsiyev	and	Ruslan	Bzarov.
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War).	This	process	culminated	in	the	militants’	attack	on	Nalchik	on	13	Octo-
ber	2005.107
The	 conflict	 between	 the	 titular	 nations	 of	 Kabardino-Balkaria	 also	 dates	
back	to	the	early	1990s.	Initially,	its	nature	was	ethnic-political	(the	ambition	
of	the	Balkar	communities	was	to	have	their	own	republic),	but	it	is	current-
ly	economic—the	Kabardin	businesses,	which	are	dominant	 in	Kabardino-	
-Balkaria,	have	been	trying	to	push	the	Balkars	away	from	the	highland	are-
as	which	are	attractive	for	tourism.	The	conflict	has	not	evolved	into	an	open	
confrontation	as	yet,	but	it	could	potentially	become	a	destabilising	factor	for	
the	republic,	especially	since	 the	 family	and	the	 inner	circle	of	 the	 former	
republic’s	 leader,	Arsen	Kanokov	 (a	Kabardin)	constitute	 the	most	 influen-
tial	business	group	in	Kabardino-Balkaria,	and	Kanokov	himself	is	one	of	the	
richest	people	in	Russia.
Since	the	civil	war	broke	out	in	Syria	in	the	spring	of	2011,	activists	of	various	
Circassian	organisations	from	the	republics	of	the	North-West	Caucasus	(and	
Abkhazia)	have	been	making	efforts	to	repatriate	as	many	of	the	Circassians	
living	there	as	possible.108	The	governments	of	Kabardino-Balkaria	and	Adygea	
have	been	supporting	their	actions,	hoping	to	boost	 their	own	popularity	 in	
this	way	and	to	increase	the	proportion	of	Circassians	in	the	total	populations	
of	 these	 subjects	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation.109	 The	 Russian	 central	 authori-
ties,	on	the	other	hand,	have	been	less	welcoming	since	they	fear	a	stepping	
up	of	Circassian	protests	against	 the	Olympics	 in	Sochi110	and	are	concerned	
about	a	possible	escalation	of	the	Kabardin-Balkar	conflict.	Hence,	the	repatri-
ates	only	receive	short-term	visas	with	which	they	cannot	settle	 in	the	Rus-
sian	Federation,	they	do	not	get	residency	registrations,	etc.	So	far,	around	700	
Circassians	from	Syria	have	resettled	to	Kabardino-Balkaria,	and	around	600	
107	 Wojciech	 Górecki,	 Przemiany	 islamu	 na	 Kaukazie	 Północno-Zachodnim	 w	 okresie	 po-
radzieckim.	 Adygeja,	 Karaczajo-Czerkiesja,	 Kabardyno-Bałkaria	 i	 Osetia	 Północna.	 in:	
Okręt	 Koszykowa.	 ed.	 Jacek	 Borkowicz,	 Jacek	 Cichocki,	 Katarzyna	 Pełczyńska-Nałęcz,	
Warsaw	2007,	p.	217–241.
108	 The	first	wave	of	repatriations	took	place	after	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union	with	sev-
eral	hundred	people	returning	to	the	Caucasus	from	countries	which	used	to	be	part	of	the	
Ottoman	Empire.
109	 The	authorities	of	Abkhazia	are	also	supporting	the	repatriations,	as	the	country	is	depopu-
lating	(the	Abkhazians	are	emigrating	to	Russia).
110	 For	more	information,	see	the	section	on	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan.
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to	Adygea.111	 The	 repatriates	 are	 typically	 young	 people	who	 often	 establish	
a	small	business	upon	arrival.	They	do	not	usually	speak	Russian.
*
The	republics	of	Karachay-cherkessia and adygea	have	been	affected	by	the	
Caucasus	armed	conflict	to	a	relatively	small	degree.	In	the	former,	29	people	
died	and	16	were	injured	in	attacks	and	terrorist	acts	in	the	years	2010-2012,	
and	in	the	first	seven	months	of	2013,	4	people	were	killed	and	2	were	injured.	
In	Adygea,	no	casualties	have	been	reported	in	the	last	four	years.
The	average	monthly	salary	 in	Karachay-Cherkessia	was	12,637	roubles	 (less	
than	US$	390)	 in	 the	first	half	of	2013.	The	population	growth	rate	was	3.6%	
(13.3	births	and	9.7	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	Unemployment	de-
creased	slightly	in	2012	to	8.9%	(from	10.35%	in	2010	and	9.8%	in	2011).	
Like	Kabardino-Balkaria,	Karachay-Cherkessia	 is	often	 the	 scene	of	various	
frictions	between	 its	 titular	nations	 (Karachays,	 i.e.	Caucasus	Turks,	consti-
tute	a	majority	in	the	republic),	but	presently	the	clashes	are	usually	relatively	
mild.	A	serious	crisis	took	place	in	the	past,	on	the	occasion	of	the	1999	presi-
dential	 election,	 in	which	 the	Karachay	 candidate,	General	Vladimir	 Semy-
onov,	defeated	the	Cherkess,	Stanislav	Derev.	Derev	did	not	accept	defeat	and	
his	supporters	occupied	the	main	square	 in	the	republic’s	capital	 for	several	
weeks.	Karachay-Cherkessia	 is	 also	home	 to	 some	 closely-knit	 communities	
of	Abazins,	a	people	related	to	the	Abkhazians	(and	traditionally	close	to	the	
Cherkess),	and	of	Turkic	Nogais,	who	side	with	the	Karachays.
In	Adygea,	 the	 average	monthly	 salary	was	 16,670	 roubles	 (over	US$	 510)	 in	
the	first	half	of	2013.	The	population	growth	rate	was	negative	(-1.4%,	with	11.7	
births	and	13.1	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	The	unemployment	rate	
in	2012	was	8.1%,	compared	to	9.3%	in	2010	and	8.4%	in	2011.	
As	with	the	subjects	of	the	Russian	Federation	which	it	neighbours,	and	espe-
cially	Kabardino-Balkaria,	for	the	last	two	or	three	years,	Adygea	has	been	the	
scene	of	 increasingly	 frequent	 conflicts	between	members	of	 the	Circassian	
nations	and	the	Armenians,	who	continue	to	grow	in	number	(Armenians	in	
the	North	Caucasus	report	higher	population	growth	rates	than	the	Kabardins	
111	 В Адыгее более 90 детей сирийских черкесов пошли в школу,	Kavkaz-uzel,	 6.09.2013.	
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229626/
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or	the	Adyghes,	and	much	higher	than	the	Russians).	So	far	most	of	these	con-
flicts	have	been	limited	to	everyday	life	situations,	although	cases	of	frays	and	
lethal	beatings	have	also	been	reported.112
*
In	Stavropol Krai 37	people	were	killed	and	88	wounded	in	the	armed	conflict	
in	the	period	between	2010	and	2012,	and	6	people	died	and	2	were	injured	be-
tween	January	and	July	2013.	In	the	first	half	of	2013	the	average	monthly	income	
was	16,802	roubles	(nearly	US$	520).	The	population	growth	rate	was	slightly	
negative	at	-0.1%	(11.9	births	and	12	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	The	
unemployment	rate	in	2012	was	clearly	lower	than	in	the	republics,	and	slightly	
lower	than	the	Russian	average	at	5.4%	(6.9%	in	2010,	and	6%	in	2011).
Krasnodar Krai (where	Sochi	is	 located)	has	witnessed	no	attacks	or	terror	
acts	 to	 date.	 The	 average	monthly	 income	 of	 19,821	 roubles	 (nearly	US$	 610)	
in	the	first	half	of	2013	was	considerably	higher	than	in	the	other	North	Cau-
casus	subjects	of	the	Russian	Federation.	Like	the	neighbouring	areas,	Kras-
nodar	Krai	reports	a	negative	population	growth	rate	at	-1.1%	(12.1	births	and	
13.2	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	The	unemployment	rate	in	2012	was	
5.6%	(6.7%	in	2010	and	5.9%	in	2011).
No	attacks	or	terror	acts	have	taken	place	in	the	rostov Oblast,	either.	In	the	
first	half	of	2013	the	average	monthly	income	amounted	to	18,628	roubles	(more	
than	US$	570).	The	population	growth	rate	was	negative	at	-3.3%	(10.9	births	
and	14.2	deaths	per	one	thousand	inhabitants).	The	unemployment	rate	in	2012	
was	6%	(compared	to	7.7%	in	2010	and	7.4%	in	2011).
In	the	two	krais and	in	the	Rostov	Oblast,	the	relations	between	the	local	Slavic	
population	and	migrants	from	the	mountainous	republics	settling	there	have	
been	 a	mounting	 social	 problem,	 and	potentially	 the	most	 serious	 source	of	
conflicts.	The	newcomers	have	been	arriving	in	Ciscaucasia	on	a	larger	scale	
for	the	last	several	years,	and	have	been	de facto	slowly	colonising	the	area	and	
pushing	out	the	Slavic	population.	Over	time,	this	may	result	in	a	permanent	
change	of	the	ethnic	composition	of	the	two	krais	and,	to	a	lesser	extent,	of	the	
112	 According	to	a	researcher	from	Kabardino-Balkaria,	for	the	time	being	the	Circassians	and	
Armenians	have	a	shared	objective,	which	is	to	marginalise	the	local	Russians.	Their	stra-
tegic	interests	are,	however,	divergent,	e.g.	both	groups	seek	to	control	the	same	sectors	of	
business.	(OSW	interview	with	a	researcher	from	Kabardino-Balkaria,	April	2012).
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Rostov	Oblast113	(the	eastern	part	of	Stavropol	Krai	has	been	receiving	mainly	
Dagestanis	and	Chechens,	and	the	region	of	Pyatigorsk	and	the	Caucasus	Min-
eralnye	Vody	–	mainly	Kabardins,	while	Krasnodar	Krai	has	been	the	destina-
tion	mainly	for	newcomers	from	Karachay-Cherkessia	and	Adygea).	The	mi-
grants	usually	come	to	work	or	study.	They	are	eager	to	work	in	agriculture,	
taking	over	bankrupt	kolkhozy	and	sovkhozy	(which	is	related	to	a	shortage	of	
agricultural	land	in	the	republics),	and	are	also	active	in	small	business.	It	is	
estimated	that	around	50%	of	students	in	Pyatigorsk	(the	capital	of	the	North	
Caucasus	Federal	District)	are	not	ethnic	Russians.114	 In	the	spring	and	sum-
mer	of	2013,	a	number	of	incidents	of	an	ethnic	nature	took	place	in	Ciscauca-
sia.	These	usually	unfolded	along	similar	lines:	a	single	criminal	or	economic	
event	would	morph	into	a	wider,	ethnically	motivated	clash.115	It	is	to	be	expect-
ed	that	incidents	of	this	kind	will	become	more	frequent	and	more	brutal.	It	
is	also	possible	that	the	Slavic	communities	will	form	vigilante	groups	(either	
spontaneously,	or	within	 the	existing	Cossack	 formations,	as	 the	Krasnodar	
Krai	Cossacks	are	already	closely	co-operating	with	the	local	security	forces	
under	special	agreements116).	
113	 For	 example,	 300	 to	 400	 Slavic	 families	 permanently	 leave	 the	 Levokumsky	 District	 in	
Stavropol	Krai	every	year	(the	district’s	total	population	is	40,000).	In	the	spring	of	2013,	
migrants	from	the	Caucasus	republics	already	accounted	for	25%	of	the	population,	and	con-
trolled	70%	of	the	local	businesses	and	land.	In	some	places	in	Stavropol	Krai	the	newcomers	
already	account	for	as	much	as	50%	of	the	population,	although	in	the	entire	Ciscaucasia,	
changes	in	the	ethnic	composition	are	still	relatively	small.	Игорь Кармазин, Ставрополье 
превращается в Косово: конфликты русских и мигрантов,	 Московский комсомолец, 
12.04.2013.	 http://www.mk.ru/social/article/2013/04/11/839978-stavropole-prevraschaet-
sya-v-kosovo-konfliktyi-russkih-i-migrantov.html
114	 OSW	interview	with	a	researcher	from	Kabardino-Balkaria...,	op. cit.
115	 A	well-known	case	concerns	the	rape	of	a	Russian	woman	on	12	August	2013	by	North	Cau-
casus	migrants	in	Rostov-on-Don.	In	response,	the	inhabitants	of	Rostov	organised	a	rally,	
calling	for	the	influx	of	migrants	to	be	curbed	and	the	rights	of	the	local	population	to	be	
respected,	 and	 for	 an	end	 to	 corruption	among	 the	 security	 service	 and	administration,	
which	 allegedly	 tolerate	 abuse	 by	 the	newcomers.	 Similar	 rallies	 took	place	 in	 the	 stan-
itsa	of	Veshenskaya	(on	12	August)	and	the	stanitsa	of	Bazkovskaya	(on	13	August).	Katar-
zyna	Jarzyńska,	Wojciech	Górecki,	Ethnic	tension	escalates	in	Ciscaucasia,	Eastweek	OSW,	
28.08.2013.	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-08-28/ethnic-tension-
escalate-ciscaucasia
116	 Since	1	September	2012,	1,000	Cossacks	in	Krasnodar	Krai	(including	150	in	Krasnodar	it-
self)	have	been	patrolling	towns	and	villages	alongside	the	police.	В Краснодарском крае 
казаки приступят к совместному с полицией патрулированию населенных пунктовб	
Kavkaz-uzel,	1.09.2012.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/211993/	
	 Since	 July	2013,	another	300	Cossacks	from	Krasnodar	Krai	have	been	taking	part	 in	op-
erations	 against	 illegal	 migrants	 along	 with	 the	 Federal	 Migration	 Service	 officers.	
Власти Краснодарского края решили привлечь казаков к рейдам против незаконных 
мигрантов,	Kavkaz-uzel,	25.07.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/227602/
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Alexander	Tkachev,	 a	 close	 associate	 of	 President	 Putin,	who	was	 approved	
for	another	five-year	term	in	March	2012,	has	been	the	governor	of	Krasnod-
ar	Krai	since	 January	2001.	He	 is	one	of	 the	people	 in	charge	of	 the	Olympic	
preparations,117	and	also	serves	as	Putin’s	representative	for	Abkhazia	(a	post	
independent	of	the	Russian	ambassador	in	Sukhumi).	Tkachev’s	strong	posi-
tion	seems	impossible	to	dent;	neither	the	inefficacy	of	the	crisis	management	
system,	revealed	during	the	flooding	in	July	2012,	nor	the	links	of	the	local	se-
curity	forces	to	the	criminal	world,	which	public	opinion	learnt	of	in	connec-
tion	with	 the	mass	murder	 in	 the	 stanitsa	 (rural	 locality)	of	Kushevskaya	 in	
2010,	had	an	effect.118	The	governor	is	also	known	for	his	harsh,	almost	xeno-
phobic	statements	about	migrants	from	the	North	Caucasus	republics,	which	
further	exacerbates	the	local	Slavic-Caucasian	relations.
117	 The	 question	 of	 the	Olympic	 preparations	will	 be	 discussed	 in	 the	 section	 on	Moscow’s	
strategies	towards	the	region.
118	 Jadwiga	Rogoża,	Flooding	in	the	Kuban:	a	natural	disaster	overshadowed	by	politics,	East-
week	 OSW,	 11.07.2012.	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2012-07-11/flood-
ing-kuban-a-natural-disaster-overshadowed-politics
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Iv. ThE rOlE OF azErbaIjaN aNd gEOrgIa
Azerbaijan	and	Georgia	have	been	having	an	influence	on	the	situation	in	the	
North	Caucasus,	albeit	to	a	limited	extent.	During	the	First	Chechen	War	the	
two	countries	remained	neutral,	although	Azerbaijan	unofficially	co-operated	
with	 the	separatists	as	a	way	 to	put	pressure	on	Moscow.	Georgia	refrained	
from	such	contacts	because,	firstly,	the	Chechen	militants	had	backed	the	Ab-
khazians	during	the	Georgian-Abkhazian	war	in	1992–1993	(as	did	the	entire	
North	Caucasus)	and,	secondly,	because	Tbilisi	hoped	that	Moscow	would	help	
it	 regain	control	of	 the	breakaway	provinces	of	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	
and	did	not	want	to	damage	its	then	good	relations	with	Russia.
During	 Chechnya’s	 quasi-independence	 (1996–1999),	 Baku	 and	 Tbilisi	 devel-
oped	intensive	contacts	with	Grozny	as	their	own	relations	with	Moscow	dete-
riorated.	In	view	of	Russia’s	fiasco	in	the	war	and	the	USA’s	heightened	interest	
in	the	Caucasus,	Georgia	and	Azerbaijan	started	looking	for	new	formulas	of	
collective	security	in	the	region,	one	of	the	results	of	which	was	the	utopian	
project	of	establishing	a	“Caucasus	OSCE”	that	would	include	Georgia,	Azer-
baijan,	Chechnya	and	Dagestan	and	which	would	be	aimed	at	excluding	Russia	
from	 the	 regional	peace	processes	 and	would	 thus	 further	undermine	Mos-
cow’s	position	in	the	region.
After	the	Second	Chechen	War	broke	out,	Azerbaijan	and	Georgia	offered	safe	
haven	to	refugees	from	the	conflict	region,	including	Aslan	Maskhadov’s	fam-
ily	and	aides.	The	son	of	the	Chechen	president	(and	the	widow	of	Dzhokhar	
Dudayev)	found	refuge	in	Baku,	and	Vakha	Arsanov,	the	deputy	president	of	
the	Chechen	Republic	of	Ichkeria,	was	offered	an	apartment	in	Tbilisi	in	which	
he	 opened	 an	 informal	 embassy	 of	 Chechnya	with	 the	 knowledge	 and	 con-
sent	of	the	Georgian	government.	Georgia	did	not	even	try	to	close	the	moun-
tain	passes	which	armed	Chechen	militants	were	reaching	the	Pankisi	Gorge	
through,	i.e.	a	mountain	area	in	Georgia	inhabited	by	the	Kist	Chechens,	to	rest	
and	treat	injuries.	It	is	known	that	Ruslan	(Khamzat)	Gelayev,	one	of	the	most	
prominent	field	commanders,	established	a	base	in	Pankisi.	Tbilisi	repeated-
ly	rejected	Russia’s	demands	to	hand	over	the	militants	and	to	allow	Russian	
troops	to	control	the	Chechen	section	of	the	Russian-Georgian	border	on	the	
Georgian	side.	This	provoked	strong	criticism	from	Moscow119	and	led,	in	sev-
119	 Moscow	repeatedly	accused	Georgia	in	particular	of	aiding	terrorists.	In	late	2001	the	Rus-
sian	Foreign	Minister	Igor	Ivanov	said	that	Osama	bin	Laden	was	probably	hiding	in	the	
Pankisi	Gorge.
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eral	cases,	to	Georgian	villages	in	the	mountains	being	bombed	(allegedly	by	
accident)	by	the	Russian	air	force.
As	the	war	dragged	on	and	its	character	changed,	the	two	capitals,	and	Baku	
in	particular,	started	to	gradually	withdraw	their	support	for	the	militants	(in	
2003–2004	Azerbaijan	began	to	unofficially	hand	over	some	of	the	refugees	to	
Moscow	and	 force	others	 to	 leave	using	 administrative	methods).	Currently	
Baku’s	 focus	 is	on	supporting	the	Azerbaijani	national	minority	 in	southern	
Dagestan	(for	example,	an	Azerbaijani	theatre	operates	in	Derbent)	and	on	ef-
forts	to	neutralise	Russian	influence	on	the	Dagestani	diasporas	on	the	other	
side	of	 the	border	 (Baku	 fears	 that	Moscow	might	 fan	separatist	 sentiments	
and	radical	Islamic	ideas	among	the	Lezgians	and	Avars	living	in	Azerbaijan).	
In	2013,	at	the	initiative	of	Baku,	one	of	the	streets	in	Derbent	was	named	after	
Heydar	Aliyev	 (father	of	 the	 current	president	 of	Azerbaijan,	who	preceded	
him	as	 the	head	of	state).	Moreover,	President	 Ilham	Aliyev	maintains	close	
contacts	with	the	Dagestani	leader	Ramazan	Abdulatipov.120
Georgia	never	decided	to	co-operate	with	Moscow	by	handing	over	refugees.	
After	the	Rose	Revolution	(late	2003	and	2004),	it	undertook	a	series	of	meas-
ures	aimed	at	reviving	traditional	social,	economic	and	cultural	contacts	with	
the	North	Caucasus	countries	(meaning	direct	contacts	not	intermediated	by	
Russian	federal	agencies)	and	at	building	the	image	of	Georgia	among	the	lo-
cal	authorities,	but	especially	among	the	public,	as	a	modern,	attractive	and	
friendly	state.	This	policy	was	further	stepped	up	and	intensified	after	Mos-
cow	recognised	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	in	the	aftermath	of	the	2008	war	
and	as	diplomatic	relations	between	the	countries	were	broken	off.	Georgia’s	
aim	was	 to	 foster	 the	 formation	of	 a	kind	of	buffer	between	 itself	 and	cen-
tral	Russia	in	the	North	Caucasus.	In	a	significant	gesture	Georgia	lifted	the	
visa	obligation	for	Russian	citizens	living	in	the	North	Caucasus	republics,	in	
order	to	facilitate	contacts	and	to	make	Georgia’s	offer	for	the	region	(which	
included	attractive	grant	programmes	for	students)	more	accessible.121	Russia	
criticised	the	move,	labelling	it	provocative	(it	responded	in	a	similar	way	to	
Georgia’s	unilateral	lifting	of	visas	for	all	holders	of	Russian	passports	on	29	
February	2012).
120	 OSW	interviews	with	members	of	the	Dagestani	diaspora	in	Moscow	in	the	years	2012–2013.
121	 The	abolition	of	visas	for	the	North	Caucasus	(on	11	October	2010)	could	also	be	regarded	as	Geor-
gia’s	late	response	to	a	similar	gesture	made	by	Russia	to	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	–	Moscow	
exempted	the	inhabitants	of	the	separatist	republics	from	the	obligation	to	obtain	visas	already	
when	the	visa	regime	was	established	between	the	two	states	on	5	December	2000.
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Tbilisi’s	 special	 focus	has	been	on	two	 interrelated	 issues	–	 the	Sochi	Olym-
pics	and	the	so-called	“Circassian	problem”.	On	25	November	2010	the	Georgian	
parliament	appointed	a	special	commission	to	investigate	whether	Russia	was	
using	the	occupied	territory	of	Abkhazia	in	order	to	prepare	for	the	Olympics122	
(which	would	be	against	the	provisions	of	the	Olympic	Charter).	The	commis-
sion	was	also	tasked	with	carrying	out	an	awareness-raising	campaign	in	the	
global	media	against	the	Olympic	Games,	which	would	highlight,	among	other	
issues,	the	environmental	threats	and	the	historical	context,	i.e.	the	fact	that	
the	Games	will	take	place	on	a	site	where	native	inhabitants	of	these	lands	were	
exterminated123).	The	Circassian	problem,	 i.e.	 the	restoration	of	 the	memory	
of	 the	Circassians’	 tragedy	and	reflection	about	possible	ways	of	compensat-
ing	it,	was	the	subject	of	a	number	of	international	seminars	and	conferences	
organised	by	the	Ilia	State	University	in	Tbilisi	and	the	US-based	Jamestown	
Foundation	under	 the	patronage	of	 the	Georgian	government	 (with	 the	par-
ticipation	of	those	Circassian	groups	in	the	West	which	opposed	the	Games).	
Ultimately,	on	20	May	2011	the	Georgian	parliament	adopted	a	resolution	rec-
ognising	the	massacre	of	the	Circassians	in	the	19th	century	Russian	Empire	as	
genocide,	and	Mikheil	Saakashvili’s	government	decided	to	boycott	the	Games.	
The	Georgian	point	of	view	was	promoted	by	the	PIK	satellite	television	chan-
nel	 (PIK	 is	 the	 abbreviation	of	 the	Russian	 for	 First	Caucasus	 Info	Channel,	
Первый Информационный Кавказский),	which	broadcast	in	Russian	and	was	
also	available	in	southern	Russia,	Turkey	and	Iran.	Moscow	saw	Tbilisi’s	sup-
port	for	the	demands	of	the	radical	Circassian	communities,	its	debasing	of	the	
Olympics	–	a	project	in	which	president	Putin’s	personal	prestige	was	involved	
–	and	finally,	the	creation	of	the	PIK	television	channel,	as	hostile	actions	and	
a	form	of	interference	in	the	internal	affairs	of	Russia.
After	the	parliamentary	elections	on	1	October	2012,	when	the	Georgian	Dream	
opposition	coalition	led	by	Prime	Minister	Bidzina	Ivanishvili	took	over	real	
power	in	Georgia,	the	country’s	activities	addressed	to	the	North	Caucasus	lost	
much	of	their	momentum.	The	PIK	television	station	was	closed	down	and	the	
decision	to	boycott	the	Games	reversed	in	two	moves	which	became	symbols	of	
122	 Georgia	has	considered	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia	occupied	territory	since	the	2008	war	
and	since	Moscow	concluded	agreements	with	 the	 two	para-states	under	which	Russian	
military	bases	were	established	in	both	of	them.	Gaining	full	control	of	Abkhazia	and	elimi-
nating	all	potential	 threats	 that	might	endanger	 the	Sochi	Olympics	 from	that	direction	
(e.g.	Georgian	sabotage)	was	one	of	Moscow’s	aims	in	that	war.
123	 See	footnote	5.
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the	change	of	course.124	In	this	situation	the	emergence	of	some	pro-Georgian	
groups	in	the	region,	made	up	of	university	graduates	and	other	beneficiaries	
of	the	Georgian	programmes,	may	be	the	most	durable	achievement	of	Tbilisi’s	
efforts	in	the	North	Caucasus	in	the	period	2008-2012.
For	security	reasons,	the	border	between	Russia	and	Abkhazia	will	probably	
be	closed	during	the	Olympic	Games,	at	 least	partly	(for	cars).	Moscow	fears	
that	it	could	become	a	gateway	for	potential	terrorists	(in	the	mountains,	the	
border	runs	only	a	few	kilometres	away	from	the	Olympic	grounds125).	Moscow	
has	 limited	confidence	 in	Abkhazia,	which	 is	a	de facto Russian	protectorate	
but,	unlike	South	Ossetia,	has	been	trying	to	preserve	a	margin	of	independ-
ence.	This	lack	of	trust	was	visible,	for	instance,	when	the	Russian	minister	of	
Defence,	Sergei	Shoygu	visited	the	Russian	military	units	stationed	in	the	re-
public	on	14	May	2013	and	decided	not	to	hold	even	a	courtesy	meeting	with	the	
para-state’s	leadership.126	Moscow	became	even	more	wary	of	Abkhazia	after	
an	unknown	gunman	shot	down	the	First	Secretary	of	the	Russian	embassy	in	
Sukhumi,	Dmitry	Vishernev,	on	9	September	2013	(several	days	later,	his	wife	
also	died	in	hospital	from	injuries	sustained	in	the	attack).	Moscow	may	take	
advantage	of	this	case	as	a	pretext	to	implement	additional	security	measures	
(deploying	 additional	 units	 of	 special	 forces	 in	Abkhazia	 before	 the	Games,	
stepped-up	checks,	also	on	the	Abkhazian	side,	etc.).
124	 The	argument	was	that	most	likely	nobody	would	join	the	boycott	and	Georgia	would	find	
itself	isolated	in	the	international	arena.	The	decision	has	been	contested	by	a	number	of	
groups	 including	 Saakashvili’s	 United	National	Movement	 and	 the	 Left	 Alliance,	which	
continue	to	call	for	a	boycott	of	the	Olympics.
125	 Since	March	2011,	Russia	and	Abkhazia	have	been	in	conflict	over	the	village	of	Aibga	which	
straddles	the	border	river	of	Psou,	very	close	Krasnaya	Polyana	where	some	of	the	competi-
tions	are	to	take	place	(according	to	Georgia	and	nearly	all	other	countries	in	the	world,	the	
river	marks	the	Russian-Georgian	border).
126	 Ольга Алленова, Послевоенная пятилетка-2,	Коммерсантъ Власть,	26.08.2013.
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v. culTural aNd cIvIlISaTIONal chaNgES
The	 question	 of	 the	 cultural	 and	 civilisational	 changes	 that	 have	 been	 tak-
ing	 place	 in	 the	North	 Caucasus	 in	 recent	 years	 has	 already	 been	 signalled	
on	many	occasions	in	this	paper,	but	it	is	so	significant,	especially	for	the	fu-
ture	 of	 the	 region,	 that	 it	merits	 a	 separate	discussion.	The	most	 important	
and	 seemingly	 irreversible	 process	 concerns	 the	 progressing	 Islamisation,	
wherein	a	growing	proportion	of	people	are	embracing	a	Muslim	identity	as	
one	of	the	most	important	elements,	if	not	the	single	most	important	element,	
of	their	self-identification.127	This	manifests	itself	not	only	in	regular	religious	
practice,	but	also	in	living	according	to	the	guidance	of	Islam,	voting	for	politi-
cians	who	identify	themselves	as	Muslims,	etc.	As	with	the	other	processes,	
Islamisation	impacts	different	parts	of	the	region	in	different	ways	and	with	
varying	levels	of	intensity	(in	addition	to	having	different	directions,	as	it	can	
be	either	‘Salafist’	or	‘traditionalist’).	However	it	is	very	difficult	to	make	ac-
curate	comparisons	since	no	detailed	studies	spanning	the	entire	region	are	
available	 at	 this	 time.	One	 should	however	note	 the	 term	“ethnic	Muslims”,	
which	is	present	in	research	literature	and	denotes	all	members	of	the	nations	
traditionally	professing	Islam.	The	term	is	imprecise	(e.g.	the	Kabardin	popu-
lation	from	the	Mozdok	area	believe	themselves	to	have	been	Christians	“since	
time	immemorial”;	besides	the	term	excludes	atheists),	but	is	nonetheless	use-
ful,	as	even	those	who	identify	themselves	as	non-believers	usually	obey	such	
religious	practices	 as	 circumcision	or	 religious	marriage	 ceremonies.	 In	 the	
1990s,	the	percentage	of	believers	among	the	native	nations	of	the	North-East	
Caucasus	ranged	from	81	to	97%	(compared	to	64%	among	Russians),	and	the	
current	phase	of	Islamisation	can	be	interpreted	as	the	natural	continuation	
of	a	historical	process	first	interrupted	by	the	October	revolution	and	the	Bol-
sheviks’	rise	to	power,	and	then	suppressed	by	the	outbreak	of	ethnic	conflicts	
in	the	decade	that	followed	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union	(around	the	years	
1990–2000).128
In	Kabardino-Balkaria,	 one	 of	 the	 symptoms	 of	 Islamisation	 consists	 in	 the	
decreasing	number	of	officially	 registered	marriages	 (instead	of	 formalising	
their	unions	at	registry	offices,	young	people	are	increasingly	being	married	
by	 mullahs,	 sometimes	 even	 without	 their	 parents’	 knowledge;	 such	 mar-
riages	are	not	included	in	the	statistics).	The	proportion	of	women	(especially	
127	 According	to	estimates	from	2009,	even	10%	of	young	people	from	the	region	declared	they	
were	of	“Muslim	nationality”.	Statement	by	a	Russian	expert...,	op. cit.
128	 Алексей Малашенко, Исламские ориентиры Северного Кавказа, Москва	2001,	s.	6,	62.
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young	women)	who	wear	headscarves	or	even	hijabs	has	also	increased	consid-
erably.129	The	research	of	Zaid	Abdulagatov,	conducted	in	the	years	1996-2010,	
shows	the	dynamics	of	 Islamisation	among	young	people	 in	Dagestan.130	The	
percentage	of	believers	in	this	group	increased	to	95%	in	the	period	in	ques-
tion.	77.6%	of	them	can	be	characterised	as	“fundamentalists”	who	believe	that	
Islam	should	be	as	 it	was	 in	 the	 times	of	 the	Prophet	 (compared	 to	 53.9%	 in	
2000),	and	9.6%	may	be	termed	“modernists”	who	believe	Islam	should	adapt	to	
the	changing	world.	58.1%	of	respondents	in	the	former	group	(and	26.9%	in	the	
latter)	believe	that	the	norms	of	sharia	are	superior	to	secular	law.	30%	of	all	
young	believers	would	be	prepared	to	protest	openly	in	the	event	of	a	conflict	
between	secular	and	sharia	law	(compared	to	25.6%	of	young	people	studying	
at	religious	schools,	which	can	be	explained	by	the	fact	that	religious	school	
students	are	almost	exclusively	traditionalists,	typically	more	loyal	to	state	in-
stitutions	than	the	Salafis,	even	those	Salafis	who	distance	themselves	from	
terrorism	and	the	Caucasus	Emirate).	The	process	of	shariatisation, i.e.	the	
tendency	to	resolve	a	growing	range	of	issues	and	daily	problems	by	reference	
to	the	rules	of	sharia	law,	exists	in	Dagestan	as	well	as	Chechnya	and	Ingushe-
tia	(as	was	mentioned	above,	some	elements	of	sharia	have	been	incorporated	
into	official	legislation	in	Chechnya).
de-modernisation	 consists	 in	 the	 revival	 of	 traditional	 social	 institutions	
such	as	customary	law,	vendetta,	or	councils	of	elders	(which	existed	before	
the	arrival	of	Russians	in	the	Caucasus	and	were	preserved	in	residual	form	
in	the	Soviet	period).	It	also	entails	reinforcement	of	the	traditional	division	of	
roles	in	the	family	and	sex	segregation	(e.g.	at	weddings	where	men	and	wom-
en	celebrate	separately),	as	well	as	a	growing	proportion	of	girls	who	go	not	
go	to	school.131	This	process	is	progressing	faster	in	villages	(especially	in	the	
mountain	areas)	and	in	the	republics	of	North-East	Caucasus.
With	the	exception	of	the	Slavic	Ciscaucasia,	the	entire	region	is	also	experi-
encing	de-russification,	which	 involves	 the	Russian	 language	being	pushed	
out	by	the	Caucasus	languages,	and	the	level	of	Russian	language	competence	is	
129	 OSW	interview	with	a	researcher	from	Kabardino-Balkaria...,	op. cit.
130	 Заид Абдулагатов, О влиянии религиозного фактора на экстремистское поведение 
дагестанской молодежи, Социс,	Issue	1/2012,	p.	106–113	(article	available	online	at:	http://
www.isras.ru/files/File/Socis/2012_1/Abdulagatov.pdf).
131	 The	 transformations	 of	 the	 Caucasus	 customs	 and	 habits,	 which	 could	 even	 be	 termed	
a	“conservative	revolution”,	are	described	in	the	books	of	the	young	author	Alisa	Ganiyeva	
(born	in	1985);	see	e.g.	her	collection	of	short	stories:	Алиса Ганиева, Салам тебе, Далгат!, 
Москва	2010.
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decreasing.	That	process	is	related,	inter alia,	to	the	changes	in	the	ethnic	compo-
sition	of	the	region’s	population,	i.e.	emigration	of	the	Russian-speaking	Slavic	
people.	It	is	still	relatively	inconspicuous	in	large	cities.	In	rural	areas	and	es-
pecially	in	ethnically	homogeneous	villages,	however,	the	Russian	language	is	
often	heard	only	on	television.	Reports	from	Dagestan	or	Ingushetia	sometimes	
include	descriptions	of	villages	where	no-one	or	next	to	no-one	speaks	Russian	
–	the	men	who	speak	the	language	are	in	central	Russia	where	they	work,	while	
the	women	who	raise	children	only	understand	it	at	best.132	In	one	illustrative	
case,	Nur-Pashi	Kulayev,	a	Chechen	born	in	1980	who	was	tried	for	involvement	
in	the	siege	of	the	school	in	Beslan	on	1	September	2004,	asked	the	court	for	an	
interpreter	as	he	did	not	understand	everything	in	Russian	and	could	not	accu-
rately	express	himself	in	the	language	(the	request	was	declined).133
The	proportion	of	 ethnic	Russians	 in	 the	 total	population	 is	declining	 in	all	
the	North	Caucasus	subjects	of	the	Russian	Federation	with	the	exception	of	
Krasnodar	Krai.	 In	 the	republics,	 the	absolute	numbers	of	Russians	are	also	
falling	as	a	result	of	Russians	reporting	lower	birth	rates	than	the	Caucasus	
nations	and	emigrating	from	the	region.	The	most	dramatic	decrease	has	been	
observed	in	Chechnya:	back	in	1989	Russians	accounted	for	24.81%	of	the	popu-
lation	of	 the	Chechen	parts	of	Chechen-Ingushetia	 (269,130	people),134	but	by	
2010	this	proportion	had	fallen	to	just	1.92%	(24,382	people).	Ingushetia	is	the	
subject	 second	most	 affected	 by	 the	 process	 –	 its	 ethnic	Russian	 population	
has	decreased	from	24,641	people,	or	13.25%,	in	1989	to	3,215	people,	or	0.78%,	
in	 2010.	 29,587	 people	 permanently	 emigrated	 from	 Kabardino-Balkaria	 in	
the	years	2006-2011,	including	17,688	Russians,	4,887	Kabardins	and	1,381	Bal-
kars.135	Between	1989	and	2010	the	percentage	of	Russians	in	that	republic	de-
creased	from	31.95%	to	22.46%	(240,750	people	and	193,155	people,	respectively).	
See	also	Appendix	4.
The	view	that	Russia	should	be	used	as	a	means	to	an	end	and	made	to	give	as	
much	as	possible	 is	 the	dominant	view	among	the	ruling	elites	of	 the	North	
Caucasus	 republics	 and	 has	 been	 gaining	 popularity	 among	 the	 intelligent-
sia	in	the	region	(especially	among	people	up	to	the	age	of	fifty).	This	attitude	
132	 See	e.g.	Iwona	Kaliszewska,	Maciej	Falkowski,	Matrioszka	w	hidżabie,	Warsaw	2010.
133	 Oliver	Bullough,	Let	our	fame	be	great,	Journeys	Among	the	Defiant	People	of	the	Caucasus,	
Allen	Lane,	2010,	p.	385.
134	 In	1989,	Russians	accounted	for	23.12%	(293,771	people)	of	the	entire	population	of	Chechen-
Ingushetia.
135	 OSW	interview	with	a	researcher	from	Kabardino-Balkaria...,	op. cit.
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has	been	described	as	follows	by	a	researcher	from	Kabardino-Balkaria:	“It	is	
a	widespread	belief	that	‘time	is	on	our	side’,	that	is,	the	North	Caucasus	will	
separate	from	Russia	sooner	or	later,	either	formally	or	informally,	therefore	
one	should	demand	as	much	money,	investment	and	places	at	universities	as	
possible	from	Moscow,	so	that	the	region	can	develop.	The	aim	should	also	be	
to	man	as	many	positions	as	possible	in	the	Russian	structures	of	power,	and	
from	there	to	support	one’s	relatives	and	one’s	country.	The	people	who	think	
this	way	are	united	in	the	opinion	that	Russia	is	a	coloniser	and	has	done	the	
Caucasus	more	harm	than	good,	but	at	this	stage	there	is	no	point	in	fighting	
it	because	it	is	too	strong.	Some	of	those	people,	the	younger	generation,	also	
believe	that	the	Caucasus	could	manage	without	Moscow	already	now,	while	
the	older	generation	disagrees”.136	In	this	context	it	is	worth	quoting	the	apho-
rism	attributed	to	Rasul	Gamzatov	(1923–2003),	a	distinguished	Dagestani	poet	
writing	in	Avar	and	in	Russian,	that	“Dagestan	did	not	join	Russia	voluntarily	
and	will	not	voluntarily	leave	it”.
The	number	of	people	in	the	North	Caucasus	who	do	not	consider	Russia	to	be	
their	homeland	has	been	growing	in	recent	years,137	while	Russians	have	in-
creasingly	been	viewing	the	North	Caucasus	as	a	kind	of	“foreign	body”	within	
their	state.	Research	carried	out	in	2013	by	VCIOM138	at	the	request	of	the	Valdai	
Club	shows	that	the	percentage	of	people	who	believe	Crimea	to	be	Russian	ter-
ritory	(56%)	is	greater	than	the	percentage	of	those	who	think	the	same	about	
Dagestan	(41%)	and	Chechnya	(39%).	The	opposite	opinion	(i.e.	that	the	areas	in	
question	are	not	Russia)	has	been	expressed	by	39%,	54%	and	57%,	respectively.	
Only	7%	believe	that	a	Chechen,	a	Dagestani	or	an	Ingush	can	be	called	a	Rus-
sian	(русский),	even	if	the	person	in	question	has	been	living	in	central	Russia	
for	many	years	(while	44%	would	use	the	term	“Russian”	for	an	Ukrainian	or	
a	Belarusian	in	the	same	circumstances,	and	10%	for	an	Armenian,	a	Georgian	
or	an	Azerbaijani).139
136	 Ibid.
137	 Islam	Tekushev	wrote:	“During	the	15-year	long	confrontation,	the	North	Caucasus	has	be-
come	a	hostile	near-abroad	for	a	majority	of	Russians.	[…]	Meanwhile,	for	the	inhabitants	of	
the	North	Caucasus,	Russia	has	become	a	hostile	territory	where	Caucasus	national	danc-
es	 (lezginka)	are	 treated	almost	as	demonstrations	of	aggression	or	superiority”.	 (Ислам 
Текушев, Теракт. А в ответ тишина...,	Caucasustimes.com,	 26.01.2011.	http://www.cauca-
sustimes.com/article.asp?id=20735).
138	 Всероссийский центр изучения общественного мнения	 (Russian	 Public	 Opinion	 Re-
search	Centre).
139	 Современная российская идентичность: измерения, вызовы, ответы, Москва, 
сентябрь 2013.
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Around	2010,	 reflections	 on	 the	possibility	 of	Russia	 giving	up	of	 the	North	
Caucasus	and	the	consequences	of	such	a	move,	which	had	been	absent	from	
public	debate	since	the	mid-1990s,	started	to	re-appear	in	the	press	and	expert	
commentaries.140
140	 For	example:	Сергей Маркедонов, Уйти нельзя,	Gazeta.ru,	21.12.2010.	http://www.gazeta.
ru/comments/2010/12/21_a_3472821.shtml
The	question	of	the	attitude	of	Russians	towards	a	separation	of	the	region	from	the	Federa-
tion	is	discussed	in	the	final	chapter.
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vI. ThE NOrTh caucaSuS IN MOScOw’S POlIcIES
1. Strategies towards the region
Moscow	has	not	developed	any	cohesive	strategy	for	the	region	over	the	more	
than	twenty	years	following	the	break-up	of	the	Soviet	Union.	during boris 
Yeltsin’s rule (1991–1999) its policies were reactive:	any	measures	that	were	
taken	were	 in	 response	 to	 events	 in	 the	 region	 (starting	 the	 First	 Chechen	
War	to	combat	separatists	was	an	example	of	this	reactive	approach).	during 
vladimir Putin’s two terms as president (2000–2008) russia implement-
ed the force-based model of managing the region,	which	required	massive	
financial	outlays	and	a	constant	heavy	military	presence	(after	the	outbreak	
of	the	Second	Chechen	War,	Chechen	affairs	were	de facto	handed	over	to	the	
Ministry	of	Defence	and,	subsequently,	to	the	Federal	Security	Service).	The	
high	cost	of	 this	 strategy	and	 the	absence	of	any	visible	 results,	 i.e.	 the	 fact	
that	Moscow	failed	to	establish	full	control	of	the	region,	 led	the	Kremlin	to	
adopt	a	slightly	more	flexible	policy	(the	above-mentioned	policy	of	Chechenisa-
tion,	 implemented	since	mid-2002).	dmitry Medvedev (2008–2012) tried to 
rebuild stability in the North caucasus using economic means,	by	initiat-
ing	various	investments	in	the	region	and	launching	financial	transfers.	The	
appointment	of	Alexander	Khloponin,	an	economist	recognised	for	his	mana-
gerial	skills,	as	the	presidential	representative	in	the	newly	created	North	Cau-
casus	Federal	District	became	a	symbol	of	this	change.141	However,	corruption	
impeded	the	implementation	of	the	‘economic’	model	of	managing	the	North	
Caucasus	–	a	considerable	portion	of	the	funds	transferred	to	the	region	was	
embezzled.	 Moreover,	 many	 of	 the	 investments	 were	 aimed	 at	 developing	
tourism	while	the	demand	for	tourist	services	in	the	region	was	negligible	due	
to	the	threat	of	terror	attacks.	launched at the onset of Putin’s third presi-
dential term in 2012, the current policy is a combination of the Medve-
dev approach, i.e. a continuation of the existing financial programmes 
supplemented by new ones that are launched, and ad hoc measures aimed 
at ensuring security for the Olympic games	 (to	be	discussed	 later	 in	 this	
chapter),	while	at	the	same	time	Moscow	tends	to	refrain	from	intervening	in	
the	region	if	intervention	could	escalate	tensions—the	absence	of	any	reaction	
to	Ramzan	Kadyrov’s	aggressive	moves	against	the	neighbouring	republics	is	
a	case	in	point.
141	 Wojciech	Górecki,	Managers	 instead	 of	 general-governors?	Moscow s`	 new	 tactics	 in	 the	
North	Caucasus,	OSW	Commentary,	Issue	36,	3.03.2010.
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Underlying	all	 those	 strategies	 is	 the	conviction,	also	 shared	by	Russian	public	
opinion,	that	the	North	Caucasus	is	a	region	that	differs	considerably	from	the	rest	
of	Russia	and	requires	non-standard	treatment.	It	seems,	however,	that	Moscow	is	
still	yet	to	take	the	strategic	decision	on	whether	to	integrate	the	North	Caucasus	
(understood	here	as	the	mountain	republics,	excluding	the	krais	and	the	oblast)	
with	the	Russian	economic,	social	and	legal	space,	or	whether	to	isolate	it	and	
accept	the	existence	of	an	informal	“internal	abroad”	within	the	country	(at	the	
level	of	official	declarations,	separation	of	the	region	is	not	an	option)142.
The	absence	of	a	comprehensive	vision	for	the	region,	a	unifying	idea	or	a	posi-
tive	proposal	(i.e.	the	things	which	have	paradoxically	been	offered,	in	reverse,	
by	the	Caucasus	Emirate),	is	visible	even	in	the	projects	initiated	during	Dmitry	
Medvedev’s	rule.	The	tourism	and	winter	sports	development	programme	may	
serve	as	an	example:	firstly,	it	is	addressed	only	to	a	few	selected	locations,	and	
secondly,	given	the	levels	of	the	corruption	and	criminalisation	of	the	econo-
my,	finding	serious	investors	is	very	difficult	and	the	potential	profits	are	not	
going	to	improve	the	lives	of	the	local	people	anyway.	In	this	sense,	Moscow	is	
continuing	the	policy	of	the	Soviet	Union,	aimed	at	reinforcing	the	divisions	
existing	 in	 the	 North	 Caucasus,	 especially	 ethnic	 divisions.143	 Moscow	 also	
approaches	the	North	Caucasus	with	distrust	or	even	fear,	which	is	visible	in	
the	fact	that	military	draft	 is	very	limited	in	the	region:	only	single	soldiers	
from	Dagestan	or	 Ingushetia	make	 it	 to	 the	Russian	army,	and	the	Ministry	
of	Defence	admits	 that	 it	 is	unable	 to	effectively	control	conscripts	 from	the	
Caucasus	who	tend	to	informally	subordinate	the	units	in	which	they	serve.144	
Meanwhile	conscripts	from	Chechnya	do	their	military	service	exclusively	in	
the	territory	of	the	republic.	In	this	situation	Moscow’s	tactic	of	avoiding	fric-
tion	and	unconditionally	subsidising	the	local	budgets	is	becoming	its	strategy.
142	 The	term	“internal	abroad”	has	been	popularised	by	the	German	researcher	Uwe	Halbach	
(Uwe	Halbach,	Russia’s	Internal	Abroad.	The	North	Caucasus	as	an	Emergency	Zone	at	the	
Edge	of	Europe,	SWP	Research	Paper	2010/RP	05,	November	2010.	http://www.swp-berlin.
org/fileadmin/contents/products/research_papers/2010_RP_05_hlb_ks.pdf).
143	 One	researcher	even	mentions	a	“dictatorship	of	parities”,	 i.e.	 the	conviction	that	all	 the	
Caucasus	nations	should	have	proportional	representation	in	the	local	government.	State-
ment	by	a	Russian	expert...,	op. cit.	One	example	of	 the	 strengthening	of	particularisms	
at	 the	 expense	 of	 the	 idea	 of	 one,	 shared	 Caucasus	 consists	 in	 the	 deepening	 hostility	
among	the	fans	of	different	football	clubs,	which	leads	to	clashes	and	riots	during	Games	
(a	mass	fight	broke	out	between	the	fans	of	Angusht	Nazran	and	Alania	Vladikavkaz	after	
a	game	in	Ingushetia	on	23	October	2013;	the	region’s	strongest	football	teams	include	Anzhi	
Makhachkala	and	Terek	Grozny).
144	 Сергей Маркедонов: отказ от призыва в армию уроженцев Кавказа говорит о не-
дееспособности государства,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	 8.04.2013.	 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/arti-
cles/222549/.
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Moscow	seldom	interferes	in	the	internal	affairs	of	the	North	Caucasus	repub-
lics,	 leaving	their	 leaderships	a	margin	of	freedom	that	is	relatively	large	by	
Russian	standards.	The	Kremlin	mainly	expects	the	local	leaders	to	ensure	sta-
bility	in	their	respective	Federation	subjects.	In	this	context,	predictability	of	
the	political	and	social	situation,	keeping	the	administration	and	public	insti-
tutions	under	control,	and	ensuring	uninterrupted	electricity,	gas	and	water	
supplies	to	households	are	more	important	for	Moscow	than	the	effectiveness	
of	 the	fight	against	 terrorism.	 It	 is	 the	 federal	agencies	which	are	primarily	
responsible	for	this,	anyway.	It	also	appears	that	at	the	level	of	the	republics	
Moscow	 is	 more	 likely	 to	 accept	 authoritarian	methods	 than	 an	 ostensibly	
conciliatory	approach	involving,	for	instance,	peace	initiatives	independent	of	
the	Kremlin	or	attempts	at	building	coalitions	of	local	political	forces.	Moscow	
may	consider	such	initiatives	to	be	signs	of	disloyalty.	One	illustration	of	this	
point	 is	 served	by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	Chechen	 leader	Ramzan	Kadyrov	enjoys	
much	greater	independence	than	the	other	leaders	in	the	region,	to	the	extent	
that	one	could	even	say	that	he	is	holding	Moscow	hostage.
The	said	margin	of	freedom	enjoyed	by	the	top	officials	in	the	Caucasus	is	also	
visible	in	the	fact	that	Moscow	has	seldom	resorted	to	dismissing	a	ruling	head	
of	a	Caucasus	republic	(other	than	in	Stavropol	Krai):	the	Ingush	leader	Murat	
Zyazikov	was	dismissed	in	the	autumn	of	2008	in	the	aftermath	of	months-
long	protests	calling	for	his	resignation.	Boris	Ebzeyev,	the	leader	of	Karachay-
-Cherkessia,	stepped	down	in	February	2011	(formally,	he	resigned	voluntarily;	
according	to	press	reports	 the	Kremlin	had	accused	him	of	 incompetence	 in	
economic	affairs).	In	late	January	2013	Vladimir	Putin	accepted	the	resignation	
of	the	president	of	Dagestan	Magomedsalam	Magomedov	(which	presumably	
had	also	been	agreed	in	advance	with	Magomedov).	It	seems	that	in	this	last	
case	the	reasons	concerned	Magomedov’s	independent	initiatives	such	as	the	
activities	of	the	Adaptation	Commission,	which	enabled	a	rapid	“reintegration”	
of	militants	who	had	surrendered	 their	arms,	and	his	 involvement	 in	 inter-
Islamic	dialogue.	The	Kremlin	is	opposed	to	any	talks	with	the	militants	and	at	
best	reluctant	to	accept	talks	with	the	Salafis,	and	so	may	have	regarded	those	
initiatives	as	a	dangerous	precedent.	Magomedov	was	 replaced	by	Ramazan	
Abdulatipov,	an	activist	and	researcher	well	known	in	Russia,	who	nonethe-
less	 has	 no	 political	 backing	 locally.	 This	 suggests	 that	Moscow’s	 intention	
behind	this	nomination	was	to	establish	direct	control	of	Dagestan	one	year	
ahead	of	the	Olympics145	(the	subsequent	arrest	of	the	mayor	of	Makhachkala,	
145	 Abdulatipov	has	been	a	deputy,	a	federal	minister	for	ethnic	policy,	and	Russian	ambassa-
dor	to	Dushanbe;	he	has	authored	a	number	of	research	papers	about	ethnic	relations	in	the	
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the	capital	of	Dagestan,	probably	served	the	same	purpose	–	this	will	be	dis-
cussed	in	more	detail	later	in	this	chapter).	The	last	case	was	the	dismissal	of	
Arsen	Kanokov,	the	leader	of	Kabardino-Balkaria,	in	December	2013.	It	should	
be	noted	that	all	the	dismissed	politicians	have	been	subsequently	appointed	
to	high-ranking	federal	offices,	proving	that	the	Kremlin	was	certain	of	their	
loyalty	and	rewarded	 them	for	 it	 in	 this	way	 (e.g.	Kanokov	became	a	 repre-
sentative	of	his	republic	to	the	Russian	Federation	Council).146
The	financing	of	the	North	Caucasus	is	a	particularly	controversial	issue,	both	
for	the	Russian	political	class	and	the	public.	Since	2008,	the	region	has	been	
receiving	very	 large,	 albeit	difficult	 to	estimate,	 sums	of	money	under	vari-
ous	target	programmes,	in	addition	to	normal	budget	subsidies	(the	budgets	of	
the	North	Caucasus	republics	report	high	deficits147).	The	funding	is	not	subject	
to	transparent	settlement	procedures,	which	creates	the	impression	that	the	
North	Caucasus	is	a	parasite	feeding	on	the	Russian	state.148	This	impression	
is	further	strengthened	by	press	reports	about	luxurious	goods	possessed	by	
leaders	 in	 the	Caucasus,	 especially	Ramzan	Kadyrov,	 and	 the	pompous	 life-
styles	of	the	growing	Caucasus	diasporas	in	Moscow	and	other	Russian	cities.	
It	is	against	this	background	that	the	slogan	calling	for	an	“end	to	the	feeding	
of	the	Caucasus”	(Хватит кормить Кавказ!)	emerged.	It	has	been	promoted	by	
one	of	the	leaders	of	the	Russian	protest	movement,	the	anti-corruption	blog-
ger	Alexei	Navalny,	and	has	been	embraced	by	large	swathes	of	Russian	public	
opinion	–	as	many	as	51%	of	respondents	in	the	September	2013	VCIOM	survey	
quoted	above	supported	it	(42%	were	against,	and	7%	expressed	no	opinion).149	
Caucasus	and	in	Russia.	Wojciech	Górecki,	The	Kremlin	increases	its	control	over	Dagest-
an,	Eastweek	OSW,	30.01.2013.	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-01-30/
kremlin-increases-its-control-over-dagestan
146	 The	principle	of	loyalty	works	both	ways.	The	Kremlin	shows	loyalty	to	the	regional	leaders	
by	refraining	from	official	contacts	with	the	alternative	elites	in	their	respective	republics	
(such	as	non-governmental	organisation,	Salafi	religious	communities,	etc.).
147	 For	example,	direct	subsidies	from	the	federal	budget	account	for	around	90%	of	the	budget	
of	 Ingushetia.	The	aim	of	 the	development	 strategy	 currently	being	 implemented	 in	 the	
republic	 is	to	reduce	this	figure	to	80%,	but	this	seems	hardly	to	be	realistic	(Екатерина 
Абрамова, Евкуров: За 20 лет...,	op. cit.).
148	 The	report	“Кто кого кормит?”	(“Who` s	feeding	whom?”)	published	by	the	Lenta.ru	portal	
noted	 that	 the	financial	 relations	between	 the	North	Caucasus	republics	and	 the	 federal	
government	were	one	of	the	prime	examples	of	the	lack	of	transparency	in	Russia` s	budget	
policy	(http://lenta.ru/articles/2012/12/14/enough/).
149	 Современная российская идентичность…,	op. cit.	According	to	the	Levada	Centre,	as	many	
as	71%	of	respondents	agreed	with	the	slogan	in	October	2013	(including	35%	who	“firmly	
supported”	it,	and	36%	who	“rather	supported”	it).	See:	http://www.levada.ru/05-11-2013/
rossiyane-o-migratsii-i-mezhnatsionalnoi-napryazhennosti
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The	outrage,	which	morphs	into	aversion	to	migrants	from	the	Caucasus	and	
leads	to	ethnic	clashes,150	 is	motivated	not	only	by	the	alleged	embezzlement	
of	subsidies	 in	 the	region,	but	also	by	 the	“bossing	around”	common	among	
migrants	from	the	Caucasus	in	central	Russia.151	Some	of	the	funding	allocated	
to	the	North	Caucasus	presumably	never	reaches	the	region	at	all,	some	is	in-
tercepted	by	the	clans	in	power	in	the	republics,	and	some	is	spent	on	invest-
ments	of	little	use	which	fail	to	stimulate	the	local	economies.	The	president	of	
Dagestan,	Ramazan	Abdulatipov	has	been	quoted	as	saying	words	which	are	
certainly	equally	 true	about	 the	other	 republics—that	 in	 recent	years	 “Dag-
estan	was	fed,	but	not	healed”	and	did	not	develop.152
At	the	end	of	the	five-year	“South	of	Russia”	programme	in	August	2013,	a	meet-
ing	was	convened	in	Pyatigorsk	(the	capital	of	the	North	Caucasus	Federal	Dis-
trict)	to	discuss	what	results	had	been	achieved.	In	the	course	of	the	meeting,	the	
Russian	minister	for	regional	development	Igor	Slunyayev	said	that	even	though	
43.6	billion	roubles	(around	US$	1.34	billion)	had	been	spent	on	various	measures	
to	improve	the	social	and	economic	situation	in	the	region,	the	list	of	outstand-
ing	problems	was	still	the	same	as	in	2008.	He	also	said	that	the	more	money	
that	was	spent	on	financing	the	republics,	the	less	market-oriented	their	econo-
mies	became.	Similar	observations	were	expressed	in	Pyatigorsk	by	the	finance	
minister	Anton	Siluanov	who	said	that	the	level	of	subsidies	for	the	budgets	of	
the	North	Caucasus	republics	was	growing	several	times	faster	than	the	financ-
ing	for	the	other	subjects	of	the	Russian	Federation.	Siluanov	further	revealed	
that	while	 the	average	number	of	state	officials	per	one	thousand	inhabitants	
in	Russia	was	1.8,	 in	Chechnya	it	was	3.5	and	in	Ingushetia,	4.6.	He	also	criti-
cised	the	North	Caucasus	leaderships	for	keeping	excessively	large	car	fleets153	
150	 For	example,	an	incident	of	this	kind	took	place	on	13	October	2013	in	the	Biryulyovo	Zapad-
noye	district	of	Moscow.	The	local	community	staged	violent	protests	after	a	young	Russian	
was	killed	by	a	person	with	a	“non-Slavic”	appearance	(the	authorities	revealed	only	a	day	
later	that	 the	suspect	was	an	immigrant	 from	Azerbaijan).	The	protests	morphed	into	to	
attacks	against	stores	employing	migrants	and	clashes	with	the	security	services	in	which	
between	 ten	 and	 20	people	were	 injured.	Katarzyna	 Jarzyńska,	 Ethnic	 riots	 in	Moscow,	
Eastweek	OSW,	16.10.2013.	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-10-16/eth-
nic-riots-moscow
151	 Public	celebrations	of	Muslim	holidays	(perceived	as	a	demonstration	of	power),	loud	wed-
dings	with	celebratory	gunfire,	night-time	rides	across	cities	in	motorcades	of	luxurious	cars	
adorned	with	flags	from	the	Caucasus	republics,	etc.	Isolated	events	of	this	kind	are	seen	as	
representative	of	the	general	attitude	of	the,	allegedly	highly	assertive,	Caucasus	diasporas.
152	 Abdulatipov	said	it	on	15	August	2013	during	a	meeting	with	president	Putin.	http://www.
rbcdaily.ru/politics/562949988516522
153	 Петр Нетреба, Дмитрий Бутрин, Премьер-министру показали горы проблем, Ком-
мерсантъ, 20.08.2013. http://kommersant.ru/doc/2259319; Силуанов: Регионы Северного 
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(usually	made	up	of	luxurious	armoured	limousines).	Despite	all	those	reserva-
tions,	less	than	a	month	later	the	Russian	Security	Council	approved	a	document	
entitled	“Principal	directions	of	state	policy	in	the	North	Caucasus	Federal	Dis-
trict”.	40	billion	roubles	(around	US$	1.23	billion)	was	initially	earmarked	for	the	
implementation	of	its	provisions	–	the	money	will	be	distributed	under	a	new,	
three-year	long	edition	of	the	“The	South	of	Russia”	programme.	President	Putin	
said	on	that	occasion	that	the	priority	of	the	policy	towards	the	region	should	be	
to	further	increase	the	pace	of	the	social	and	economic	development	of	the	North	
Caucasus	 since	 difficult	 living	 conditions	 there	 provided	 “nourishment	 for	
extremists”.154	This	declaration	can	be	interpreted	as	an	indication	that	the	Rus-
sian	leadership	is	going	to	keep	the	course	of	its	Caucasus	strategy	unchanged	at	
least	until	the	end	of	Putin’s	current	presidential	term,	leading	to	a	petrification	
not	only	of	Moscow’s	relations	with	the	region,	but	also	of	the	internal	political	
and	social	situation	in	the	North	Caucasus	republics.	
2. Operation Sochi 2014
By	 establishing	 the	 North	 Caucasus	 Federal	 District	 comprising	 seven	 Fed-
eration	subjects	which	were	previously	part	of	the	Southern	Federal	District	
(President	Dmitry	Medvedev’s	decision	to	this	effect	was	published	on	19	Janu-
ary	2010),	the	Russian	authorities	sought	to	symbolically	highlight	that	Sochi	
was	 not	 the	 Caucasus	 –	 Krasnodar	 Krai,	 where	 Sochi	 is	 located,	 remained	
within	the	original	Southern	Federal	District.	The	decision	was	a	psychologi-
cal	and	propaganda	exercise,	which	in	a	way	stigmatised	the	North	Caucasus	
republics	(with	the	exception	of	Adygea),	since	the	new	Federal	District	was	the	
only	one	to	be	created	based	on	ethnic	and	religious	criteria.155	Stavropol	Krai	
was	included	into	the	new	District	along	with	the	Islamic	republics	associated	
Кавказа могли бы сэкономить на автомобилях для чиновников, 1prime.ru,	 19.08.2013.	
http://1prime.ru/Politics/20130819/765663024.html
154	 Муса Мурадов, Северному Кавказу укажут новое направление, Коммерсантъ, 10.09.2013.	
http://kommersant.ru/doc/2275567	
	 In	December	2011,	while	he	was	still	prime	minister,	Vladimir	Putin	said	that	cutting	in-
vestments	 in	 the	North	Caucasus	would	 lead	 to	 serious	disturbances,	which	might	 even	
result	in	the	breakout	of	war	as	reduced	subsidies	would	result	in	greater	emigration	from	
the	North	Caucasus	to	large	Russian	cities	and	the	ensuing	problems.	He	added	that,	should	
migration	be	curbed,	young	people	in	the	region	would	join	the	armed	underground	and	
back	the	idea	to	separate	the	Caucasus	from	Russia	(Лучше поздно, чем никогда,	Expert-
club.ge,	23.12.2011.	http://rus.expertclub.ge/portal/cnid__10661/alias__Expertclub/lang__
ru/tabid__2546/default.aspx).	The	local	elite’s	take	on	the	question	of	subsidies	is	discussed	
in	the	section	on	the	civil	war.
155	 С созданием нового федерального округа Северный Кавказ приобретает особый статус 
в России,	Kavkaz-uzel,	20.01.2010.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/164427
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with	terrorism	and	Islamic	fundamentalism	in	order	to	avoid	the	impression	
that	the	new	district	was	a	‘reservation’	of	Caucasus	highlanders	(this	was	also	
the	reason	why	the	new	district	was	not	formed	consisting	exclusively	of	the	
most	unstable	republics	of	Dagestan,	Chechnya and	Ingushetia	–	firstly,	there	
are	hardly	any	ethnic	Russians	in	those	republics	and,	secondly,	such	a	deci-
sion	would	lead	to	disputes	about	where	the	capital	of	such	a	district	should	be	
located).	However,	the	new	federal	district	has	failed	to	streamline	the	admin-
istration	of	the	North	Caucasus,	one	of	the	reasons	for	this	being	the	conflict	
between	the	president’s	plenipotentiary	representative	Alexander	Khloponin	
and	Ramzan	Kadyrov.156	
In	order	to	enforce	loyalty	among	the	North	Caucasus	leaderships	in	the	run-
up	to	Olympics	and	during	the	Games,	Moscow	decided	to	carry	out	a	series	of	
show	arrests	of	high-ranking	officials	in	Dagestan	in	the	summer	of	2013.	The	
most	widely	known	case	was	seen	on	1	 June	with	the	arrest	of	Said	Amirov,	
the	long-time	mayor	of	Makhachkala	(since	1998)	and	the	leader	of	the	Dagest-
ani	branch	of	the	United	Russia	party,	who	had	been	regarded	as	the	second	
most	 influential	politician	 in	 the	region	after	Kadyrov.	Amirov	was	accused	
of	having	contracted	a	murder,	and	after	several	months	of	investigation,	also	
of	terrorism	and	arms	trafficking.157	He	was	arrested	in	a	dramatic	operation	
that	 involved	 his	 fortress-like	 house	 being	 stormed	 by	 a	 special-forces	 unit	
sent	from	Moscow	and	him	subsequently	being	evacuated	by	helicopter.	The	
Dagestani	Interior	Ministry	had	not	been	notified	of	the	operation.	Those	facts	
suggest	that	it	was	a	deliberate	demonstration	of	Moscow’s	power	and	deter-
mination.	It	was	apparently	supposed	to	send	a	message	to	elite	groups	in	the	
Caucasus	 that	no-one	 is	untouchable.	The	campaign	was	an	ad hoc	measure	
aimed	at	ensuring	peace	before	the	Olympics,	rather	than	improving	internal	
relations	in	Dagestan	in	the	longer	term;	besides	Amirov,	no	other	clan	leaders	
were	arrested,	and	those	who	remain	at	large	will	presumably	start	a	turf	war	
after	the	Olympics	(the	other	detained	officials	were	either	Amirov’s	associates	
156	 Wojciech	 Górecki,	Managers	 instead	 of	 general-governors?…,	 op. cit.;	Wojciech	 Górecki,	
“Creeping’	civil	war	…,	op. cit.	Russian	media	have	also	suggested	that	Khloponin	had	em-
braced	the	clan	way	of	doing	politics	in	the	Caucasus,	which	manifested	itself	inter alia in	
the	fact	that	he	appointed	his	son-in-law	Nikita	Shashkin	as	deputy	acting	director	general	
of	 the	North	 Caucasus	 Resorts	 company	 (ОАО „Курорты Северного Кавказа”) (Максим 
Гликин, Светлана Бочарова, Максим Товкайло, Развитие Кавказа стало семейным 
делом,	Vedomosti.ru,	 15.05.2013.	 http://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/12025491/kavka-
zskij_klan_hloponina
157	 Саиду Амирову предъявлено обвинение в подготовке теракта,	Kavkaz-uzel,	28.10.2013.	
http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232422/
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or	people	who	played	no	major	role	in	the	informal	relations	in	Dagestan,	and	
their	detention	was	probably	intended	solely	to	avoid	the	impression	that	the	
enforcement	authorities	operated	selectively).
The	measures	taken	by	Moscow	directly	aimed	at	ensuring	the	security	of	the	
Olympics	resemble	the	planning	of	a	special	operation.	During	the	Games,	a	de 
facto	state	of	emergency	will	be	in	force	in	Sochi	and	in	the	surrounding	area.	
Under	President	Putin’s	decree	which	entered	into	force	on	23	August	2013,	one	
month	before	the	start	of	the	Games,	i.e.	as	of	7	January	2014,	any	meetings	un-
related	to	the	Olympics,	including	rallies	and	demonstrations,	will	be	banned.	
The	restrictions	will	remain	in	force	to	21	March	(i.e.	the	fifth	day	after	the	end	
of	the	Paralympics	which	are	traditionally	held	after	the	Olympics).	While	it	
remains	in	force,	the	city	will	be	divided	into	access-controlled	zones	(which	it	
will	be	possible	to	enter	only	after	undergoing	a	police	check)	and	closed	zones	
(with	access	only	for	the	contestants,	service	personnel	and	sports	fans).	Cars	
with	registration	plates	from	other	regions	will	not	be	let	into	Sochi	without	
special	passes.158	The	area	surrounding	the	Olympic	grounds	will,	practically	
speaking,	be	cordoned	off.	Soldiers	from	the	Sochi	Operational	Group	created	
in	August	2012	(military	spetsnaz,	more	than	10,000	troops	and	officers)	will	
be	patrolling	the	mountain	areas,	pathways,	gorges	and	passes	in	the	stretch	
of	land	from	Abkhazia	to	the	border	between	Karachay-Cherkessia	and	Kabar-
dino-Balkaria	(around	200	kilometres	from	the	Olympic	city).	No	tourists	will	
be	allowed	into	resorts	such	as	Arkhyz	and	Teberda,	or	even	the	Prielbrusye	
area,	which	Emirate	militants	could	theoretically	operate	from.159	The	border	
with	Georgia	is	to	receive	additional	protection	from	units	of	the	58th	Army.	In	
Sochi	itself,	42,000	police	officers	will	deployed	during	the	Games	in	addition	
to	24,500	other	functionaries	of	the	Interior	Ministry	and	10,000	soldiers	of	the	
Internal	Troops,160	as	well	as	Cossack	detachments.161
158	 На время проведения Олимпиады в Сочи будут запрещены митинги,	 Kavkaz-uzel,	
24.08.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/228995/;	Лев Левинсон: в Сочи на время 
Олимпиады вводится режим чрезвычайного положения,	Kavkaz-uzel,	24.08.2013.	http://
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229015/
159	 The	Sochi	Operational	Group	includes	two	spetsnaz	brigades	of	the	Southern	Military	Dis-
trict:	the	22nd	Brigade	and	the	10th	Brigade.	Алексей Михайлов, К защите Олимпиады в Сочи 
подключился армейский спецназ,	Izvestia.ru,	26.02.2013.	http://izvestia.ru/news/543324
160	 Колокольцев: МВД направит на Олимпиаду в Сочи дополнительные силы, Kavkaz-uzel,	
30.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232575/
161	 Казаки встретят гостей Сочи на вокзалах,	 Vse-o-sochi.ru,	 http://vse-o-sochi.ru/news/
city/1032-kazaki-vstretyat-gostey-sochi-na-vokzalah.html
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On	10	September	2013,	a	special	commission	tasked	with	finding	and	remov-
ing	illegal	immigrants	from	Sochi	began	operation	(many	illegal	migrants	had	
worked	on	the	construction	of	the	Olympic	facilities).	Only	those	holding	Sochi	
residency	registrations	will	be	allowed	to	stay	in	the	city	during	the	Games	(in	
addition	to	technical	personnel,	the	Olympians	and	the	fans);162	by	22	October	
functionaries	of	the	Federal	Migration	Service	had	identified	1,800	addresses	
of	apartments	occupied	by	immigrants.163
The	ceremony	during	which	representatives	of	Vancouver,	the	host	of	the	pre-
vious	Winter	Olympics,	handed	over	the	Olympic	symbols	to	the	city	authori-
ties	of	Sochi,	was	a	perhaps	 insignificant	but	nonetheless	 telling	example	of	
how	Moscow	cares	only	about	the	propaganda	and	public	relations	success	of	
the	Olympics,	and	does	so	at	any	price,164	in	line	with	the	maxim	that	the	end	
justifies	the	means,	even	if	that	involves	violations	of	the	rights	of	local	people	
and	disregard	 for	 the	historical	 context.	During	 the	 stage	performances	 ac-
companying	the	ceremony,	the	“native	inhabitants”	of	the	host	city	were	repre-
sented	by	a	Cossack	choir,	while	the	Cossacks	had	actually	been	the	vanguard	
of	the	Russian	troops	that	conquered	the	Caucasus	in	the	19th	century.	No	refer-
ence	was	made	to	the	folk	culture	of	the	Circassians,	the	real	native	inhabit-
ants	of	the	Sochi	area,	either	on	that	occasion	or	when	the	Olympic	mascots	
and	merchandising	were	being	designed,	despite	pleas	 from	representatives	
of	the	Circassian	communities	loyal	to	Russia	which	refrained	from	calling	for	
a	boycott	of	the	Games.165
162	 В Сочи с 10 сентября начинает работу комиссия по обнаружению нелегальных 
мигрантов,	Kavkaz-uzel,	 2.09.2013.	 http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/229406/;	 Human	
Rights	 Watch	 призвала МОК обратить внимание на задержания мигрантов в Сочи,	
Kavkaz-uzel,	3.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231057/ 
163	 Ткачев: ФМС Кубани выявила в Сочи 1800 «резиновых квартир», в каждой числятся 
более 10 человек, Kavkaz-uzel,	23.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232155/
164	 For	information	about	the	cost	of	the	Olympics,	see	e.g.	Wacław	Radziwinowicz,	Igrzyska	
oligarchijskie,	Gazeta Wyborcza,	28.10.2013.
165	 Символика Олимпиады в Сочи должна отражать культуру черкесов, уверены 
представители адыгских организаций,	Kavkaz-uzel,	8.04.2010.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.
ru/articles/167516/
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vII. cONcluSIONS aNd TENTaTIvE FOrEcaST: ruSSIa 
wIThOuT ThE caucaSuS?
Russia	conquered	the	North	Caucasus	in	the	19th	century	in	order	to	more	effec-
tively	administer	the	territories	of	today’s	Georgia,	Azerbaijan	and	Armenia,	
which	had	been	incorporated	into	the	Russian	empire	several	decades	before.	
Then,	as	now,	control	of	the	region	seems	to	be	a	prerequisite	of	Russia	pre-
serving	its	influence	on	the	South	Caucasus	(and	Moscow	is	indeed	determined	
to	maintain	its	influence	there,	as	demonstrated	by	its	adoption	of	a	more	ac-
tive	policy	towards	Azerbaijan	and	Armenia	in	the	spring	and	summer	of	2013,	
ahead	of	the	Eastern	Partnership	summit	in	Vilnius166).	The	potential	loss	of	the	
North	Caucasus	would	seriously	impede	Russia’s	contacts	with	its	ally	Arme-
nia	(the	only	country	in	the	South	Caucasus	with	a	Russian	military	base,	and	
the	only	one	to	have	joined	the	Moscow-controlled	Collective	Security	Treaty	
Organisation).	It	would	also	hinder	contacts	with	Abkhazia	and	South	Ossetia,	
the	breakaway	 republics	 that	Russia	has	 recognised,	 and	with	 Iran.	Moreo-
ver,	energy	transit	routes	important	for	Moscow	are	also	located	in	the	North	
Caucasus,	including	the	Baku–Novorossiysk	oil	pipeline	and	the	gas	pipeline	
to	Armenia,	as	well	as	roads	and	railways.	The	region	also	hosts	important	air-
ports	 (the	 local	hub	 in	Mineralnye	Vody),	 the	sea	ports	of	Novorossiysk	and	
Makhachkala,	 spas	 and	 resorts	 (Yessentuki,	Kislovodsk,	 Pyatigorsk,	Anapa,	
Sochi),	and	the	only	winter	sports	resorts	in	the	European	part	of	Russia	(the	
Sochi	and	Prielbrusye	areas).
In	view	of	all	this,	control	of	the	North	Caucasus	transport	and	transit	infra-
structures	and	the	borders	with	Azerbaijan	and	Georgia	(including	the	Abkha-
zian	and	South	Ossetian	sections)	is	crucial	for	Moscow.	From	this	perspective,	
stability	 in	 the	region	(which	cannot	be	ensured	 in	 the	 longer	 term	without	
full	integration	of	the	region	with	the	rest	of	the	country)	is	not	an	end	in	itself	
but	rather	a	means	to	facilitate	the	control	Moscow	needs,	or	in	fact	to	make	it	
possible	at	all.	By	analogy,	permanent	instability	in	the	North	Caucasus	would	
threaten	the	security	of	the	whole	of	Russia	to	the	extent	that	it	would	hinder	
this	control,	or	spread	beyond	the	region,	as	it	does	in	the	event	of	Emirate	ter-
ror	attacks	in	central	Russia	or	ethnic	clashes	and	conflicts	involving	migrants	
166	 Aleksandra	Jarosiewicz,	Moscow	is	haggling	with	Baku	ahead	of	the	presidential	election,	
Eastweek	 OSW,	 28.08.2013,	 http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2013-08-28/
moscow-haggling-baku-ahead-presidential-election;	 Szymon	 Ananicz,	 Armenia	 turns	
away	from	the	EU,	Eastweek	OSW,	4.09.2013,	http://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analy-
ses/2013-09-04/armenia-turns-away-eu
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from	the	Caucasus	in	Moscow	and	other	cities.	A	potential	attack	during	the	
Sochi	Olympics	would	be	an	extreme	case,	a	blow	to	the	prestige	of	Russia	and	
of	President	Putin	personally.	If	not	for	the	real	threat	of	instability	being	‘ex-
ported’	beyond	the	North	Caucasus,	a	state	of	civil	war	could	even	be	provi-
sionally	beneficial	to	Moscow	(assuming	the	conflict	remains	contained	in	the	
region	and	isolated,	in	the	sense	of	being	a	confrontation	between	the	militants	
and	the	siloviki,	with	no	attacks	on	civilian	targets),	as	the	Emirate	is	the	only	
real	opposition	to	Ramzan	Kadyrov	left	in	the	region.	Elimination	of	the	armed	
underground	would	 further	 strengthen	 Kadyrov’s	 position	 against	Moscow	
because	he	would	 then	no	 longer	have	 significant	 opponents	 and	would	not	
need	the	support	of	the	federal	security	forces,	as	is	currently	the	case	in	the	
event	of	larger	clashes	with	the	militants	(for	example	in	February	2012;	nor-
mally,	however,	the	federal	troops	seldom	have	to	leave	their	barracks).	With	
the	militants	out	of	the	picture,	the	financing	that	Chechnya	receives	from	the	
central	budget	would	be	automatically	reduced	(a	large	portion	of	the	funding	
is	earmarked	for	the	fight	against	terrorism,	which	does	not	necessarily	mean	
it	is	spent	as	intended).	In	a	situation	of	this	kind	it	would	be	easy	to	imagine	
a	 scenario	 in	which	Kadyrov	becomes	 the	 leader	of	a	new	 instalment	of	 the	
national	liberation	movement	and	exploits	the	advantages	which	Dudayev	and	
Maskhadov	did	not	have,	such	as	the	absence	of	internal	opponents,	the	ethnic	
homogeneity	of	the	republic,	considerable	financial	resources	and	the	poten-
tial	support	of	at	least	part	of	the	Muslim	Ummah.
The	growing	sense	of	alienation	experienced	by	ethnic	Russians	in	relation	to	
the	North	Caucasus	and	its	inhabitants	and	vice	versa	may	be	likened	to	the	
situation	 in	 the	final	decades	of	 the	 19th	 century	when	 the	 region’s	 informal	
status	was	that	of	an	internal	Russian	colony.	In	the	Soviet	period	the	region	
was	 the	 poorest	 and	 the	most	 under-invested	 part	 of	 the	 country,167	 and	 af-
ter	1991	the	difficulties	it	experienced	were	exacerbated	as	a	result	of	the	two	
Chechen	Wars	and	the	various	smaller	conflicts.	The	sympathy	that	sections	of	
the	Russian	intelligentsia	felt	for	Chechnya’s	independence	aspirations	in	the	
early	1990s	and	during	the	First	Chechen	War	has	been	largely	eroded	by	the	
167	 In	the	Soviet	period,	so-called	hidden	unemployment	existed	in	the	North	Caucasus,	which	
affected	the	native	inhabitants	in	particular.	There	are	some	indications	suggesting	that	in	
the	1960s	to	1980s	the	Soviet	authorities	deliberately	stymied	the	region’s	development	in	or-
der	to	stimulate	emigration	to	central	Russia,	the	Urals	and	Siberia	and	in	this	way	to	curb	
the	demographic	advantage	of	the	Caucasus	nations	–	which	were	not	to	be	trusted	–	over	
the	Slavic	population,	and	to	minimise	the	risk	of	upheavals	and	rebellions	(in	Stalin’s	time,	
deportations	played	the	same	role).	Moscow’s	fears	were	not	unfounded,	as	the	last	unit	of	the	
Chechen	anti-Communist	guerrilla	led	by	Khasukha	Magomadov	was	defeated	only	in	1976.
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attacks	attributed	to	the	Chechens	carried	out	on	residential	buildings	and	the	
raid	 into	Dagestan	staged	by	Basayev	and	al-Khattab	in	the	summer	of	1999.	
After	the	siege	of	the	Dubrovka	theatre	in	Moscow	by	the	commando	of	Movsar	
Barayev	in	October	2002	and	the	attack	of	terrorists	with	links	to	Shamil	Ba-
sayev	on	a	school	in	Beslan	in	September	2004,	the	Caucasus	started	to	be	asso-
ciated	solely	with	terrorism	and	religious	fanaticism.	Currently	one	can	even	
speak	of	Caucasophobia in	Russia,	with	the	rapidly	growing,	assertive	Caucasus	
diasporas	in	Russian	cities	as	the	main	objects	of	distaste	for	the	region	(while	
at	 the	 same	 time	nationalist	 groups	 are	 also	 growing	 in	 strength	 in	Russia,	
which	exacerbates	the	ethnic	tensions168).
As	a	consequence	of	the	North	Caucasus	being	perceived	in	this	way,	a	grow-
ing	number	of	Russians	support	the	idea	of	separating	the	problematic	region	
from	their	country.	The	Levada	Centre	has	been	studying	this	tendency	since	
1996,	polling	its	respondents	on	their	attitude	towards	the	potential	secession	
of	Chechnya.	 In	 June	2013	12%	of	the	respondents	replied	that	Chechnya	had	
already	de facto seceded	and	24%	stated	that	they	would	support	it,	while	27%	
said	they	would	not	be	particularly	concerned	about	it.	13%	said	they	would	be	
against	 it,	 10%	believed	such	a	 scenario	 should	be	prevented	even	at	 the	ex-
pense	of	war,	and	14%	had	no	opinion.	In	May	2011,	the	percentages	had	been	
11%,	23%,	28%,	12%,	13%	and	14%,	respectively,	and	in	April	2009	–	10%,	14%,	21%,	
19%,	22%	and	15%169.	The	separation	scenario,	however,	is	not	among	the	options	
considered	by	the	Russian	leadership,	at	 least	officially.	In	his	address	to	the	
Valdai	Club	in	September	2013	Vladimir	Putin	said	that	the	integrity	of	Russia	
was	one	of	the	“red	lines”	which	“no-one	is	allowed	to	cross”,170	but	the	very	fact	
that	the	issue	was	discussed	illustrates	the	unique	and	very	specific	place	of	
the	North	Caucasus	in	the	Russian	state.
*
The	Olympic	Games	in	Sochi	are	a	very	important	point	of	reference	for	all	the	
actors	in	the	North	Caucasus.	The	caucasus Emirate will	presumably	seek	to	
168	 In	 late	October	 2013	 Lev	Gudkov,	 director	 of	 the	 Levada	Centre,	 said	 he	 believed	Russia	
was	 on	 the	 verge	 of	 carrying	 out	 pogroms.	 Глава „Левада-Центра”: Россия находится 
в предпогромном состоянии – вопрос лишь, где рванет,	Kavkaz-uzel,	 25.10.2013.	http://
www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/232217/
169	 Отделение Чечни и Северный Кавказ, Levada.ru,	1.07.2013.	http://www.levada.ru/01-07-
2013/otdelenie-chechni-i-severnyi-kavkaz
170	 Statement	by	the	President	of	Russia…,	op. cit.
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use	them	as	an	opportunity	to	demonstrate	its	potential	and	ability	to	desta-
bilise	the	situation	(despite	the	unprecedented	security	measures	undertaken	
by	Moscow).	In	view	of	Dokku	Umarov’s	statement	of	3	July	2013,	in	which	he	
called	on	militants	to	disrupt	the	Olympics,	it	cannot	be	ruled	out	that	attacks	
will	be	carried	out	or	attempted	before	or	during	the	Games	(especially	as	the	
militants	have	not	shown	any	activity	beyond	their	republics	since	early	2011,	
which	might	 suggest	 that	 they	 have	 been	 ‘gathering	 strength’	 ahead	 of	 the	
Olympics).	Attacks	could	occur	both	in	Sochi	or	the	surrounding	area,	and	in	
other	places,	and	the	closer	to	the	Olympic	city,	the	smaller	their	scale	would	
need	to	be;	in	Sochi	or	in	Krasnaya	Polyana	even	a	small	terror	attack	without	
casualties	would	guarantee	worldwide	publicity	and	panic	among	participants	
at	the	Olympics,	while	in	Rostov-on-Don	or	Moscow	a	similar	effect	could	only	
be	achieved	with	a	dramatic	attack	with	hundreds	of	victims	(the	attack	on	
a	bus	in	Volgograd	in	October	2013	does	not	seem	to	follow	the	logic	of	Umarov’s	
statement).	But	it	is	also	possible	that	the	Emirate	no	longer	has	the	real	power	
and	destructive	potential	it	certainly	had	in	2009–2011;	and	the	speculations	
about	Moscow’s	influence	on	the	armed	underground	are	impossible	to	verify.
It	should	be	expected	that	once	the	Olympics	are	over,	the	Emirate	will	resume	
the	tactics	it	employed	from	2011	to	2013,	i.e.	combining	attacks	on	representa-
tives	of	the	security	forces	and	state	bodies	in	the	Caucasus	with	‘work	at	the	
foundations’,	 i.e.	promoting	 its	 ideas	among	children	and	young	people,	 tak-
ing	over	control	of	mosques	through	friendly	mullahs,	and	combating	‘pagan’	
customs	and	secular	lifestyles	(in	mid-October	2013,	the	prosecution	authori-
ties	closed	down	a	kindergarten	in	Makhachkala	that	was	operating	without	
licence	under	the	name	“Fatimka”	and	was	probably	run	by	Salafis171).
The	Chechen	leader	ramzan Kadyrov	will	most	likely	take	no	action	ahead	
of	the	Olympics,	but	it	is	to	be	expected	that	once	the	Games	are	over,	he	will	
resume	his	attempts	at	extending	his	influence	at	least	as	far	as	to	Ingushetia.	
It	would	only	be	possible	to	stop	him	if	Moscow	made	a	concerted	effort	at	in-
tervention.	This	would	nonetheless	be	difficult	to	imagine	in	the	present	cir-
cumstances	(eliminating	Kadyrov	would	entail	a	brutal	war	over	who	should	
succeed	him,	and	possibly	even	a	new	Russian-Chechen	war).
In	 the	run-up	 to	 the	Olympics,	Moscow (the federal government of rus-
sia) will	focus	on	ensuring	the	security	of	the	Games,	and	subsequently	will	
171	 В Махачкале прокуратура закрыла детский сад, работавший без лицензии, Kavkaz-uzel,	
13.10.2013.	http://www.kavkaz-uzel.ru/articles/231601/
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probably	continue	to	implement	the	“Medvedev-Putin”	strategy	of	transfer-
ring	large	sums	of	money	to	the	region	and	making	scattered	investments	in	
the	economies	of	the	Caucasus	republics,	as	the	adoption	of	the	new	three-
year	“South	of	Russia”	programme	appears	to	suggest.	An	approach	of	 this	
kind	will	not	solve	the	problems	faced	by	the	Caucasus	nor	will	it	guarantee	
success	in	the	fight	against	the	militants.	It	will,	however,	make	it	easier	for	
Moscow	to	pursue	a	“divide	and	rule”	policy	by	reinforcing	divisions	within	
the	region	(the	rivalry	of	the	local	clans	over	access	to	funds	from	the	central	
budget).	 This	 strategy	 requires	money,	 but	 force-based	methods	 (the	 “first	
Putin”	strategy	as	a	potential	alternative	 to	 the	current	approach)	are	also	
very	costly	as	 they	 involve	keeping	a	 large	military	presence	 in	 the	region	
and	will	in	addition	provoke	stronger	resistance	and	generate	more	emigra-
tion	from	the	region.
In	a	less	probable	scenario,	Moscow	may	attempt	to	ultimately	quash	the	re-
bellion	after	the	Olympics	and	at	the	same	time	discipline	Ramzan	Kadyrov.	
The	deployment	of	large	numbers	of	troops	in	Dagestan	in	the	spring	of	2012,	
already	mentioned	in	this	paper,	may	suggest	that	this	is	indeed	a	possible	sce-
nario.	However,	this	variant	would	involve	the	risk	of	extreme	destabilisation	
in	 the	region	 (one	of	 the	possibilities	being	 that	Kadyrov	could	 turn	against	
Russia	in	rebellion),	and	the	potential	success	could	turn	out	to	be	short-lived	
as	a	Salafi	Islamic	revolution	could	break	out	afterwards	(and	such	a	revolu-
tion	is	rather	unlikely	at	this	moment	because	many	Salafis	do	not	want	to	be	
associated	with	the	militants,	in	the	event	of	a	confrontation	with	the	Emir-
ate,	which	the	Caucasus	Muslims	could	perceive	as	an	attack	on	their	religion,	
it	could	become	a	realistic	possibility).	Nevertheless,	it	is	indeed	possible	that	
Moscow	will	 try	 to	 curb	 Kadyrov’s	 lawlessness	 outside	 the	 Caucasus	 (espe-
cially	the	operations	of	his	bodyguard	in	central	Russia,	undertaken	without	
Moscow’s	consent).
Irrespective	of	the	variant	which	is	implemented,	Moscow	may	further	isolate	
the	region	from	the	rest	of	the	country	by	tightening	the	rules	on	residency	
registrations	in	order	to	make	it	more	difficult	for	people	from	the	Caucasus	to	
move	to	the	other	Federation	subjects.	This	could	be	done	e.g.	by	stepping	up	
checks	at	the	external	borders	of	the	North	Caucasus	Federal	District.
The regional elites in	the	North	Caucasus	will	seek	to	preserve	the	existing	
symbiosis	–	which	is	a	de facto	parasitic	relationship	–	between	themselves	and	
the	federal	centre,	because	they	find	such	an	arrangement	convenient—in	re-
turn	for	loyalty	and	for	“keeping	order”	within	their	republics,	they	receive	not	
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only	guaranteed	financial	benefits	from	Moscow,	but	also	security.	It	should	be	
expected,	however,	 that,	 following	 the	Olympics,	Moscow	will	become	more	
determined	in	its	efforts	to	curb	the	most	glaring	cases	of	abuse	of	power	and	
corruption.
In	 the	 foreseeable	 future	neither	azerbaijan nor georgia will	play	a	major	
role	in	the	Caucasus.	However,	Abkhazia	may	play	such	a	role	on	a	small	scale	
for	 the	North	West	Caucasus	as	a	centre	 integrating	 the	Circassian	national	
movements.	Its	status	will	be	helpful	in	this	–	while	it	has	been	recognised	by	
only	a	handful	of	states,	its	position,	even	as	part	of	Georgia,	is	formally	higher	
than	that	of	the	Circassian	republics	of	the	Russian	Federation.	Sukhumi	can	
for	 instance	 organise	 larger-scale	 resettlement	 programmes	 for	 Circassians	
from	the	Middle	East	(who	can	freely	travel	to	Russia	once	they	have	Abkhaz-
ian	passports).
The	 international	 situation	 may	 also	 influence	 developments	 in	 the	 North	
Caucasus	and	relations	between	Moscow	and	the	region.	Should	the	crisis	over	
Iran	deteriorate	or	war	break	out	again	between	Azerbaijan	and	Armenia	over	
Nagorno-Karabakh,	this	would	lead	to	Russia	stepping	up	its	presence,	includ-
ing	a	military	presence,	in	the	South	Caucasus.	In	this	case	Moscow	would	be	
more	likely	to	resort	to	forceful	methods	again	or	at	least	to	deploy	major	police	
and	military	forces	in	the	North	Caucasus	and	take	over	certain	tasks	from	the	
local	security	forces,	such	as:	protecting	the	internal	borders	(between	the	re-
publics),	manning	road	checkpoints	and	controlling	strategic	infrastructure.	
Any	crisis	 in	Russian-Georgian	relations	may	also	 lead	to	a	militarisation	of	
the	region.
*	*	*
On	25	October	2013	the	Russian	State	Duma	adopted	draft	amendments	to	the	
Criminal	Code	and	the	anti-terror	laws	(Vladimir	Putin	signed	the	document	
on	3	November).	Under	the	new	rules,	not	only	the	perpetrators	of	terror	acts	
will	 be	 financially	 liable	 for	 their	 consequences,	 but	 also	members	 of	 their	
families	and	broadly	understood	“close	persons”,	unless	 they	can	prove	 that	
their	assets	were	not	gained	through	terror	activities.	Despite	that	caveat,	the	
essence	of	the	amendment	brings	the	Russian	legislation	closer	to	the	practice	
found	in	the	North	Caucasus	and	especially	in	Chechnya	wherein	houses	be-
longing	to	the	families	of	militants	are	demolished	in	order	to	dissuade	them	
from	 participating	 in	 the	 armed	 underground.	 The	 adoption	 of	 the	 amend-
ment	shows	that	instead	of	trying	to	incorporate	the	North	Caucasus	into	the	
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Russian	legal,	economic	and	social	space,	Moscow	itself	is	adopting	some	of	the	
principles	and	rules	prevailing	in	the	Caucasus	(in	this	case,	elements	of	col-
lective	responsibility).	This	stems	from	the	federal	leadership’s	helplessness	in	
the	face	of	the	problems	posed	by	the	region	and	is	a	way	to	shirk	off	some	of	
the	responsibility	for	the	fight	against	the	insurgency.
The author would like to thank Ewa Fischer and Katarzyna Jarzyńska 
for their assistance.
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Appendix 1
Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground  
in the north Caucasus in the years 2010-2012, broken down by republic
victims of acts of terrorism and clashes 
with the armed underground in the 
North caucasus in the years 2010-2012
2010 2011 2012
Dagestan
Killed 378 413 405
Wounded 307 411 290
Chechnya
Killed 127 95 82
Wounded 123 106 92
Ingushetia
Killed 134 70 84
Wounded 192 38 83
North	Ossetia
Killed 24 4 7
Wounded 171 10 7
Kabardino-Balkaria
Killed 79 129 107
Wounded 82 44 49
Karachay-Cherkessia
Killed 2 22 5
Wounded 2 12 2
Stavropol	Krai
Killed 10 17 10
Wounded 79 7 2
Total North caucasus
Killed 754 750 700
Wounded 956 628 525
Total (killed and wounded) 1,710 1,378 1,225
Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Kavkaz-uzel.ru	website.
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Appendix 2
Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground  
in the north Caucasus in the years 2010-2012, in broken down by category
Losses	of	siloviki,	mili-
tants	and	civilians
2010
Total	killed	
and	wounded
As	%	of	total	
victims
2011
Total	killed	
and	wounded
As	%	of	total	
victims
2012
Total	killed	
and	wounded
As	%	of	total	
victims
Civilians
Killed 180
669		
(39.12%)
177
342
(24.82%)
89
216
(17.63%)
Wounded 489 165 127
Functionaries	
of	security	
forces
(siloviki)
Killed 225
692		
(40.47%)
190
652
(47.31%)
211
600
(48.98%)
Wounded 467 462 389
Militants
Killed 349
349		
(20.41%)
384
384
(27.87%)
409
409
(33.39%)
Wounded 254 370 14
Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Kavkaz-uzel.ru	website.
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Appendix 3
Victims of acts of terrorism and clashes with the armed underground  
in the north Caucasus in 2013
victims of acts of terrorism 
and clashes with the armed 
underground in the North 
caucasus in 2013
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX
Dagestan
Killed 10 31 26 22 38 26 23 no	data 32
Wounded 14 12 15 13 91 17 8 no	data 26
Chechnya
Killed 14 0 6 3 1 2 4 no	data 4
Wounded 8 2 7 6 1 15 7 no	data 8
Ingushetia
Killed 0 5 7 8 3 0 2 no	data 2
Wounded 0 13 1 14 8 6 2 no	data 4
North	Ossetia
Killed 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Wounded 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Kabardino-Balkaria
Killed 12 1 7 1 3 9 13 no	data 6
Wounded 1 1 0 0 2 4 1 no	data 0
Karachay-Cherkessia
Killed 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Wounded 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 no	data 0
Stavropol	Krai
Killed 0 0 0 0 0 2 4 no	data 0
Wounded 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 no	data 0
Total North caucasus
Killed 39 37 47 34 45 39 46 42 44
Wounded 23 28 25 33 102 43 19 34 38
Total (killed and wounded) 62 65 72 67 147 82 65 76 82
Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	data	from	the	Kavkaz-uzel.ru	website.
Total	in	January	–	June	2013:
495	victims	including	241	killed	and	254	wounded.
Dagestan:	315	victims	(nearly	64%	of	the	total	number)	including	153	killed	and	162	wounded.
Chechnya:	65	victims	(more	than	13%)	including	26	killed	and	39	wounded.
Ingushetia:	65	victims	(more	than	13%)	including	23	killed	and	42	wounded.
Kabardino-Balkaria:	41	victims	(more	than	8%)	including	33	killed	and	8	wounded	(the	country	with	the	
second	largest	number	of	those	killed).
Karachay-Cherkessia:	6	victims	(more	than	1%)	including	4	killed	and	2	wounded.
Stavropol	Krai:	3	victims	(less	than	1%)	including	2	killed	and	1	wounded.
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Appendix 4
ethnic Russians in selected republics of the north Caucasus  
in the years 1989-2010
Years
Russian	
Federation	
Subjects
1989 2010
Total	
popula-
tion
Number	
of	Rus-
sians
%	of	
Rus-
sians
Total	
popula-
tion
Number	
of	Rus-
sians
%	of	
Rus-
sians
Dagestan 1,802,579 165,940 9.2% 2,910,249 104,020 3.57%
Chechnya* 1,084,433 269,130 24.82% 1,268,989 24,382 1.92%
Ingushetia** 185,996 24,641 13.25% 412,529 3,215 0.78%
North	Ossetia 632,428 189,159 29.9% 712,980 147,090 20.63%
Kabardino-
Balkaria
753,531 240,750 31.95% 859,939 193,155 22.46%
Source:	Author’s	own	calculations	based	on	the	1989	Soviet	census	and	the	2010	Russian	census.
*	In	1989	-	Chechen	part	of	the	then	Chechen-Ingush	ASSR
**	In	1989	-	Ingush	part	of	the	then	Chechen-Ingush	ASSR
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Map.	Administrative	divisions	of	the	Russian	North	Caucasus	and	Georgia
abberviations: N. O. − North Ossetia; S. O. − South Ossetia; INg. − Ingushetia
